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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
For the last few years, the concept of natural kind terms has haunted 
me, especially the location of these terms. Are the meanings of natural 
kind terms in the head or in the world? This question has been the most 
pressing one in the philosophy of mind and language. I realised that we 
cannot separate the mind from the world. I had in the beginning only a 
layman’s conception regarding mind, meaning and the world. When I 
entered the field of philosophy, inspired by my mentor Hilary Putnam, I 
found that semantic externalism is a vexing issue involving a vast area. 
The nature of meaning regarding propositional contents and natural kind 
terms gives rise to a fundamental disagreement between the two groups of 
philosophers called internalists and externalists, as I argue in Chapter 1. 
The theory of description is a reliable theory which deals with the 
descriptive sense of a proper name, whereas the causal theory of reference 
obviously offers much more significance to objective reference. The 
descriptivist thinks that the meaning of a general term consists in its 
descriptive contents, so here, the references of proper names can be 
determined by description. Descriptivism follows the idea that, in the case 
of referring to an object, a name that refers to the referred object has the 
property (relational property). 
It seems to me that Frege’s theory of reference can be found to be 
about the relation between language and the world, while his theory of 
sense is regarding the relation between language and mind. Hence we find 
that Fregeans amongst externalists (like Gareth Evans, Putnam), emphasise 
Frege’s theory of reference, while Fregeans amongst internalists (like 
Gabriel Segal, Searle) emphasise Frege’s theory of sense. So these recent 
orthodoxies, i.e. internalism and externalism, both have a Fregean root. 
There are a lot of cases where a speaker cannot know the reference-
deterring properties that descriptivists argue for. Putnam (if I am not 
wrong) is the first thinker who extends the causal theory of reference to 
proper names and to natural kind terms (though in this thought 
experiment, he does not take Kripke’s “Baptism” seriously). He claims 
that the causal theory of reference accepts the “social transmission” of the 
terms and a “causal chain” which is linked with linguistic community. The 
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elementary question for Putnam is how the user of the word would explain 
its meaning. Semantic externalism claims that the concepts important for 
our knowledge become meaningless if and only if they have no causal 
connection with the referent or the external world. 
In Chapter 2, I attempt to see how mental content makes a certain 
difference to our beliefs. Chalmer’s six puzzles indicate the necessity of 
admitting narrow content. Internalists like Segal, Searle, Fodor, and Block 
argue in favour of the concepts of non-referentiality, supervenience and 
micro-structure to establish internalism by holding the dictum that 
“meanings are in the head”. For Searle, intentionality does not depend on 
any representational background. The mental states that possess objects 
have some internalistic background. Here we can draw a parallelism 
between mental states and language in terms of mind, but not through 
language. To satisfy psychological conditions, mind inflicts intentionality 
upon language. Besides, Block’s “splitting objection” in favour of 
internalism assumes that if X (person) splits into A and B, two different 
people, then the principle of identity suggests that X is not equal to A and 
X is also not equal to B. Even A and B are not equal, as they occupy a 
distinct location at the same time. Block’s “conceptual role semantic” 
claims that without any change in narrow content, it is quite impossible to 
formulate a substantial change in the beliefs of A and B. Even Fodor 
argues that to identify supervenience, it is required to accept narrow 
contents. His intention is to show that meaning is individualistic. But 
Putnam refutes this view to suggest that every speaker who counts as fully 
competent in the use of language might be called upon to face the 
constraints of publicity. The naturalistic outlook that a human being is 
inclined towards is the seminal magnetism of externalist appeal. The 
meaning of a term is generally fixed by two things that traditional theories 
of meaning ignore. These things are the world and other people, and were 
first pointed out by Putnam. Putnamian semantic externalism makes 
explicit the meaning of a natural kind term determined by two different 
levels: “stereotype” and “division of linguistic labor”, where the nature of 
the paradigm of the terms gets its meaning in conjunction with our 
transactions with the external objects and socio-linguistic practices. 
Chapter 3 covers a crucial part of my analysis, where I look again at 
the debate, from philosophy of language to metaphysics, by scrutinising 
the scopes of different externalisms and their interrelations. My purpose 
here is to preserve the externalist thesis from the strong criticisms of 
internalists. In natural language, there is an important problem related to 
the existence of empty terms. If the externalist admits that without any 
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reference they cannot have any content, then “what will be the reference of 
‘water is wet’ in Dry Earth?” From this perspective, the internalist charges 
that “externalism is catastrophic”. So here we will find that the concept of 
the “causal chain” in externalism fails to satisfy the semantic requirement. 
The second great charge against externalism raised by internalists is the 
problem of self-knowledge and the first person authority, which are by 
nature much more authoritative and incorrigible. The primary concern is 
whether externalism leads to a claim that a person may not have first 
person authority over his or her own mental states. I have tried to respond 
to these arguments from the externalist background, mainly from 
Davidson, Burge and Bilgrami’s points of view. Davidson tries to show 
that externalism is compatible with privileged self-knowledge which tells 
us about the infallibility and incorrigibility of our mental contents. His 
sunburn example proved this. We cannot claim that mental states are out 
of mind, as causal relations make a critical difference to mental states, like 
water is causally related to H2O and “twater” is causally related to XYZ. 
Davidson holds a historical causal theory of representational content, 
according to which we cannot separate the idea of past causal interaction 
with external affairs in our constitutive meaningful use of language. He 
modifies the Wittgensteinan representational thesis to add that the content 
is individuated by causal and historical environment. Social externalist 
Tyler Burge claims that the question is not whether beliefs are in the head 
or constituted by external objects; his claim is more commonsensical, and 
talks about the location of beliefs’ contents. For him, belief states are 
located where the believers are located. It seems to me that there is a 
crucial relationship between belief content and the believer, in the sense 
that these belief contents are embedded by socio-linguistic practices. 
Besides, Bilgrami, as an externalist, offers a unified content theory, in 
which he finds unity in the narrow and wide contents in our beliefs. He 
also believes that the first person authority of an agent is not immediately 
available. It inevitably varies from agent to agent. So these are not 
concepts that have an a priori background, because our concepts are 
embodied in our social behaviours. Orthodox externalists disbelieve in 
self-knowledge for the reason that it will lead to inconsistency. 
Bilgrami’s thesis of “constraint on externalism” rules out the bifurcation 
content theory to intimate that social externalism items can well suit the 
contents that are routed through the agent’s beliefs. Even in different 
situations, where external items look for social contents, Bilgrami’s 
constraint thesis clarifies its linguistic requirement through turning these 
issues into ordinary beliefs like “water is the substance that comes out of 
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the tap”. Thus Bilgrami protects his constraint theory from the threat of 
self-knowledge; social and non-social external elements are unified with 
agents’ beliefs.  
Actually, my intention in this book, especially in Chapter 4, is to show 
how we can reformulate the relationship between internalism and 
externalism from the perspectives of semantic holism and phenomenology. 
It seems to me that every sentence has its own semantic imports, and we 
should understand these semantic imports in terms of separate semantic 
concepts that are dependent on the entire language. Semantic holism can 
make a bridge between internalism and externalism only if we accept that 
analyticity and apriority are possible in our natural language. It is a well-
known fact that semantic holism is much closer to semantic externalism, 
whereas semantic atomism is closer to semantic internalism. It seems to 
me that we can accept the concepts of apriority and analyticity to some 
extent in natural language, because there are some “one criterion words”, 
like the terms “vixens” and “bachelors” etc., and “law-cluster” concepts, 
like “atoms are indivisible”, which can be regarded as analytic 
propositions and are regarded as true because they are accepted as true. 
Bilgrami’s new theory of externalism emphasises that it is possible for 
two agents to share a particular concept in their locality of contents, even 
if they do not share the same concept on the “meaning theoretical” level. 
He strongly believes that no two agents can have the same concepts at the 
“meaning theoretical” level, as concepts are very fine grained, so they are 
hardly ever shared. Bilgrami mainly refutes the bifurcation theory of 
content for two different reasons. The first commonsensical reason is that 
it is very unintuitive to say “I always have a thought”. The second is that a 
thought with wide content is very often the kind of thought that one cannot 
know that one is having, and Bilgrami does not think that we should ever 
say that there is failure of self-knowledge unless there is some 
psychological evidence for it, such as self-deception or some similar 
Freudian type - one should not deny self-knowledge on the basis of 
theories of reference of linguistic terms. In other words, we may get to 
know more astronomy if we discover that the morning star is the evening 
star, or that water is H2O, but we do not get to know our own minds 
better). 
Most philosophers (externalists) try to consider how intentionality is 
submerged into the world, though there are some philosophers, whom we 
call internalists, who think that the world is submerged into intentionality. 
Here my concern is to show the mind-world relationship from Heidegger’s 
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point of view. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein makes a linkage between 
the world and Being. We cannot separate Being (mineness) from this 
mundane world. The conception of Dasein omits the division between the 
subject-object dichotomies. The mineness or ownness of Dasein discloses 
that Dasein does not refer to an isolated world, as it is always surrounded 
with the public world. To refute the ontic sense of Dasein, Heidegger 
argues that Dasein has some ontological existential sense that refers to the 
inseparability of man and world. Similarly, we cannot separate the mind 
from the world. Meaning and mind are externally embedded and this 
hooks a referential directness into the objective world. 
My reformed externalism, which I call internalistic-externalism, 
considers language a “social phenomenon” of inter-subjective communication, 
which also tries to make a connection between internalism and externalism. 
My internalistic-externalism believes that intrinsic contents do not rest on 
a third person’s beliefs, as here, the agent is the main authority on his/her 
beliefs or the contents of these beliefs. The agent has some immediate 
access to the content that a third person can only infer, like in the case of 
“toothache”. This conception of authoritative self-knowledge may incline 
toward solipsism or be close to acceptance of a kind of private language, 
but, like Wittgenstein, I reject any kind of private language or solipsism. It 
seems interesting to me to believe that intrinsic experiences get their 
meanings when they are used in public language, and we can also think 
about these through natural language. An incorrigible private experience 
finds its external expression when we attempt to see its meaning from our 
publicly sharable language viz., natural language.  
But my theory is distinct from Bilgrami’s “unified theory of content” 
in the sense that, for me, the contents are by nature unified, but division is 
created because of natural language. It seems to me that there are 
individualistic minds, but these do not work privately, since they 
participate in our natural language. I will argue that analytic philosophy 
and continental philosophy (phenomenology) can meet to make a link 
between the mind and the world in regards to the theory of meaning, 
language and phenomenal Dasein or “being-in-the-world”. My argument 
is that there is no private mind, as minds are related with the linguistic 
world, and natural language is the ground on which minds meet. There is 
no mind in our linguistic community that can be apart from the 
environment. So meaning is not something which is only external; the 
meaning of a term can be determined partly because of the contribution of 
the mind and obviously partly because of the contribution of the world. 
There is a symmetrical way of showing the co-relation of mind and world. 

CHAPTER ONE 
THE INTERNALISM-EXTERNALISM DEBATE  
IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY  
OF LANGUAGE AND MIND         
 
 
 
“Humans are distinguished from other animals by their power of meaning-
end-reasoning.” 
—David Papineau 
Introduction 
In this chapter, my aim is to build up the groundwork of the theory of 
meaning and mind. Here I will emphasise how the theory of description 
and the causal theory of reference can separately develop their points of 
view, viz. mentalese individualism and socio-linguistic phenomenon. 
Descriptivism focuses on the general terms that consist of descriptive 
content and lead to the mode of presentation of reference through sense. 
Meanwhile, the causal theory of reference refutes descriptivism to ensure 
that there is a causal chain of reference between words and objects that 
helps us to identify an agent’s thought and its relation with the external 
environment. The debate between internalism and externalism is based on 
two traditional controversial theses: internalism holds that mental contents 
are semantic contents and they are in our minds or heads, whereas 
externalism says that contents are actually linguistic references and they 
exist in the external world. The externalist slogan is that “the meanings 
ain’t in the head”, whereas internalists like Segal, Searle, Block and Fodor 
have argued in favour of internalism by claiming that “meanings are in the 
head or brain”. Internalists’ arguments feature in the explanation of the 
mentalese standpoint, e.g. the intentionality, self-referentiality and 
supervenience hypotheses. On the other hand, externalists (especially 
Hilary Putnam) try to provide a response to critics with a background of 
natural kind externalism (physical externalism) which is committed to the 
theory of casual constraint of reference. My focus in this chapter is to 
revisit the debate between externalism and internalism and find out its 
importance in the philosophy of mind and language.  
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(1.1) Contemporary Debate: Internalism versus 
Externalism 
In tracing back to the internalism versus externalism debate, we find 
that the onset of the distinction between internalism and externalism dates 
back to the Cartesian legacy. As intended by Descartes, the idea of the 
“self-containedness thesis” is that the mind is self-contained with respect 
to the world, i.e. what is truly mental or internal to the subject can exist 
without the existence of anybody else. Even the essence of the mentalistic 
character of an individual mind is capable of distinguishing itself from any 
material objects. The idea of external or internal and the dualistic idea 
about body and mind emerge from the Cartesian view. We can see this 
debate from two alternative perspectives: metaphysical and linguistic. 
Metaphysically, we can explain this debate about the existence and 
identity conditions of mental content. When it comes to finding the 
location of mental content, philosophers are divided into two groups. The 
fundamental concern between these two groups that escorts their 
disagreement is the relationship between the mind and the world. 
Internalists try to defend the thesis that the content of the mind is 
essentially independent of the external world, while externalists claim that 
there is a causal relationship between mental content and the non-mental 
world. So the location of the content is the core of the metaphysical debate 
regarding internalism and externalism, in the sense that internalism 
believes that mental properties are intrinsic only if they are preserved 
across internal replicas, whereas externalism is opposed to this thinking. 
For externalists, mental properties are dependent on the physical or social 
environment. In a word, for internalists, mental contents are located in 
one’s head, whereas externalists’ claim is that they are located in the 
world. 
In his writings, Descartes tries to give some elementary replies, which 
conceptually stand on epistemology and ontology. The modern philosophy 
of mind, beginning with Descartes, and its historical journey pave a 
dominant way of thinking by looking again at the mind-body problem and 
also challenging the two predominant radical opinions, viz. monism and 
materialism. Mark Rowlands claims: 
The Cartesian conception is not just a single view of the mind; it is an 
array of interwoven views, like the strands of a rope, each lending support 
to the others, and each being supported by the others. The strength of the 
Cartesian picture lies not merely in the strength of the individual theses 
that make it up but also, and perhaps even more importantly, in the way 
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these strands bind together to yield a sweeping and comprehensive vision 
of the nature of human beings.1  
We know that Descartes’ substance dualism provides for a causal 
interaction between mind and body, which are by nature two different 
substances, and his motivation by science and reason privilege him to 
think that there is a distinctive place of mind within a metaphysical 
framework. Descartes’ doctrine (Cartesian Dualism) mingles with 
epistemology and ontology. From the perspective of ontology, he claims 
that the existence of the mind does not depend on the existence of the 
body and vice versa. Their interrelated relationship can be regarded as 
external and contingent. Besides this, from the realm of epistemology, he 
also claims that we can know and be aware of our own minds, but 
knowing others’ minds is not dependent on first person authority or 
intuition. In brief, we can be securely aware of our own minds. For 
Descartes, physical things such as the body have spatio-temporal 
locations. Actually, extension is the essential part of the body, whereas 
minds are essentially thinking things, so we can call them immaterial. 
Here one can ask: “Is man an amalgam of two things – mind and 
body?” Descartes’ answer would be “yes”! There is a keen interaction 
between mind and body, but in principle, they could be separated. For 
Descartes, a body is not only considered heavy, coloured and hard, but can 
be extended in length, have depth, etc., whereas mind, as a non-physical 
substance, is an amalgam of thought and extended substance through 
reason. Dualism not only teaches us that these two different sets of 
properties encompass the dichotomy between the mental and the physical, 
but focuses on the notions of autonomy, exclusion, privilege etc. The first 
set of properties, which we call “mental properties”, also includes the 
features of thought, rationality, consciousness, subjectivity, self-
knowledge etc. The second set of properties deals with some of the 
mundane physical properties like shape, size, weight, extension etc. This 
autonomy is what externalism questions, which I will focus on later. An 
agent can bear both these sets of properties, emphasising the mind-body 
problem by raising some puzzling situations. We can claim that mind and 
matter are heterogeneous substances, in this sense, but for me it sounds 
problematic. 
However, the problem of Descartes’ dualism inflates the question 
about “interactionism” between the physical and the mental properties. 
Rowlands says:  
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The problem of Descartes’s dualism is explaining how this interaction 
between mental and physical takes place. The general problem is that 
Descartes makes the mental and the physical so different that they don’t 
seem to share the necessary properties to make this sort of interaction 
intelligible.2  
This effect infringes on the first law of thermodynamics, as it accepts 
that an interaction between physical and non-physical is possible. This is a 
significant charge against Descartes’ dualism. “Interactionism” is not only 
a metaphysical issue. It has a broad epistemological perspective. In 
Discourse on Method, Descartes considers that to get rid of the imperfection 
of knowledge, it is required that we must doubt from the very beginning. 
But permanent scepticism cannot be a reliable method of sincere inquiry. 
From this fact we can prove that, in spite of denying everything, the denier 
remains. So the indubitable, fundamental truth of Descartes’ philosophy is 
“Cogito ergo sum” or “I think, therefore I am”. 
There is a well-proven opinion that consciousness or self (I) is independent 
in its existence. Self has continuous and identical existence, as it has 
certain successive modes of thought. One can ask: can we know for certain 
that material objects are affecting our senses, that it is not that we are 
producing the material objects, or the existence of these material objects 
depends on our perception? McCulloch says:  
We have perceptual experiences and form beliefs which we take to be 
generally reliable guides to a material environment which we inhabit. That 
is, we take ourselves to know things about the material world, where 
knowing things about is a specific relation between minded things and 
their world.3  
We find two types of claims to understanding the mental phenomena: 
the location claim and the position claim. The location claim emphasises 
that there is a keen token identity between mental entities and the subject’s 
skin. It actually says that mental events are located inside the skin of the 
subject that possesses them. The location claim cannot be regarded as a 
claim about properties; rather, it is exclusively a claim about particulars. 
Meanwhile, the position claim insists on the idea that the mental properties 
of the subject do not depend on the external properties of the subject, as 
mental properties are intuitive and non-relational in nature. So the 
independence of mental properties can be explained by the notion of 
individuation, which expresses an externalist approach to the subject of the 
properties.  
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There is epistemic containment within a subject that calls for the 
argument for certainty in Cartesian Dualism. It goes like this: 
Premise 1. I can doubt that my body exists.  
Premise 2. I can’t doubt that I am a thinking being.  
Premise 3. So, I am distinct from my body or I, as a thinking being, am 
not my body.  
 
The idea of certainty cannot work with Descartes’ argument for 
dualism, because the argument for certainty can mislead the basis of the 
physical world, but the strong approach of the mind has an authority 
nevertheless deluded by the question of certainty. The question of 
certainty is not constructed from dualism. It stems from the “self-
containedness thesis” and also the fact that our mental states are self-
presenting. We are not certain about our knowledge of the external world, 
as it can be falsified, but knowing one’s own mind has a special content, 
viz. first person authority, takes a better approach to knowing one’s own 
mind rather than knowing the external world. The content of infallibility is 
associated with the concept of knowing your own mind. If you do not 
carry out any self-deception, then your mental state will provide you with 
incorrigible knowledge about the inner world. Descartes’ opinion was a 
little less extreme than the present view about first person authority or 
self-knowledge, but we can surely claim that the idea of incorrigible 
knowledge of our own mental state leads to self-intimating content, or it 
would be better to say that your own mind is transparently available to 
yourself, and you are the only person who can infallibly think that you 
know things about “x or y”.  
(1.2) The Descriptivism of Frege and Russell 
Frege has distinguished between the study of word-world relations 
(theory of reference) and the study of word-meaning relations (theory of 
sense). However, he wants to see them as working together in a fully 
integrated theory of language. Frege takes sense as the mode of 
presentation of the reference. In the case of proper names, and also 
definite descriptions, Frege considers these singular terms to designate 
their references not directly, but indirectly, i.e. via sense. For him, 
linguistic expressions have both sense and reference. He attempts to 
dissolve the concept of proper names into singular terms. Thus, the class 
of singular terms seems to be ever swelling. Actually, proper names, 
singular pronouns, demonstratives, definite descriptions, and indefinite 
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descriptions are all regarded as “singular terms”. Frege believes that the 
semantic value of a word depends on the particular object that it stands 
for. In his famous paper “On Sense and Reference”, Frege claims: 
Every declarative sentence concerned with the reference of its words is 
therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its reference, if it has one, 
is either the True or the False.4  
Frege also believes that for traditional philosophers, the conception of 
identity relation is based on the logical law of identity. We may clarify this 
by arguing that everything is principally identical with itself. But Frege 
assumes that it is not the case that all identity relations are of the form “A 
is A” or “Red is red”. We may even find some identity statements of the 
form “A is B” or “All mothers are women” etc. Now what is curious is 
that Frege draws a puzzling picture from a different point of view. Here 
we will find a difference in cognitive values, because if we consider it a 
relationship between objects, then we will not find any kind of cognitive 
difference between two identical sentences. But one cannot deny this kind 
of difference in our language. To get some ideas of these difficulties, let us 
look closely at these problems. Here, two different cases have been noted: 
a) The morning star is the morning star. 
b) The morning star is the evening star.  
Both “morning star” and “evening star” designate the same planet 
(Venus) as their reference. So we may find that it is impossible to make a 
distinction between these two sentences through the referential theory of 
meaning. We need to see its sense, as here the sense is something 
different. There is no doubt that the notion of sense is defined as a “mode 
of presentation” of reference. Let us now consider the sense of “morning 
star” in this way: a star which obviously rises in the “morning sky”; 
similarly, the sense of the term “evening star” would be “a star which rises 
in the evening sky”. Frege cautions us, saying that every term that carries 
sense has also a reference that can go wrong. Even bearer-less names, 
numbers and abstract entities have no references at all. We find a new 
dimension in his well-known work “Logic”,5 where Frege introduces the 
concept of “mock proper names” which have no designation. For instance, 
proper names like “Scylla has six heads” or fictitious characters like “Falu 
Da” in Satyajit Roy’s detective stories are to be regarded “mock proper 
names”. Here it is relevant to mention that Frege actually believes in the 
context principle, which says that the sense of a term can be understood in 
terms of the context of the sentence in which the term is used. Frege 
believes that the term always contributes to the determination of the sense 
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of a sentence in which it is used. He also thinks that a proper thought can 
only be expressed by an assertoric sentence. Here it must be noted that an 
assertoric sentence can be a proper assertion if and only if it expresses a 
proper thought.  
Frege believes that there is a third kind of sentence that is neither true 
nor false, but logic does not deal with it. Let us see how a sentence might 
fail to be either true or false. Suppose I say “All of Lalan’s sons are 
asleep”. Now, if all the sons of Lalan were really asleep, then this sentence 
would be true. If not all of them are asleep the sentence would be false. 
But in this case, Lalan has no sons at all; can we say that the sentence is 
true? The answer would be definitely not. Can we claim that the sentence 
is false? The answer would be definitely not. So, we see that in such a 
situation there is no reference to the expression “the sons of Lalan”, so the 
sentence fails to have a truth value. We may call such a sentence an 
expression without thought. Frege says: 
Names that fail to fulfil the usual role of a proper name, which is to name 
something, may be called mock proper names.6  
One may argue that Frege believes in proper names that have sense, 
though though they have no reference. He thinks that some proper names 
have fictitious sense. R.M. Harnish7 tries to clarify this thought from three 
different perspectives. Let me discuss these one by one: 
a) Fictitious Sense from an Idealistic Interpretation:  
Here, fictitious proper names belong to the realm of ideas. They have 
no direct relationship with a sentence about physical objects rather than 
about the world of ideas. We can even try to interpret our sentences in 
such a way that they would be mere ideas. Frege tends to use such 
idealistic ideas in his logic, though he had a firm belief that sense is 
objective and by its nature cannot belong to the realm of mere ideas.  
b) Not True or False: 
Frege believes that “instead of ‘fiction’ we could speak of ‘mock 
thought’ (Scheingedanken). Thus, if the sentence of an assertoric type is 
not true, it is either false or fictitious, and it will generally be the latter if it 
contains a mock proper name”.8 But we need to confirm that the “mock 
proper name” is not devoid of sense. Like a genuine proper name, it does 
not express any thought which is either true or false.  
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c) Lack of Seriousness: 
Frege had a firm belief that logic does not deal with any kind of mock 
thought. We may have these thoughts in language and fictions, but we 
cannot take fiction seriously the way we take logic seriously. In the movie 
“2012”, a writer shows that the world is going to be destroyed in 2012, but 
we do not take it seriously, whereas we would give the same issue much 
more value or take it more seriously if it were to be raised by scientists. I 
have clarified this idea elsewhere9 that “… in fictions, though names are 
used there, they are not used in order to genuinely refer to something. It is 
as though we are playing a game as if referring”. 
It would be very relevant to ask: what would happen to fiction about 
historical characters, like dramas about Julius Caesar or Chandragupta 
Mourya? Frege replies: 
Even the proper names in the drama, though they correspond to names of 
historical persons, are mock proper names; they are not meant to be taken 
seriously in the work.10 
The word “mock” is suggestive. It means “as if” a proper name, or a 
term which seems to function like a proper name but actually does not. It 
seems to me that Frege is no longer taking mock proper names as proper 
names without reference, because “Caesar”, in a drama, is definitely a 
mock proper name, and yet it refers to the great Roman Emperor. We may 
finally consider that Frege is actually replacing “not to be taken seriously” 
by “not being used to refer to”. What I want to say here is that in fiction, 
though names are used, they are not used in order to genuinely refer to 
something. It is as though we are playing a game of “as if” referring or 
referring to something that sounds like pretending. 
Besides, Bertrand Russell tries to criticise the Fregean notion of sense 
and bearer-less names, including the concept of “semantic value”, in his 
well-known “Theory of Description”. F.P. Ramsey considers Russell’s 
theory of description a paradigm case of philosophy. Russell has two 
different views about the conception of description. In his Principia 
Mathematica, he first states that “by a ‘description’ we mean a phrase of 
the form ‘the so and so’ or some equivalent form”. But two years later, in 
his famous article “On Denoting” (1913), Russell has modified his 
thinking to mention that a description may be of two sorts, definite or 
indefinite. An indefinite description is a phrase of the form “a so and so” 
and a definite description is a phrase of the form “the so and so”. Russell’s 
main purpose is to make a distinction between names and definite 
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descriptions. He uses an example to establish his thought: “Scott is the 
author of ‘Waverley’.” Obviously, here “Scott” is a name and “the author 
of ‘Waverley’” is a definite description. But in the case of abstract entities 
or bearer-less names, like “unicorn” or “round square”, Russell believes 
that these are merely proper names with no designation. He also tries to 
make a distinction between a definite description and an indefinite 
description of “uniqueness”. An example of definite description may be as 
follows: “The present president of India is a man.” Now, an example of 
indefinite description is as follows: “I met a girl on the way to temple.” He 
also suggests that we can say “I met a ghost on my way to temple”. 
Though this sentence is meaningful, the problem is that it has no 
constituent, therefore we can regard it as false. 
Russell thinks that definite descriptions are incomplete symbols which 
can be used in the context of a sentence. Here, Russell attempts to avoid 
the problem of identifying definite descriptions in terms of any proper 
names; therefore, their semantic value does not depend on the objects 
which they stand for. He also offers a way of paraphrasing the standard 
type of whole sentence by breaking it up into three different parts which 
are derived from the main. He also cautions us that only a genuine proper 
name can turn out to be a demonstrative expression, such as “this” and 
“that”. We can express the main sentence “Scott is the author of 
‘Waverley’” as follows: 
a) At least one person authored Waverley. 
b) At most one person authored Waverley. 
c) The person who authored Waverley was Scott. 
Actually, the original proposition refers to the name, but analysis 
shows that this operation is descriptive. Even in the case of the sentence 
“The present king of France is bald”, we will find that the object that is 
referred to by the descriptive phrase does not exist. It would be better to 
suggest that the sentence should be treated as false rather than lacking in 
truth value. Ayer writes:  
Russell calls these purely demonstrative signs logically proper names and 
he takes it to be characteristic of a logically proper name that its 
significant use guarantees the existence of the object which it is intended 
to denote. Since the only signs which satisfy this condition are, in his 
view, those which refer to present feelings or sense-data, his philosophy of 
logic is tied at this point to his theory of knowledge.11  
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Here, I would like to point out the reason why I have discussed Frege 
and Russell’s descriptivism as preliminary platforms from which the 
debate between internalism and externalism was initiated. It is difficult to 
decide whether Frege was an internalist or an externalist. It seems to me 
that Frege’s theory of reference is about the relationship between language 
and the world, while his theory of sense is closer to the relationship 
between language and mind. As an internalist, Searle claims:  
Both the Fregean and the present account of meaning are internalist in the 
sense that it is in virtue of some mental state in the head of a speaker and 
hearer – the mental state of grasping an abstract entity or simply having a 
certain intentional content – that speaker and hearer can understand 
linguistic references.12  
But Putnam considers Frege an externalist. In his paper “Meaning and 
Reference”, he states: 
Frege, however, rebelled against this “psychologism.” Feeling that 
meanings are public property - that the same meaning can be “grasped” by 
more than one person and by persons at different times – he identified 
concepts (and hence “intensions” or meanings) with abstract entities rather 
than mental entities.13 
 At present, Putnam still believes that Frege is an externalist, as he 
says:  
I do not believe I have ever called him (Frege) an “internalist”, What I said 
in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning”’ is not that he thought that meanings 
(Sinne, in his terminology) are internalistically identified, but that he 
thought that grasping a meaning was a mental state in the traditional 
internalists sense, and that too is a mistaken form of internalism. However, 
I am not a professional Frege scholar and I could be wrong. Today, some 
philosophers are reading all sorts of “up to date” doctrines into Frege. 
Perhaps they are right, but I am not yet convinced. My evidence for my 
reading of Frege as holding that grasping concepts is a mental state in the 
traditional sense is that he said that “concepts are transparent to reason and 
reason's nearest kin” [I quote from memory]. Obviously, if externalism is 
right, the identity conditions for the concept water are not “transparent to 
reason.”14 
 I agree with Putnam that Frege’s theory of meaning has an externalist 
perspective. But it sounds interesting to me that Frege can also be regarded 
as an internalist when it comes to his descriptivism. Frege’s descriptivism 
tells us that one can think about an object without having any constitutive 
relationship to the object. This thesis opens up space for empty terms. 
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(1.3) Putnam and Kripke’s Theses on Reference 
We find refutations of descriptivism in Putnam and Kripke’s thoughts 
regarding the meaning of proper names. They refute Lockean 
descriptivism. Lockean descriptivism states that:  
(a) An ordinary natural kind term (like water) denotes not only a 
natural kind, but also a nominal kind. 
(b) It does so in a specificatory way, i.e. by a description. 
(c) The term requires association with the right list of superficial 
properties. 
 
Now one may ask: “What are natural kind terms?” and also “What are 
nominal kind terms?” Actually, a natural kind term is determined by the 
properties, the possession of which is necessary and sufficient for 
membership of the kind. A natural kind term is of course a term that 
denotes such a natural kind. The fundamental properties of water are H2O, 
or one oxygen atom bonded to two hydrogen atoms. Terms like “water” or 
“gold” are not merely singular terms, but also general terms. Meanwhile, a 
nominal kind is regarded as a property which is determined by superficial 
properties that are not necessary or sufficient for natural kind terms, for 
instance, “bachelor”. 
Saul Kripke, when he was a fellow of Harvard’s society (1963-67), 
first claimed that the reference of a proper name or a natural kind term is 
determined by causal chains. There is an initial “baptism” of water (or 
H2O) by the term “water”. Our successful use of the term “water” depends 
on causal relations between our use of the term and the event of baptism. 
Kripke argues that Russellian descriptivism is wrong in considering proper 
names to be definite descriptions. Kripke also believes that Mill is right to 
conclude that proper names are non-connotative. Kripke thinks that natural 
kind terms are like rigid designators, devoid of any connotation. Kripke’s 
theories of direct reference and rigid designators say that a singular term 
“x” is directly referential if and only if it is non-descriptive, and as a rigid 
designator, this singular term refers to the same object in all possible 
worlds.  
Though Hilary Putnam extends the causal theory of reference of proper 
names to natural kind terms, still he does not give significance to baptism, 
as Kripke proposed. Putnam actually gives more importance to the 
question of how the user of the word would explain its meaning. He thinks 
that we cannot define a natural kind term (like “tiger”) by merely 
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conjoining some “defining characteristics”, like striped, four-legged, 
carnivorous etc. This is so because a natural kind term may have some 
abnormal members. For instance, a three legged tiger is still a tiger. In My 
Intellectual Autobiography, Putnam says:  
On the view I proposed, the meaning of a “natural kind term” such as the 
word “gold” is partly fixed by the division of linguistic labor and partly by 
what I was later to call the shared “stereotype”.15  
Here we find a crucial difference between Putnam and Kripke, as we 
do not find the idea of “division of linguistic labour” in Kripke’s works. 
But the main issue of the Kripke-Putnam thesis is that the descriptive 
specification of a natural kind term does not ensure any reference 
relationship between the term and its referent. Later, the views of Putnam 
and Kripke are extended to the philosophy of mind. It is supposed that just 
as the language-world relationship is crucial in deciding what our terms 
mean, similarly, the thought-world relationship is important in identifying 
our thoughts and their objects. This thesis gives birth to externalism. 
There is a tendency to explain the meaning of sentences in terms of 
truth conditions, and truth conditions are explained in terms of the 
references of the constituent terms of a sentence and its synthetic structure. 
Logicians consider the structure of a sentence from the point of view of 
symbolic logic, and also seek a reliable logical theory which would 
explain how its truth conditions are determined. Meanwhile, the 
Grammarian emphasises the structure of natural language, seeking a 
mapping of each sentence from the prospective of “semantic 
representation” or “meaning”. We find radical progress in the structure of 
semantic theory from the period of Frege to the present. But one important 
question remains untouched. Putnam takes this point and asks: “Why is 
the theory of meaning so hard?” 
We may find a plausible answer in Putnam’s own point of view. He 
thinks that the problem lies mainly in the use of general terms, or names, if 
you like. Actually, general terms can be given meaning in different ways: 
First, the transformation of verbal forms, like “hunter”, i.e. one who 
hunts. 
Secondly, natural kind terms, like gold, tiger, lemon etc. 
 
A natural kind term is determined by the properties which are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership of the kind. 
Actually, a natural kind term has some fundamental properties. For 
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instance, water (H2O) is a natural kind term whose fundamental property is 
being composed of molecules of one oxygen atom bonded to two 
hydrogen atoms. A non-natural kind term has some superficial properties 
whose possession is not necessary or sufficient for its membership. For 
instance, “mother” is a non-natural kind term whose essential property is 
not always “giving birth to a child”. There are some “barren women” who 
become mothers by adopting a child. I will focus on this issue in more 
detail later. 
There are two different theories that help us to understand natural kind 
terms. One is called the “description theory” of natural kind terms, and the 
other the “causal theory” of natural kind terms, as I already mentioned. 
Description theory claims that to understand a natural kind term, it is 
important to grasp its sense or intention. The common way of 
understanding sense or intention is to know the descriptive conditions of 
the referred term. The sense of a name is given by a definite description, 
which is mainly associated with the name. For instance, “Wittgenstein was 
a pupil of Russell and also a teacher of Anscombe”. Here, “Wittgenstein” 
is the name and “a pupil of Russell and also a teacher of Anscombe” are 
the descriptions. Gareth Evans mentions that:  
The Description Theory of what a name denotes holds that, associated 
with each name as used by a group of speakers who believe and intend that 
they are using the name with the same denotation, is a description or set of 
descriptions cullable from their beliefs which an item has to satisfy to be 
the bearer of the name.16  
On the other hand, the causal theory of reference describes two 
different parts through which they are associated with each other: 
First, the theory of reference fixing; this tells us how a term is 
associated with its referent. 
Secondly, the theory of reference borrowing; mainly a social 
transmission of a term which has a causal chain linking it with the 
linguistic community. I shall discuss this later. 
 
According to the traditional view (description theory), the meaning of 
a natural kind term is given by specifying a conjunction of its fundamental 
properties. How can you define a tiger? The answer is so simple: “just 
conjoin all its properties.” A tiger has different properties, like striped, 
four-legged, carnivorous etc. Therefore the conjunction of all these 
properties is the actual meaning of the term “tiger”. Now “the tiger has the 
properties x, y, z” can be considered an analytic truth. Here, the predicate 
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term is contained in the subject. But Putnam challenges this point of view. 
He argues that this is a mistaken idea. The term “tiger” is not definable by 
merely conjoining some “defining characteristics”, like striped, four-
legged, carnivorous etc. One may ask why it cannot be defined in such a 
way; Putnam clarifies that a natural kind term has some abnormal 
members. A three legged tiger is still a tiger. Here we can find two 
different notions: natural kind terms and normal members. We know that a 
natural kind term has certain characteristics which indicate the “essential 
nature” of this term, which is generally shared by its normal members. So 
a normal member is an individual which is essentially associated with that 
natural kind term. We may call this “essential nature” a characteristic of 
these natural kind terms. Putnam claims:  
Language is not only used to verify and falsify and classify; it is also used 
to discuss. The existence of standardized stereotypes, and hence of 
meaning, is a necessity for discussion, not for classification.17  
Putnam also believes that sometimes, traditional theory plays an 
important role in describing “one-criterion” concepts like bachelor, vixen 
etc. Putnam suggests that we are never able to define a natural kind term 
by its “defining characteristics”, because normal members of the term (like 
lemon, yellow, peel, tart taste etc.) may not be the ones we really take to 
be normal. What we call normal may also change with time and vary 
under different circumstances. Normally, a stripeless white tiger is also a 
tiger, or a blue lemon is also considered a lemon. Actually, description 
theorists try to understand natural kind terms, for instance, a tiger, in terms 
of such properties as striped, carnivorous etc. We find that these criteria do 
not necessarily follow from the natural kind term. So the analyticity of a 
natural kind term is not possible in description theory, though we will find 
some exceptions here. So Putnam thinks that here it is important to admit a 
causal theory of natural kind terms. I will briefly clarify his view. 
According to Putnam, the modified definition of the natural kind term 
“lemon” will be as follows: 
X is a lemon = df X belongs to a natural kind whose… (as before) OR X 
belongs to a natural kind whose natural numbers used to….(as before) OR 
X belongs to a natural kind whose normal members were formally 
believed to, or are now incorrectly believed to…(as before).18  
We find that two ideas are significant in a causal theory: the idea of 
reference fixing and the idea of reference borrowing. In the causal theory 
of reference, we may identify the sense of a term through the type of its 
causal chains. It has a connection with causal networks, i.e. the social 
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transmission of a name in our linguistic community. Putnam especially 
picks up on this issue for rejecting the description theory. He argues that 
not only reference fixing, but also reference borrowing has an important 
role to play in the context of the definition of a natural kind term. Putnam 
extends the causal theory of reference of proper names to natural kind 
terms, which no one has done before. 
(1.4) Putnam on Externalism 
I would like to discuss how an important insight that we find in 
Putnam’s “Twin Earth Thought Experiment” can help us in tackling the 
main question: “Do natural kind terms have wide content?” The most 
celebrated argument for its truth derives from the thought experiment 
devised by Putnam. In his famous article “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”,19 
Putnam speaks about two presuppositions which traditional theories of 
meaning accept. In fact, Putnam challenges the presuppositions, which 
are: 
A. Knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state. 
B. The meaning of a term determines its extension. 
 
Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot accept these presuppositions 
together, and we should drop one of them. It is quite true that we cannot 
relinquish the second presupposition, as it would be a denial of our theory 
of meaning. We cannot discard the thesis that the meaning of a term 
determines its extension. Here, a relevant point still remains unsound. We 
need to take a closer look at this point. Quine wonderfully suggests that 
there is “no entity without identity”.20 If we are to admit mental states, we 
need to state their identity conditions. For this, we need to mention their 
identity conditions through their content. For instance: 
Arka believes that Ram is an avatar.  
Aban believes that Krishna is an avatar.  
We find a difference between their beliefs because the contents of their 
beliefs are different. Kim thinks:  
Content has a lot to do with what is going on in the world, outside the 
physical boundaries of the subject.21  
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There are two types of mental content which we find in the philosophy 
of mind: 
a)  Narrow content: Narrow content is the content of a particular 
belief which is determined by the individual’s internal mental properties. 
An internal property is a property that does not depend at all on the 
individual’s environment. We find this idea first in Descartes’ “self-
containedness thesis”. Later, descriptivists like Frege, Russell etc. also 
believed that names are actually descriptions in disguise. “Wittgenstein” is 
not a proper name, but a definite description like “the eccentric pupil of 
Moore and Russell and the author of Philosophical Investigations”. 
Russell does not believe that “Pegasus”, “ghost” or other such abstract 
entities have any real existence. The terms “Pegasus” and “ghost” are 
descriptive terms that are not applicable to anything in the world, rather 
than in our conceptual scheme. Actually, the meaning of a mental state is 
determined by its internal properties. This internal property is understood 
in terms of the descriptive conditions. Fodor, Segal, Searle, and Ned Block 
are supporters of this view.  
 
b) Broad or wide content: Wide content is the content of a particular 
belief which is not determined by individual intrinsic properties. Actually, 
it (the content) is determined by an individual’s relation to his/her 
environment. We may also call it relational wide content. Putnam, Burge, 
Davidson, and even later, Fodor, have become supporters of this view. I 
would like to discuss how an important insight that we find in Putnam’s 
“Twin Earth Thought Experiment” can help us in tackling the question 
“Do natural kind terms have wide contents?”  
Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot accept the mentioned 
presuppositions together, and we should drop one of them. It is quite true 
that we cannot relinquish the second proposition, as that would be a 
refutation of our theory of meaning. Now Putnam claims that if meanings 
have to determine the extension of a term, then we must admit that 
meanings are not in the head. Putnam tells us to imagine a science fiction 
scenario where we find a planet like our earth in the galaxy. Let us call it 
“twin earth”. Let us also imagine that “twin earth” and our earth are 
identical and are inhabited by persons who are, molecule for molecule, 
Doppelgangers. In a word, they are truly identical. But there is one 
difference which we may find; in Putnam’s words: 
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One of the peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the liquid called “water” is 
not H2O, but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and 
complicated. I shall abbreviate this chemical formula simply as XYZ.22 
However, all the observable properties of H2O and XYZ remain the 
same. Twin water or “twater” tastes like water and it quenches thirst like 
water. Now Putnam urges us to imagine the period of 1750, when neither 
the inhabitants of earth or of twin earth had any knowledge of chemistry 
and they were therefore unable to realise that “water” and “twater” had 
different chemical constitutions. Let us also imagine that Sree is a girl on 
our earth; she says that “water quenches thirst”. Similarly, twin-Sree, who 
is actually, molecule for molecule, identical with the Earthian Sree, also 
says that “water quenches thirst”. Putnam suggests that, although they are 
in the same psychological state, their words refer to different things. Here, 
by the term “water”, Sree means H2O, while twin-Sree means XYZ, 
because they have learnt the use of the term “water” in completely 
different ways: one by an act of ostension to H2O and the other by an act 
of ostension of XYZ. So it follows from this experiment that despite being 
in the same psychological state23 (narrow content) Sree and twin-Sree have 
used the innocent term “water”, which actually means two different 
objects. And changes in the meaning of the term (water/twater) lead to a 
consequent change in the term’s extension and also create a change in the 
speaker’s mental state. So Putnam says: “Cut the pie any way you like, 
‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!”24 
Putnam’s thought experiment, which rests on his causal theory of 
reference, establishes an anti-descriptive standpoint. For him, the meaning 
of a natural kind term like “water” is determined by its relational broad or 
wide content. So, for reference fixation, any association of the description 
or the internal state of the speaker is inadequate. In this situation, a speaker 
would have to grasp the socio-linguistic phenomenon that is behind the 
success of such a reference. Putnam’s idea of “division of linguistic 
labour” suggests to us that: 
... It is simply that “meanings” should be implicitly known (or 
“associated” with the relevant words and sentences) by every speaker who 
counts as fully competent in the use of language. This might be called the 
constraint of publicity: it requires that meanings should be public.25  
Here Putnam wants to clarify that a fully competent speaker has the 
ability to use his/her own words aptly and also understand others’ words 
properly in his/her own linguistic community. This may rely on his/her 
interactions with others of varying interests, capacities and also expertise 
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within the same community circle. According to Putnam, an individualistic 
conception of knowledge cannot be possible at all. He does not believe 
that every speaker will be an expert on everything which he/she uses 
his/her language to speak about. Here, one important issue is that it is 
required for the speaker to be aware of a standard minimum account of 
information about the used words through which he/she is able to 
participate in any kind of shared discussion in his/her linguistic 
community. I would like to insert here some of my observations that may 
be able to express the whole debate in a nutshell. There is a longstanding 
misunderstanding about the facts of Putnam’s semantic externalism. We 
consider that the “twin earth” thought experiment puts importance on the 
fact that on “twin earth”, the term “water” does not consist of H2O, so we 
earthians should say that it is not “water” at all. The term “water” has 
different meanings on our earth and “twin earth”, as it varies depending on 
the environment. Putnam says that earthian Sree’s word “water” and twin-
earthian Sree’s word “water” are not synonymous, but can be 
homonymous. They are not synonymous because earthian Sree and twin-
earthian Sree are not microphysical duplicates. In the case of the “twin 
earth thought experiment”, the references of natural kind terms like 
“water”, “tiger”, “gold” etc. are dependent on the causal connections 
between instances of these terms. This process is possible in three 
different ways:  
Firstly, there may be a direct way that depends on the speaker’s 
perception.  
Secondly, one can communicate with other speakers who have the right 
causal connections with instances of the natural kind term and get 
information from him/her. 
Thirdly, it is also possible that one person can interact with a thing that 
may not exist, or that no other people may be familiar with, like 
“extraterrestrial intelligence” etc. We may call it, as Putnam does, 
“reference by description”. But this “reference by description” also 
ultimately rests on the direct reference procedure. Putnam actually 
generalises the “twin earth” argument to propose that references to 
objects in the external world depend on information carrying causal 
connections with those objects. The main point I would like to 
focus on is what makes externalism attractive or what the 
significance of semantic externalism is today. 
 
It seems to me that the most attractive part of semantic externalism is 
that there exists a naturalistic stance towards human beings in the world. 
Another part of it is confronting the view of incorrigibility or intrinsic 
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ability that attempts to see the whole debate from the skin inwards. 
Semantic externalism vindicates the fact that the concepts that are 
important for our knowledge become meaningless if and only if they have 
no causal connection with their referents or the external world. Like 
Putnam, I also believe that to have a concept, it is necessary to have an 
appropriate causal connection with our environment. Semantic externalism 
implies externalism about the mind; if to have a mind is to have thoughts, 
then to have a mind, it is not sufficient to have the right goings-on in the 
brain and the rest of the body; to have a mind you have to be hooked up to 
an environment in the proper way, or see the casual interactions that 
extend into the environment. Elsewhere, I mentioned that:  
The externalist claims that my present belief is caused by my past beliefs. 
Even my future beliefs must be causally connected with my present and 
past beliefs. So there is a causal change which guides our belief system. If 
we trace back to the origin of this belief, then we will find that there is an 
“initial baptism” or reference fixing of a name or natural kind term by 
some speakers.26 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the case for descriptivism and 
referentialism as the preliminary steps in the debate between internalism 
and externalsim. It might be thought that the debate is not confined to the 
theories of definite and indefinite description and the causal theory of 
reference. Frege’s theory of meaning, which integrates with his theory of 
language, focuses on the claim that the theory of reference and the theory 
of sense (the study of word-meaning relations) can go together. Frege’s 
theory of meaning has taken an important role in the ongoing debate 
between internalism and externalism. His theory of reference is closer to 
externalism, indicating that meanings are public properties that can be 
grasped by different people at different times, or one person at different 
times. So in a word, it is shareable, and this concept of shareability refutes 
the thesis of “psychologism”. Besides, internalists have placed importance 
on the theory of sense, which inclines towards the mental state of the 
speaker and hearer who grasp certain intentional contents.  
The main argument against descriptivism, as portrayed by the causal 
theory of reference (Putnam, Kripke and so on), is that in determining the 
meaning of a natural kind term, it is not possible to get the required 
meaning through the mere conjoining of the “defining characteristics”. 
There are some cases where defining characteristics cannot help to obtain 
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the exact meaning of the term because of some abnormal characteristics of 
the term referred to. For externalists, the procedure of changing the 
definition of a term is possible by changing its reference. The traditional 
theories of meaning try to ignore two very crucial aspects like, other 
people and the world, that become prominent in the causal theory of 
reference, viz. externalism. Putnamian semantic externalism makes 
explicit the meaning of a natural kind term, determined on two different 
levels – “stereotype” and “division of linguistic labour”, where the nature 
of the paradigm of the terms gets its meaning in conjunction with our 
transactions with external objects and socio-linguistic practices. I think 
that the most attractive part of semantic externalism, as argued by Putnam, 
is its naturalistic outlook towards human beings in the world. Besides this, 
the externalism thesis also challenges the view of intrinsic abilities, which 
tries to see the whole debate from the skin inwards.  
CHAPTER TWO 
MIND AND WORLD:  
A LINGUISTIC SKETCH 
 
 
 
“Philosophy is not only concerned with changing our views, but also with 
changing our sensibility, our ability to perceive and react to nuances.” 
—Hilary Putnam 
Introduction 
The first chapter brings out a clear understanding of the enduring 
debate between internalism and externalism, which originated from a non-
descriptivist account of descriptivist tradition, a tradition which curtails 
the role of the causal theory of reference in semantics to concentrate much 
more on internal mental content. The reason why this debate has received 
so much attention in the philosophical community is that it tries to draw 
attention to the relationship between the mind and the world. The debate 
centres round the question of whether the world has a constructive 
relationship with the mind or not. In this chapter, I would first like to 
delineate the defence of internalism that accepts the narrow content thesis 
from the different perspectives of internalists like Chalmers, John Searle, 
Bogossian, Frank Jackson, Ned Block and Jerry Fodor. For them, 
“meaning is a mental or some sense intrinsic content” that does not rest on 
the external world. The non-relationality, self-referentiality, indexical 
expression, and supervenience theories try to establish the claims that 
mental contents are narrow in nature and that the meaning of a term can be 
derived through the mental state of the subject. I would like to conclude 
the chapter by defending the externalist view (once proposed by Putnam), 
challenging the internalist approach through a holistic framework of 
externalism that paves the way to a socio-linguistic background for 
meaning; a thesis asymmetry with the conceptual role of semantics. 
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(2.1) The Six Puzzles Regarding Content 
David Chalmers 1  wonderfully portrays the fact that there are six 
puzzles in philosophy which indicate the necessity of admitting narrow 
content. 
1. The first puzzle is one that results from Putnam’s “twin earth 
thought experiment”, which we discussed earlier. 
2.  The second one is Frege’s puzzle, which speaks of the cognitive 
difference between our thoughts that “Hesperus is Hesperus” and 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus”. This cognitive difference also indicates a 
conceptual difference in our mental content. 
3. The third puzzle about belief was made famous by Kripke in his 
thesis “A Puzzle about Belief”. Kripke attempts to show that we cannot 
draw any definite conclusion about the substitutivity of belief context. He 
wants to refute Mill’s “theory of names”, which tells us that the meaning 
of a name is exhausted by its referent. Actually, Mill’s theory believes in 
the transparency of proper names, which was later rejected by Frege and 
Quine. Both of them believed that proper names are not windows into 
belief content, because in such a scenario there would be a fallacy of 
reductio ad absurdum. Kripke mainly argues for two different principles: 
First, the disquotational principle, which tells us that if a speaker of a 
language L assents to P and “P” is a sentence in L, then the speaker 
believes that P.  
Second, the translational principle, which tells us that the truth of a 
sentence in a language expresses the same truth value in the case of 
the translation of the sentence into another language. If a sentence 
expresses a truth in one language, then a correct translation of it 
into any other language expresses the same truth. 
 
I will mention here Kripke’s famous puzzle in Bilgrami’s words. 
Bilgrami writes:  
Here are the barest bones of Kripke’s puzzle. A Frenchmen, Pierre, learns 
from his nanny, while growing up monolingually in Paris, something 
which he expresses by saying “Londres est jolie.” When, later, Pierre goes 
and settles in an ugly section of London and after picking up the native 
language, he is disposed to say “London is not pretty.” However, he 
doesn’t realize that the city he learnt about in Paris is the city of which he 
is now a resident. The example gives rise to a puzzle because, given 
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certain assumptions (included among which is the assumption of a 
denotational conception of meaning and concepts), one would, by a short 
step, end up attributing blatantly inconsistent beliefs to Pierre.2 
We can summarise this puzzle in this way. Let us imagine Soma (an 
agent) meets Mimi (another agent) on two different occasions, once in a 
music hall and the other in a university seminar. It is difficult for Soma to 
recognise that she has met the same person, Mimi, twice. Therefore, she 
utters two different sentences: “Mimi has musical talent”, and “Mimi has 
no musical talent”. Here we will find that a rational person holds 
contradictory beliefs.  
4. A similar kind of problem arises in propositional attitudes 
ascribing context. Chalmers describes it as “the mode of presentations 
problem”. Let us look at an example: Arka says that “Aban believes that 
Harry Potter can fly with his broomstick”. This is a true sentence. Let's 
imagine that Aban does not know that “Daniel Radcliffe” played the role 
of Harry Potter. In this scenario, Arka’s claims will be false. But both 
accounts are same. “Harry can fly” and “Radcliffe can fly”, as 
propositions, can be regarded as the same. For Chalmers, to believe that 
Radcliffe can fly, we need to go through it in terms of appropriate modes 
of presentation. Now one might ask: “How can the mode of presentation 
be treated as an account of belief ascriptions?” This is a difficult puzzle 
related to content. 
5. The problem of the essential indexical. Chalmers writes: “When I 
believe that I am in danger, I will take evasive action. This belief seems to 
be essentially indexical, or self-directed; if I merely believe that x is in 
danger, where (unbeknownst to me) I am x, I might do something else 
entirely. How can we square this indexical aspect with an account of the 
contents of thought?”3 
6. The puzzle of contingent a priori. Saul Kripke attempts to show 
that we have found a mistake in the traditional account of the intimate 
relationship between a priori and necessary proposition. In Naming and 
Necessity, he says that it is not true that an a priori proposition must be 
necessary. First, Kripke considers Wittgenstein’s comment about the 
standard metre bar of Paris. He mentions that Wittgenstein says something 
very puzzling about this. He says:  
There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long, 
nor that it is not one meter long, and that is the standard meter in Paris.4  
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Kripke believes that we can find a mistake in Wittgenstein’s view. He 
asks the question: “If the stick is a stick, for example, 39.37 inches long (I 
assume we have some different standard for inches), why is not it one 
meter long?”5 
The length of everything totally depends on the time at which we 
measure it. Now it is important for us to ask: “Is it necessarily true that the 
stick S is one meter long at time t0?” Some philosophers are trying to 
establish that a purely meaning-constituting sentence like “Stick S is one 
meter long at t0” is a justified a priori statement which must be necessarily 
true. But Kripke believes that this definition is not able to define the 
meaning of what we call a “metre”; rather it indicates a fixing of the 
reference. Let us see what we are doing here. We are marking out a stick 
of a particular length at a particular time and deciding to call the length 
“one metre”. This really marks out an accidental property and we have to 
make a note of this. Here it is important to say that if we had applied heat 
to this stick S at time t0, stick S would not have been one meter long. In 
Kripke’s own words:  
In some counterfactual situations the stick might have been longer and in 
some shorter if various stresses and strains had been applied to it.6  
Kripke points out that there is an intuitive difference between the 
phrase “one metre” and the phrase “the length of S at t0”. In the real world, 
the phrase “one metre” designates a certain length; we universally regard it 
as 39.37 inches. Here, the first phrase “one metre” would be the “length of 
the stick S at time t0”. But the second phrase, “the length of stick S at time 
t0”, is not able to designate anything. The reason for this is that if we had 
applied heat to stick S at time t1, then it would have expanded in its length. 
Once, Putnam suggested to me: 
Kripke does not use the term “a priori proposition” because a priority has 
to do with Knowledge; even if my knowledge that the standard meter stick 
in Paris is one meter long is a priori (because I know that stick is the 
“standard”), the phrase “one meter” long is not synonymous with “the 
same length as the standard meter stick in Paris”, because the standard 
meter stick in Paris could have been less than a meter long, in which case 
the property we rigidly designate as “being one meter in length” would not 
have been (i.e. isn’t the same in that possible world) as the property of 
being (in that possible world) the length of the standard meter stick in 
Paris... I know a priori that the standard meter stick in Paris is one meter 
long is “an a priori proposition”, you make it sound as if “being a priori” 
is an intrinsic property of the relation between the properties of being the 
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standard meter stick in Paris and being the length; but it isn’t. But 
contingent identities between the designations of predicates can, 
surprisingly, sometimes be known a priori. That’s Kripke’s discovery.7 
Now we can remind ourselves of Quine’s famous dictum: “No entity 
without identity.” If we are to accept mental states in our ontology, then 
we need to state their identity conditions. A mental state is identified 
through its contents. We find a difference between two beliefs because the 
content of the beliefs is different. We may understand the content of a 
mental state by inner specifications or by relational specifications.  
(2.2) Internalism versus Externalism:  
Searle’s Defence of Internalism 
The origin of internalism can be found in the thinking of Descartes. 
From his first principle “Cogito ergo sum”, a new way of thinking was 
derived which is called the “self-containedness” thesis. According to this 
view, the mind is internal to the subject and does not depend on any kind 
of external object or body.  
Gabriel Segal, in his book A Slim Book About Narrow Content,8 speaks 
of internalism, mentioning two ideas fundamental to it: 
a) Non-relationality: 
Content is not relational so it does not depend on the environment. 
Here, the term “relational” is used in the sense that our beliefs, desires etc. 
are not dependent on the external world. They are regarded as an intrinsic 
framework of an agent.  
b) Supervenience on microstructure: 
The advantage of focusing on microstructure is that on the level of 
elementary particles, whatever it is that determines content probably 
supervenes on it. 
John Searle, in his book Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of 
Mind,9 argues the “meanings are in the head” thesis. He believes that the 
fundamental question of philosophy is “how does language relate to 
reality?” In his previous work Speech Acts,10 he claims that speakers are 
always related with the performance of a linguistic act. But his main 
intention is to show from Fregean accounts how expressions and objects 
are related to an individual mind. Searle resists the Fregean idea of a “third 
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realm”. For Searle, the Fregean theory of meaning is actually an internalist 
thesis. He aptly points out that the classical debate between internalism 
and externalism is based on the main question “What is the proper way to 
analyse meaning and reference in our language?” Searle writes: 
Both the Fregean and the present account of meaning are internalist in the 
sense that it is in the virtue of some mental state in the head of a speaker 
and hearer – the mental state of grasping an abstract entity or simply 
having a certain intentional content - that speaker and hearer can 
understand linguistic references.11 
Searle talks about five types of objection which are raised by 
externalists to suggest that in the scenario of reference and meaning, 
narrow content does not play any substantial role. We can précis these 
objections as follows:  
1) There is a difference between de re and de dicto and other kinds of 
propositional attitudes. De re beliefs make a standard relationship 
between agent and object. 
2) There is also a difference between the referential and the attributive 
use of definite descriptions. Attributive use is related to objectivity, 
while referential use is not.  
3) All indexical expressions, like “I”, “you”, “this”, “that” etc., require 
an objective account; in other words, these are world-involving. 
4) The causal theory of reference tells us that reference is achieved by 
virtue of some external causal relationship. 
5) The causal theory of reference opposes the psychological theory of 
meaning and any kind of psychologism. 
 
But Searle does not consider these objections suitable. He believes that 
“meanings are in the head”. Searle at first tried to refute Putnam’s 
arguments. Putnam tried to hold on to the revised version of “meaning 
determines extension” and avoid alternative arguments like “psychological 
states determine extension”. To refute Putnam’s thinking, Searle uses an 
example. He says that “The murderer of Brown” fixes the extension, even 
though it is a fact about the world, i.e. who committed the murder of 
Brown. Searle suggests:  
The theory that intension determines extension is the theory that intensions 
set certain conditions which anything has to meet in order to be part of the 
extension of the relevant intension.12  
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It is worth mentioning that there is a crucial difference between de re 
and de dicto beliefs. De re refers to actual objects, while de dicto refers to 
psychological contents. Even Tyler Burge, in his famous paper “Belief de 
re”,13 claims that “A de re belief is a belief whose correct ascription places 
a believer in an appropriate non-conceptual contextual relation to objects 
the belief is about…” But Searle firmly states that de dicto beliefs are 
conceptual in nature and de re beliefs are considered, in a sense, a 
contextual aspect. Intentionality is a new factor that Searle attributes to the 
background of conceptual and contextual analysis. 
Here, it is relevant to discuss the concept of indexical expressions. In 
his paper “The Problem of Essential Indexical”,14 John Perry believes that 
some thought contents are indexical. He also believes that it is too hard for 
a Fregean to know the indexical intentional content, as the Fregean sense 
cannot grasp the conditions of satisfaction. Suppose X believes “I am X” 
and Y also believes “I am X”. We will clarify here that X is true, but Y is 
false. In the case of “I am X”, the Fregean sense of the sentence is not 
sufficient to determine which proposition is actually expressed by it. Perry 
and Kaplan accept the theory of “direct reference”. Searle suggests: 
According to them, in such cases the proposition is not the Intentional 
content in the mind of the speaker but rather the proposition must contain 
the actual objects referred to.15  
Searle also believes that there is a long-standing misunderstanding 
about the concept of intentionality, and even in the nature of the indexical, 
as in the thought of Perry and Kaplan. Actually, indexicality does not 
consist in representational backgrounds. Searle thinks that a person can 
consider Mr. X to be the inventor of Y. Suppose it was proved that one 
million years ago, the same object Y was invented by some humanoid in a 
distant galaxy. Now the question is: can we still say “Mr. X was the 
inventor of Y”? 
Searle replies sharply that: 
When I say Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals there is a concealed 
indexical in the background: the functioning of the Background in such 
cases assigns an indexical interpretation to the sentence. Relative to our 
earth and our history, Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals …16 
He also mentions three different components of indexical expressions, 
through which he is trying to give a response in favour of internalists’ 
account of indexical expressions. Let me discuss this briefly. 
Chapter Two 
 
34
a) Self-referentiality: Searle claims that if a person sees his/her hand 
in front of his/her face, then the condition of his/her indexical proposition 
would be self-referential; it may be better to say intentionally self-
referential. This is because here, the truth condition requires reference to 
the utterance itself. It does not depend on any third person’s claim. 
b) Non-indexical descriptive content: Searle believes that self-
referentiality is also related to the idea of lexical meaning or non-indexical 
descriptive content. Actually, there are four types of non-indexical 
expression that we find in our language: time (now, later, yesterday, etc.), 
place (here, there etc.), utterance directionality (“I” refers to the person 
speaking), and discoursal relations (the former, the latter). Even non-
indexical contents have two important parts - a sense can be determined by 
a particular determinable form. Besides this, a sense expresses the sort of 
entity that an expression refers to. For instance, “yesterday” expresses the 
determinate time “one day before”, and here, the type of entity which is 
referred to is without doubt a day.  
c) Awareness of the context of the utterance: The intentional content 
of an utterance will be fulfilled only by the intentional context of 
awareness on the part of the speaker and also the hearer. Sometimes we 
might say “That man is drunk”. Here, an indexical expression needs some 
indexical relation to clarify its sense, for example: “The man who stands in 
relation R (perceptual or temporal) to this utterance is drunk.” 
Now we can summarise Searle’s thinking in the following way: 
a)  Meanings are actually in the head of the speaker, which is also a 
part of the mental makeup of the language user. 
b)  Linguistic utterances are intentional in nature. 
c)  Meanings do not depend upon external, causal or contextual 
determinations.  
 
Actually, for Searle, intentionality has an “aboutness” feature. When a 
person believes, then he/she believes in something. When one desires, then 
he/she must desire something. This shows that mental states like belief, 
desire, fear, etc. are linked with intentional objects. Now, one can ask: “Is 
there any intentional state that has no causal link to the world or an 
object?” 
In this case, we see that there is no pain “for something”, like the way 
in which there can be love or hate “for something”. Frank Jackson once 
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told me: “The object of a pain is the (putative) disturbance located where 
the pain is felt to be. I of course agree that there is nothing a pain is of in 
the sense in which there is something one is fearful of.” But the problem is 
that we cannot claim that every mental state has an intentional object. 
What is the intentional object of the mental state “truth”? Or 
“universality”? The concepts of truth and universality lack intentional 
objects. Searle gives the example of undirected euphoria or anxiety. A 
change in an intended object can lead to a consequent change in beliefs. So 
the changeability of an agent’s belief rest on its intended object. Believing 
in “ghosts” and believing in “cancer” are not the same belief anyway. 
Searle thinks that even mental states that possess objects have internalistic 
factors. No beliefs are independently attached to an object. Searle 
articulates three different features of intentionality to refute the causal 
theory of reference. These are as follows: 
a) Psychological mode and representative content are two important 
features of intentional states. The former deals with the psychology of 
beliefs and desires, whereas the latter pertains to what is believed, what is 
desired, etc. It is not that the states have their own content, but intentional 
states, with their contents, refer to objects. 
 
b) Mental states do not only depend upon psychological modes. Let 
me take two ordinary examples: if X (a person) claims that “it is too hot 
today”, here the direction of the belief is mind to world, but in the case of 
a belief where X (a person) believes that “Y (his friend) will come to visit 
my home today”, here, the direction is obverse or from world to mind. So 
we find that intentionality and mental states have contents as well as 
objects; they are directed to fit together.  
 
c) The “condition of satisfaction” is also a fundamental feature of 
intentionality. It helps to understand intentionality as an intention that can 
be satisfied when what is intended is satisfied. When we want to know a 
person’s intentional state, then we must understand in what conditions 
his/her intention would be satisfied. Now Searle claims that the 
intentionality of mental states is intrinsic. It is not derived from others, as 
intentionality is considered a bedrock here. But language’s intentionality is 
derived, as it has some representational capacity. Searle writes: 
A sentence is a syntactical object on which representational capacities are 
imposed: beliefs and desires and other Intentional states are not, as such, 
syntactical objects (though they may be and usually are expressed in 
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sentences), and their representational capacities are not imposed but are 
intrinsic.17 
A parallel between language and mental states can be drawn in terms 
of the contribution of the mind, rather than language. The mind imposes 
intentionality on language purposely, and here, the purpose is obviously to 
meet a condition that expresses a psychological state upon it. It is not that 
language does not have a considerable position here: it helps the mind to 
think. Language has the ability to refer and attribute, which can be 
regarded as a mirror of the mind. We know that only words that are parts 
of a language have meaning, but mental states do not have meaning, 
because they are by nature intentional. Logical positivists and ordinary 
language philosophers bestow significance on language rather than the 
mind. They consider that the notion of incapability of understanding 
language rejects the sense of knowing or believing our mental states. 
Through language we can structure or categorise the concepts of the mind. 
Thinking is a process that depends upon language. Even Searle also admits 
that without the help of language we cannot explain a mind’s 
intentionality. Searle argues that any primitive, paralinguistic form of 
intentionality depends on language and for him, intentionality that is 
illuminates in a linguistic form is no doubt internal. 
Searle also raises a wonderful answer to propose that animals and 
children have pre-linguistic forms of intentionality. Children develop a 
richer concept of intentionality, or a complex series of developing mental 
states that interact with intentionality, which it would be possible if we 
anticipate it and expand a more categorised linguistic form. But for Searle, 
the structure of the process depends on the primitive biological forms that 
are associated with pre-linguistic intentionality. 
There is a tendency to know a person’s mental states in terms of the 
conditions that satisfy the person’s intentions. It would be very odd if 
Searle claimed that the mind imposed intentionality on language 
purposely. We may think that the concept of meaning is related to the 
entities that deal with language and not with mental states. So language is 
the parameter that helps us to talk about intentionality, which has an 
aboutness feature. Putnam thinks that the problem is contained in the 
confusing use of terms like intension and intention. When we want to 
know a person’s mental state, then actually we want to know the content 
of their thought (a notion closely related to propositional attitudes like 
beliefs and desires). So here, the notion is actually intension rather than 
intention. If my mental state is thinking “today will be a rainy day”, in this 
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case, one’s talking about “my intention being satisfied” makes no sense. 
However, to ask whether the veridicality condition (accuracy condition) of 
that state is satisfied does make some sense. It would even be misleading 
if we claim that for Searle, mental states are intentional, as they express a 
person’s intentions, rather than intensions. Putnam would agree with 
Searle’s opinion that language does not require there to be intentionality. 
Putnam also argues that even the mental states of animals are capable of 
representing simple features of the world, like shape, colour, distance etc., 
and in the case of non-human primates, it is possible that there is already 
full-fledged intentionality - “full-fledged” in the sense that here, the 
concept of mistaken belief is available to the theory of mind. Here, one 
could ask: What is the use of language? Putnam replies: 
Language vastly enlarges the range of contents our mental states are able 
to have, but I don’t think it is necessary for there to be intentionality (sense 
and reference) at all.18 
For Searle, we cannot claim that mind in any way imposes 
intentionality on mental states, as he thinks that they are intrinsically 
intensional and that mental states are caused by and even realised in the 
brain. But it would be very difficult to find the difference that says these 
are brain states rather than mental states. One idea is that Searle believes 
that the “brain secretes intentionality”, like the way the adrenal gland 
secretes cortisol. This is a very controversial issue that I would like to 
avoid here. 
In their paper “Some Content is Narrow”,19 Frank Jackson and Pettit 
claim that it is too hard to prove narrow content. But basically, their aim is 
to preserve the notion of narrow content in terms of the truth condition in 
folk psychology. They consider that the problems of predicting human 
behaviour have compelled them to believe in the folk truth of evaluable 
narrow content. In the case of prediction of bodily movement, it is 
required to know the person’s internal neurophysiology. But it is quite 
impossible for a layman to do so. Therefore, folk psychology tries to 
explain narrow content from the observable behaviour of mankind. One 
may ask: “What constitutes the externally available evidence that helps us 
to solve the folk problem of predicting behaviour?” A quick answer would 
be our raw behaviour or physical behaviour, which we can immediately 
perceive through our sense organs. But we find one hard problem here. 
The behaviour of human beings is incredibly different. If we want to know 
an action, it is better to know the internal etiology of certain behaviours. 
Frank and Pettit claim that: 
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But we cannot go internal to find the patterns and generalizations we folk 
need to get started. Rather, we have to find the patterns at the behavioural, 
external level first, and then maybe we can proceed to go internal to 
explain the patterns we have discovered, and so describe our data in the 
language of intentional action.20  
Here, one thing we must clarify is that a partition between the 
compatibility of possibilities and the incompatibility of possibilities has 
taken a key role in our belief. Even the truth evaluability of the contents 
depend on the set of possibilities. Now one may ask whether predictive 
content is a folk notion or not. In the case of predictive notions, sometimes 
we depend on an implicit common sense theory on people’s behaviour. 
But the externalist claims that predictive contents are actually broad 
contents that stay outside of the skin. There are two alternative opinions 
we find in this situation. One opinion tells us that predictive content is 
something non-individualistic in nature. It is something like water 
solubility. Meanwhile, another opinion says that water solubility is a kind 
of narrow property that actually makes supervenience on internal content. 
Let us imagine, for an example, that if Aritra (a person) was near a lion, 
then he would start to run away from the lion. Is this individualistic? If we 
consider this action individualistic, then what is required here? In the first 
sense, to be individualistic it is required that the property will be inter-
world narrow in every possible world. Another opinion tells us that to be 
individualistic is to require that the property will be intra-world narrow in 
every possible world, where the subject and his/her doppelganger 
(molecule-for-molecule identical person) have the same property. Frank 
and Pettit claim that predictive content will be intra-world narrow, not 
inter-world narrow. The decisive point is that doppelgangers exhibit the 
“same behaviour in the same situation”. One can assume that the 
autonomous belief–desire patterns of predictive content must be narrow. 
Jackson once wrote to me: 
I agree that the causal history of content involves a shared language and 
our place in a society of fellow thinkers and language users but all the 
same I think that the content of what we share supervenes on how we are 
from the skin in.21  
(2.3) Block’s Way Out 
Ned Block raises a wonderful question in this regard. He says: “If I 
accept a sentence and later reject it, then the meaning of what I accept is 
not the same as the meaning of what I later reject, so how can I ever 
change my mind?”22 Here, it is important to mention that Block considers 
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“meaning” and “content” more or less interchangeable and believes that 
contents are narrowly holistic. Narrow content is actually inside the head. 
Psychological explanation is the main purpose of narrow content. Block 
wants to clarify his thinking, which is based on a version of Putnam’s 
Ruritania 23  example. The argument is that Bruce and Walter, two 
doppelgangers (molecule-to-molecule identical people) live in different 
places: let us call the places B and W. The dialects of the two places are 
the same, except in B, people use “grug” instead of “beer”, whereas in W, 
they use “grug” instead of “whiskey”. Now imagine that the B dialect 
lacks “beer”, and the W dialect lacks “whiskey”. In B, “whiskey” means 
“whiskey” and in W, “beer” means “beer”. Here, Ruritanian is considered 
the same as English except for the use of “grug” in the two dialects. At the 
age of 10, both Bruce and Walter have the same beliefs about the concept 
of “grug”, like: 
a. “Grug” is a brownish liquid. 
b. “Grug” is bought in liquor stores. 
c. “Grug” is often served before dinner. 
d. Drinking “grug” makes grownups act funny. 
 
But at the age of 12, when they learn more about society, then Bruce 
could claim the following: 
a. “Grug” translates in English to “beer”. 
b. “Grug” comes in small cans. 
c. More than six cans of “grug” make people very drunk. 
d. “Grug” is relatively cheap. 
While Walter could claim the following:  
a. “Grug” translates in English to “whiskey”. 
b. “Grug” comes in litre bottles. 
c. One glass of “grug” knocks you out.  
d. “Grug” is expensive. 
 
Here, both doppelgangers have the same belief, except for the 
indexical “grug” beliefs. Both of them have even used it as it is 
terminologically appropriate in their own societies. The argument focuses 
on the basic idea of sameness and difference. At the age of 10, Bruce’s 
“grug” has the same narrow content as Walter’s “grug”. But at the age of 
12, we can see some difference in their narrow contents because of the 
differentiation in their native tongues. Block suggests that: 
Chapter Two 
 
40
The idea is to justify this inter-personal claim by appeal to an intra-
personal claim, the claim that each twin’s two “grug’s” differ in narrow 
content from each other, a consequence of the DIFFERENCE principle. 
But isn’t this just a matter of a difference in beliefs too?24 
Block’s first objection is that neither “Bruce” nor “Walter” learns 
anything (any main essential property) about “grug”, like its chemical 
formula (roughly20% alcohol is used in “beer”, and 40%-50% is used in 
“whiskey”. Block’s second objection is an indexical objection which says 
that, by the rule of logic of identity, it follows that Bruce “grugB” is not 
equal to Walter's “grugW”. The same holds for narrow synonymy. But 
Block does not hold that this indexical difference makes a difference in 
their psychological explanations. In Block’s words:  
But the difference comes from the indexical not from the narrow content 
of “grug” itself. Bruce says “Grug is their word for whiskey”. Whereas 
Walter says “Grug” is our word for “whiskey”. It is the indexical 
difference that makes the difference.25 
Block’s third objection is regarded as a “splitting objection”, which 
argues that if X (person) split into two persons A and B, then the principle 
of identity suggests that X is not equal to A, and X is not equal to B. Even 
A is not equal to B, as both inhabit distinct locations at one time. Now 
Block argues that without a change of narrow content, it is quite 
impossible to make extensive changes in the belief of a split of “grug” into 
“grugB” and “grugW”. Block claims:  
The upshot is that I could have motivated the difference in narrow content 
between the two “grugs” within each twin at age 12 by appealing just to 
the fact that each twin thought the two words picked out different things. 
There was no real need to appeal to a difference in beliefs.26 
What is important here is that we need two kinds of identity relation: 
one is the intra-personal relation and the other is the inter-personal 
relation. Then the main problem of holism (you cannot change your mind) 
will be solved. 
(2.4) Fodor on Narrow Content 
 Jerry Fodor also supports narrow content as a function from concept to 
referent. In his early writing, in The Language of Thought,27 he believes in 
narrow content and supports that “meanings are in the head” hypothesis. 
For him, the conception of narrow content is related to certain function-
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based observable properties. In his book Modularity of Mind, Fodor points 
out that psychology is not a primary level philosophy, but a kind of 
speculative work. Even he considers the theory of observation a major 
problem. Our mind is not a single homogeneous system. It is actually 
composed of numerous sub-systems, and every sub-system carries out 
certain tasks. Each system depends on certain modules. There are five 
sense modules, and one specific language module. The language module 
closely interacts with the conceptual system, which is considered a 
computational module. Fodor thinks that a particular object can be 
recognised through the conception of its perceptual prototype. But we 
cannot consider a perceptual prototype an image. Here, one thing needs to 
be clarified: the concept of the prototype is distinct from the concept of the 
stereotype. The stereotype mainly deals with words and phrases, while 
Fodor’s prototype is something deeper than words. Fodor believes that if a 
person perceives an object in his/her visual system, then he/she will have 
built up a module, which is like a little computer through which the mind 
can recognise the shape of an object with no colour or image. Putnam 
clarifies Fodor’s ideas by saying that it is just like a thermostat, which can 
recognise a change of temperature without processing the concept of 
temperature. Fodor, who was inspired by Noam Chomsky, thinks that the 
Putnamian concept of the “division of linguistic labour” has just played 
the role of giving information about the observable properties (referent) of 
a narrow content, without giving enough referents through which we can 
recognise it properly. He believes that only internal language can be 
regarded as a proper object of scientific study. A universal grammar is a 
theory of an initial state of the language system. Here Fodor attempts to 
give us a psychological narrow content theory by establishing a 
relationship between linguistic mental entities and non-linguistic entities.  
Even Fodor’s computational theory about content is a variant of 
Searle’s intentionality theory. In his early writing, e.g. Psychosematics,28 
Fodor depends upon the supervenience hypothesis in order to sustain the 
claim of individualistic narrow content. Fodor writes:  
States of type X supervene on states of type Y iff there is no difference 
among X states without a corresponding difference among Y states. So, in 
particular, the psychological states of organisms supervene on their brain 
states iff their brains differ whenever their minds differ.29 
For Fodor, we have to identify mental content in terms of narrow 
content to establish supervenience theory, and in this aspect, the 
externalist theory about broad content is wrong.30 Supervenience theory 
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claims that there can be no change in supervenient property without a 
change in subvenient property; it may be better to say that no 
psychological change will occur without a physical change. Here we 
notice that a dependence relationship is associated with being coloured, 
and being red is said to be conceptually necessary, but it is not possible for 
a psychological-cum-moral property, for example, being an honest human, 
to become conceptually necessary. In this case, being honest and being a 
man are not conceptually necessary. MacDonald writes: 
In short, supervenience itself is a name for a class of thesis that may 
concern different objects, different kinds of relations between them, and 
different strengths of relations, each thesis itself requiring independent 
explanation and defence.31 
Now, Fodor believes that folk psychology is externalist in nature, but 
he had a long-held belief in the argument that folk psychology and 
scientific psychology are both individualistic in nature. Internalism 
focuses on the idea that two agents who are physical duplicates will be 
psychologically alike, no matter how much their respective environments 
diverge. Fodor’s famous Computational Theory of Mind is regarded as an 
individualistic agenda. Having established this thesis, Fodor turns to the 
theory of “methodological solipsism”, which deals with an approach in 
cognitive science which talks about an agent isolated from the 
environment. “Methodological solipsism” also tries to describe the internal 
mental life of an individual in a way that makes no hypothesis about the 
nature of the external world. Fodor claims that the concern of cognitive 
psychology is to “study mental processes qua formal operations in 
symbols”. We can clarify this idea to add that cognitive psychology is 
mainly interested in the internal process of a representation which only has 
manipulating syntactic or formal properties, like a computer. In Cain’s 
words:  
In short, cognitive psychology, in studying and attempting to characterize 
the computational processes executed by the mind-brain, will consider the 
individual in isolation from the environment and will individuate mental 
representations and states formally or syntactically and, therefore, 
individualistically.32 
In his well-known book The Elm and the Expert,33 Fodor modifies the 
conception of scientific psychology in terms of the “computational theory 
of mind”. This argument runs as follows: 
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The higher level laws are implemented by lower level mechanisms. 
Scientific psychology commits to a “computational theory of mind” by 
holding those intentional laws which are implemented by computational 
mechanisms themselves.  
Now two different conditions are required: 
a) Computational mechanism can implement intentional laws only if 
those laws are narrow.  
b) Even those laws appeal to the intentional properties that are locally 
supervenient.  
 
I would like to clarify here that Fodor’s whole philosophical argument 
is based on two issues: 
Firstly, he believes that mental states are characteristically intentional. 
Secondly, he also argues that mental processes are characteristically 
computational. 
 
One can claim that the Fodorian thesis cannot solve the “twin earth” 
problem. Oscar’s desire for “water” causes him to form an intention to get 
a glass of “water”, and also to engage in “water”-seeking behaviour. 
Meanwhile, Oscar2’s desire to “twater” similarly causes him to form an 
intention to get a glass of “twater” and to engage in “twater”-seeking 
behavior. Here, Oscar’s thoughts diverge in their causal power from 
Oscar2’s twater thoughts, and vice versa. Externalists criticise internalists 
by saying that, if internalists considered the twins different in their causal 
power, we should admit that these states are dependent upon the external 
world. Fodor tries to give a response to this comment. He argues that the 
difference between the twins and their thoughts fails to meet a necessary 
condition for being a difference in causal powers. There is also a 
conceptual connection to be found between the twins and also in their 
thought. Fodor thinks:  
It is conceptually necessary that if you are connected to water in the right 
way then you have water thoughts (rather than twater thought) and it is 
again conceptually necessary that if you are connected to twater in the 
right way then you have twater thoughts (rather than water thoughts). To 
have water thought just is to have a thought that is connected to water in 
the right way, and to have a twater thought just is to have a thought that is 
connected to twater in the right way.34  
Chapter Two 
 
44
The term “right way” obviously indicates the exact way in which your 
thought is a proper water thought.  
(2.5) Putnam’s Response to the Critics:  
A Holistic Framework of Externalism 
Putnam sketches a theory of holism in two parts: 
a. Holism with respect to meaning 
b. Holism with respect to belief fixation 
 
But the conception of belief fixation creates so many problems in 
meaning holism. It is true that there is a mass of differences between the 
beliefs of our ancestors and those of present generations in the context of 
nouns, like plant, water, etc. The present generation believes that plants 
contain chlorophylls, that plants carry out the photosynthesis process, etc. 
But 200 years ago, our ancestors did not have all this knowledge. In such a 
situation, we do not consider them to have lived in a different world, or 
think that their notions were “incommensurable” with our notions, because 
Putnam suggests that the concept of our beliefs has been identified 
differently over time, but not the essence. Putnam now claims that “all 
interpretation depends on clarity, because we always have to discount at 
least some differences in belief when we interpret”.35 
But another option still remains, and that is holism with respect to 
meaning. Putnam admits its philosophical importance in his writings. 
“Sophisticated mentalism” informs us that entities are actually (a) 
psychologically real, (b) associated with individual sentences, and (c) also 
involved in the processing of these sentences. But this creates many 
problems in our ordinary language, because sometimes the same sentences 
can have different meanings, or different sentences may have the same 
meaning. It is not an analytical sentence that “tigers have stripes”, because 
stripeless tigers are still considered tigers. In Putnam’s paper “Meaning 
Holism”, we find a satisfactory solution to the problem of “sophisticated 
mentalism”. Here Putnam establishes his “holism” as depending upon 
three fundamental requirements:  
a) “Meaning must have the right powers of disambiguation”: This 
shows that our theory of meaning is actually a true picture of the speaker’s 
knowledge. 
b) “Invariance of meaning under the normal process of belief 
Mind and World: A Linguistic Sketch 45
fixation”: Let us consider that if the word “tiger” means a tiger that has 
stripes, then our process of belief fixation will change when we find that 
some tigers are stripeless. But we do not think the word “tiger” has 
changed its meaning; this teaches us to interpret a speaker’s utterances 
within a consistent holistic framework. 
c) Putnam also believes that meaning must be known by “every 
speaker who counts as fully competent in the use of language. This might 
be called the constraint of publicity: it requires that meaning should be 
public”.36 It indicates the practical ability of a “speaker” to engage in 
linguistic behaviour. Here, it is also pertinent to mention that Akeel 
Bilgrami also tries to avoid the causal theory of relation, because there is 
no exact way of establishing the causal relation between the concept of the 
agent and the object in the environment. In his book, Belief and Meaning: 
The Unity and Locality of Mental Content,37 Bilgrami says that contents 
are necessarily public, as they are externally determined, not in a causal 
way. This is also a counter attack on Putnam’s present thinking. But 
Putnam says: 
My position has always been that there are causal constraints on reference, 
but that does not mean that reference can be reduced to causality.38 
 Amongst the earliest and also the most influential arguments for 
relational wide content, we find this argument in Putnam’s paper “The 
Meaning of ‘Meaning’”,39 where there is a tendency to map the whole 
system from linguistic content and also to extend it to mental content. We 
can present the thesis of “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” through three 
statements: 
First, the meaning of a word takes a relevant part, in Putnam’s view, 
but he avoids the content of psychological states. 
Second, Putnam extends the causal theory of reference of proper names 
to natural kind terms. 
Third, he also believes that meaning can be separated into two factors: 
i) Extension conditions 
ii) Stereotypes 
 
In his paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Putnam speaks about two 
presuppositions which traditional theories of meaning accept. Basically, he 
challenges these two presuppositions, which I mentioned earlier: 
a)  Knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state.  
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b) The meaning of a term determines its extension. 
 
 Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot accept these presuppositions 
together and we should drop one of them. It is quite true that we cannot 
relinquish the second proposition, as it would be a refutation of our theory 
of meaning. His “twin earth” thought experiment claims that I and my 
doppelganger share the same psychological state about “water” and 
“twater” as tasteless, colourless, liquid, etc. But the fact is that on my 
“earth”, water is identified as H2O, but on “doppelganger earth”, water is 
identified as XYZ. In such a situation, neither of us has knowledge of the 
fact we are referring to two different things using the term “water”. So it 
follows from this experiment that, in spite of being in the same 
psychological state (narrow content), I and my doppelganger can use the 
innocent term “water” to actually mean two different substances. And a 
change in this meaning leads to a consequent change in extension and 
even a change in our mental states. So Putnam concludes that “cut the pie 
any way you like, ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” Even in the case of 
“elm” and “beech”, it is too difficult for a speaker to make a distinction 
between them. Therefore, we need a “division of linguistic labour”, in 
which experts will guide us about the exact meaning of a reference term. 
Putnam suggests: 
The conceptual content associated with the words “elm” and “beech” is 
practically the same; but the extensions are determined by criteria known 
to experts with whom the average speaker is in a cooperative relation.40 
In his book Representation and Reality,41 Putnam also tries to refute 
Block’s point of view regarding the defence of the narrow content thesis. 
Ned Block endorses the view that all plausible psychological theories on 
things like belief, desire, even perception, are related to the computational 
theory of mind. Block primarily refutes Fodor’s view on the conception of 
the “function of observable properties”, and tries to establish his own 
thesis called “conceptual role semantics”. Putnam thinks that Block has 
taken the idea of the “conceptual role” from Wilfrid Sellars’s famous work 
Science, Perception and Reality.42 Sellars also thinks that language has 
maintained three different rules: 
a) Language entry rules: 
There is a belief box; when a speaker has a certain experience, then he 
puts it into a sentence and keeps it in a belief box. 
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b) Language rules: 
When a speaker accepts certain sentences, then he accepts other 
sentences. 
c) Language exit rules: 
When a speaker has certain beliefs in his belief box, then he performs 
certain bodily movements or says certain words etc.  
Block believes that we can describe “conceptual roles” synthetically 
and he tries to give much more attention to the concept of similarity of 
meaning, rather than sameness of meaning. Putnam criticises Block’s 
opinion, saying that a “conceptual role” can be changed without there 
being a change in meaning. Here, Putnam concludes this idea in two 
different ways: 
First, Putnam believes that the meaning of a word will lose its own 
context if and only if there is a change in the meaning of the word, but the 
conception of reconstruction of meaning is only dependent on the 
consequent change of the subject. 
Secondly, in the case of a natural kind word, the extension is regarded 
as a dominant “component” of meaning. Even Putnam endorses that water 
and H20 are not synonymous terms. Actually, H20 is synonymous with a 
description like “a chemical compound which consists in two parts of 
hydrogen and one part of oxygen”. Block believes that to be a natural kind 
term is to be a conceptual role. Here, Putnam rightly points out the 
mistaken part of Block’s conceptual role semantics. He suggests that a 
person can have a conceptual role for “ether”, which is regarded as an 
empty expression. Putnam also states: 
A central problem that a conceptual role theory faces is this: only a small 
number of the beliefs we have at a given time partake in fixing the 
meaning of a term.43  
He gives a wonderful example: a king as a male hereditary ruler of a 
country is regarded as a fundamental feature of the stereotype of the term 
“king”. But we find that the King of England does not rule. Therefore, 
there are some family resemblances which are actually denoted by the 
term extension. Block might say that this difficulty is not only applicable 
to his “conceptual role semantics”, but we can regard it as a genuine 
problem of any kind of theory of meaning. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the argument of the six puzzles was introduced to bring 
into the discussion the role of narrow content. Applying these analyses, 
internalists make a distinction between individual and environment. 
Internalism gives much more attention to the narrow content of the mind, 
whereas externalism is concerned with the language of causal events, 
which is fixed by external affairs. Actually, internalism focuses on the 
claim that the beliefs and experiences of an agent are fully constituted by 
what goes on inside the mind of the subject, where the physical or social 
environment cannot have any influence on their content. So, in 
internalism, the content of the mental state of an agent does not depend on 
the external affairs of the subject. Meanwhile, externalism holds that the 
world is individuatively basic with respect to mental states, and mental 
distinctions are defined by the worldly state of affairs. I have also 
examined three prominent thinkers’ defence of internalism; they try to 
refute externalism and the belief in the wide content thesis. Searle, Block 
and Fodor aim to give satisfactory accounts of internalism by analysing 
their own strategies: “intentionality”, “conceptual role semantics” and the 
“computational theory of mind”. Searle’s intentionality hypothesis talks 
about indexical expressions of self-referentiality and an awareness of the 
context of utterances, which precede the fact that linguistic utterances are 
intentional in nature and meanings are in the head of the agent, therefore 
not dependent on the causal or contextual determination of the external 
world. Block and Fodor both try to show that computational models of our 
conceptual system are intrinsic in nature. Fodor is much more interested in 
the psychological narrow content theory, using it to establish a relationship 
between linguistic mental entities and non-linguistic entities in terms of 
perceptual prototypes. Contrary to the internalists’ argument for narrow 
content, Putnam and other externalists have introduced the idea of broad 
content, according to which our perceptual experience makes a causal link 
with the environment. Even in the case of some exceptional terms like 
“elm” and “beech”, though the terms are conceptually the same, an expert 
in our linguistic community will know the distinctions that can help the 
layman to distinguish between the two similar trees or the words. Here, 
perception is a causal content that represents what is perceived in the 
environment. So Putnam suggests that meanings are not in our head or 
mind. This claim leads to one of the most significant debates in 
contemporary philosophy of mind and language. We find conflict between 
externalism and the introspective knowledge of content. The externalist 
approach shows that the content of our thoughts rests on the external 
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environment, and is obviously not in the head of the speaker. Now the 
point is that any kind of knowledge about this content would be 
knowledge of the external environment. It would not be possible for 
agents to know that “water is wet” or “twater is wet” without knowing the 
external world or environment in which the terms “water” and “twater” are 
located. This sort of knowledge is based on empirical knowledge about 
content, rather than introspective knowledge that points toward 
internalism. 
 

CHAPTER THREE 
EXTERNALISM AND ITS CRITICS      
 
 
 
“Living in a material world I am a material girl.” 
—Madonna 
Introduction 
 In the first two chapters of my book, I have discussed the debate 
between internalism and externalism from the perspectives of metaphysics 
and philosophy of language. In this chapter, my intention is to track down 
the transition of the debate from philosophy of language to philosophy of 
mind. First, I will point out varieties of externalism and their scopes in the 
debate. Later, my purpose will be to scrutinise the two strong charges 
raised by internalists against externalism. I will discuss the views of Segal, 
Boghossian, Dretske and Shoemaker, whose strongest criticisms against 
externalism are particularly pertinent to the debate. The crucial task of this 
chapter is to give a response to the arguments made by internalists against 
externalism (empty terms and self-knowledge) based on the approaches of 
three prominent externalists: Davidson, Tyler Burge and Bilgrami.  
(3.1) Varieties of Externalism 
As discussed earlier, externalism says that our intentional mental states 
have contents that are world-involving. The content of an agent’s thought 
does not supervene on his/her mental states. Here, “external” means 
“external to the body or skin of the subject”. Externalism does not exist 
only in one form; it can vary as follows: 
1. Natural kind externalism, supported by Hilary Putnam. We may also 
call this physical externalism. Putnam’s “twin earth” thought experiment 
deals with natural kind terms like “water”. According to Putnam, though 
the earthian and twin-earthian have the same psychological states, they 
still use the natural kind term “water” to refer to two different substances 
(H2O, and XYZ respectively). A change in the meaning of the term 
“water” leads to a consequent change in its extension and also a change in 
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mental states. Here, Putnam’s intention is to prove that mental content 
cannot supervene on bodily states. 
2. Natural kind and non-natural kind externalism can have a social 
character. We may call this view social externalism, and it is supported by 
Tyler Burge and followed by many others. Burge pays attention to 
intentional states involving not only natural kind terms, but also non-
natural kind terms like “sofa”, “arthritis”, etc. Burge describes a set of 
“arthritis” beliefs of an agent, and these beliefs were attributed to content 
clauses containing “arthritis in oblique occurrence”. In this case, many of 
these beliefs were true; for instance, the agent had the sort of pains and 
aches that characterise “arthritis”. But the person wrongly believed that 
he/she had “arthritis” in her/his thigh. The person was ignorant about the 
fact that, by definition, “arthritis” cannot develop in a patient’s thigh; it is 
actually an inflammation of joints. Burge argues: 
The differences seem to stem from differences “outside” the patient 
considered as an isolated physical organism, causal mechanism or seat of 
consciousness. The difference in his mental contents is attributable to 
differences in his social environment… such differences are ordinarily 
taken to spell differences in mental states and events.1 
3. There is another kind of externalism which is called singular term 
externalism, propounded by Gareth Evans and later by John McDowell. It 
is also called radical externalism. 
4. There is another type of externalism, found in Bilgrami’s writings, 
that he called externalism with constraint (C). In Belief and Meaning: The 
Unity and Locality of Mental Content,2 Bilgrami says that “the contents of 
an agent’s mind are necessarily public”. But one thing is important here: 
Bilgrami attempts to avoid the causal determination thesis, an initial claim 
of externalism, because for him there is no exact way to determine the 
causal relations between speakers and objects in the world. 
5. Phenomenological externalism, a recently developed externalism, is 
well supported by McCulloch in his paper “Phenomenological Externalism”. 
The slogan of the phenomenological externalism is “contents are not in the 
head but in the mind”. McCulloch emphasises: 
Phenomenological externalism is an attempt to cash out intentionality, 
construed as a genuine mental feature, in terms of real (e.g., ontic, causal, 
nomic) relations between thinkers and bits of the world.3  
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Here I want to add that, while defending the critical theory of 
phenomenological externalism, McCulloch has elaborated upon the 
concept of world-involvedness in terms of configuration of subjectivity. 
Later, I will try to defend various types of externalism in my writings. 
(3.2) Two Strong Charges against Externalism 
Internalists have renewed the attack on externalism from two strong 
perspectives, through which they attempt to argue that externalism is 
incompatible with a) empty natural kind terms and b) privileged self-
knowledge and first person authority. First, I will mention here the first 
charge, which is known as that of “empty natural kind terms”, deliberately 
argued by internalists against externalism. 
3.2.1 Empty Natural Kind Terms and Externalism 
According to externalists, natural kind terms are fundamentally 
relational to their environment. Internalists, mainly Segal, claim that “this 
most courageous of externalist views is catastrophic. There are numerous 
empty kind terms that we must take to express concepts”.4 Segal’s view on 
moderate internalism is referred to as the “Thesis of World Dependence” 
of kind concepts or “TWD”. Segal argues that non-physical entities or 
empty terms are not meaningless. The non-existence of ghosts does not 
mean that “ghost” is meaningless, because we have an idea about ghosts in 
our mind. He claims that “ghost” is also considered an empty natural kind 
term as there are specific names for specific kinds of spirit or ghost, and 
many common features of ghost stories are shared by different cultures. 
For Segal, internalism refers to theses where two interconnected 
requirements are met: 
First, content does not depend on anything outside of the skin. 
Secondly, content also depends on microstructures. 
 
Though Segal believes that Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment 
can be regarded as a paradigm case in the philosophy of language and 
philosophy of mind, still he criticises Putnam’s argument, saying that if we 
believe that on twin earth there is no water (H2O), we cannot rightly claim 
that twin Oscar is actually Oscar’s twin. Here we find some kind of 
ramification. Even Thomas Kuhn once suggested to Segal that an object 
which is in nature totally different to H2O could not be microscopically 
very similar to water. So one might argue that although the twin earth 
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thought argument is conceptually possible, it is nomologically impossible. 
Segal’s refutation of the fundamental characteristics of physical 
externalism as defended by Putnam is as follows: 
First, physical externalism states that the extension of a non-empty 
term depends on the real relationship between the agent and the external 
world. But Segal refutes the thesis by showing that non-physical terms or 
empty concepts are not meaningless. We can have significant ideas 
regarding certain empty terms such as “polio”, “quark”, “ghost” etc. 
Secondly, in physical externalism, it is also required that an extension 
condition is essential to the cognitive content of the concept. Segal says 
that this thinking is catastrophic in the sense that there are so many empty 
concepts expressed in our language. Someone might argue that “water is 
wet” without any thought containing the idea of H2O. One can refer to 
H2O only if the earth actually contains water, not if the earth is empty. 
Now I will mention another key charge that is raised by Paul 
Boghossian with the main purpose of attacking externalism from the 
background of “empty concepts”. Boghossian renews his attack on 
externalism in his well-known paper “What Can the Externalists Know A 
Priori?”5 He suggests that in the case of empty terms, the externalists fail 
to denote natural kind terms like “phlogiston” or “ghost”. Boghossian’s 
objection against externalism is that externalism is incompatible with 
privileged self-knowledge because: 
a) Externalists cannot individuate any property as the reference of an 
empty natural concept such as “ether” or “ghost”. 
b) Without any reference they cannot admit any content. 
c) Sometimes, on the basis of introspection, we consider whether an 
apparent natural kind thought has any content or not. In this case, 
self-knowledge and a priori thinking help us to infer knowledge 
about the concepts of natural kind terms such as “water”, “gold” 
etc. 
d) Empirical investigation also helps us to decide whether a particular 
natural kind thought has any content or not. 
 
Externalism gives relevant answers to the above criticisms. For 
externalists, if “water” exists on the earth, then Souvik (an agent) uses the 
term “water” because he has interacted causally with instances of “water”. 
This would not be possible if water did not exist. It follows from this 
experiment that empty terms have no meaning, as they have no reference 
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success, and there is no causal relation between empty terms and the 
environment. By this argument, externalists try to give a satisfactory 
answer to the question raised by Boghossian regarding empty terms. But it 
is not a satisfactory answer, because externalists cannot give the truth 
conditions of “water is wet” on earth and cannot specify the tokens of 
water. I will discuss these issues later.  
3.2.2 Self-Knowledge and First Person Authority 
Here, I will first confer Boghossian’s point of view on privileged self-
knowledge and externalism. Boghossian asks the question “Is externalism 
compatible with the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge?” For him: 
By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what 
concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are 
internal to us, but on facts about our environment.6 
He also clarifies the concept of self-knowledge by saying that:  
By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view 
that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, 
what our thoughts are in our own case.7 
In the case of self-knowledge, we find that the process of knowing 
oneself is removed from any kind of empirical knowledge. The process of 
self-knowledge relates to the following requirements: 
a) The agent entertained a thought. 
b) The thought has a particular conceptual content. 
c) The content is that “water is wet”. 
 
Boghossian also admits that the concepts of referent and extension take 
a central role in the knowledge of a natural kind term like “water”. Here, 
the referent of “water” will be the stuff called “water”, and the extension 
of “water” consists of the set of all aggregates of “H2O” molecules that 
exist anywhere. Boghossian tries to prove that we can find a term which 
may articulate a property, but nothing actually has that property. 
Boghossian reminds us that externalism is interested in talking about the 
linguistic community, rather than the individualistic theory itself.  
It is relevant to discuss again the concept of empty natural kind terms. 
Boghossian mentions two kinds of scenario in which natural kind terms, 
for example quark, caloric etc., fail to designate their referents. The 
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referent of a word is not available here. It would be a hasty claim that the 
existence of a concept is only dependent on its referent, because we can 
imagine the concept of “dry earth”, like we can imagine “twin earth”. 
Externalists, however, hold that “water” expresses an atomic concept 
under some conditions where it has a non-empty extension, and this 
extension may be H2O or XYZ or something else. We can say that this 
argument is much more metaphysical than epistemic or semantical. Some 
externalists reply that the concepts are satisfied by different context-
independent conditions. Now what would the satisfactory conditions of 
“water” on “dry earth” be? The extension of “water” on “dry earth” cannot 
be found. In Boghossian’s words: 
... Since there is no natural kind at the end of the relevant causal chain 
leading up to uses of “water” on dry earth, there is no fact of the matter 
what the referent of “water” is and so no fact of the matter what 
proposition is expressed by sentences involving it.8  
An externalist might reply that a determinate concept cannot be 
expressed by an empty token; therefore, empty terms have no extensions. 
Related to this, it will be affirmative to talk about Fred Dretske’s defence 
of externalism. Wonderfully, he claims that our beliefs have mental 
contents which are determined by the external state of affairs. He writes 
that: 
Beliefs are in the head, but what make them beliefs, what gives them their 
intentional content, what makes them about something, are the relations in 
which these internal states stand (or stood) to external affairs.9  
We can compare beliefs to the concept of money. Money is in our 
pockets. But the pocket does not give the money its value. The worth or 
value of money is constituted by external matters, such as social and 
economic conditions. Similarly, beliefs have content because what 
happens in our conceptual world is related to the external world. Dretske 
also believes that he is not only an externalist when it comes to mental 
content; he also considers himself an externalist with relation to all kinds 
of representation. The instruments on the dashboard in a car are also 
relational facts which express information about the car’s speed (like 80 
km/hr). It is comparable with an object or an event in our brains’ 
processes. An event or object becomes representational through acquiring 
an appropriate informational function. Dretske calls this kind of externalism, 
which denies that thought supervenes on the neurobiology of the thinker, 
metaphysical externalism. But he refutes the argument to say: 
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The special authority we enjoy about our own minds is an authority about 
what we think – that, for instance, there is water – not about the fact that 
we think it.10 
For Dretske, sense perception gives us reliable information about 
external affairs. But sense perception cannot be about what is happening in 
the mind. For example, if a person claims that he walked all the way from 
England to India, then it would not be easy to believe. It would be 
physically impossible for a person to go from England to India and cross 
the sea by walking. Now, internalists may argue that we can know this 
impossibility through our internal mental states or intuition. But that does 
not help. Though Dretske believes in externalism, he is compelled to 
accept authoritative and privileged access in experience. Dretske writes: 
My first person authority extends only to the facts that, given that these 
external relations obtain, are internally accessible to me – to content, to 
what I think and experience.11  
Here, the concept “I think” is quite difficult to understand. One cannot 
learn the meaning of “I think” through the teaching of others, but only by 
thinking oneself, in a linguistic community, as grown up people do. So 
externalists need to accept the concept of first person experience. With this 
argument, Dretske tries to imply the importance of internal states and first 
person authority in the field of externalism. 
 In the light of the foregoing account of self-knowledge and first 
person authority, I would like to discuss Sydney Shoemaker’s views on 
first person authority. We know that self-knowledge is knowledge of our 
own beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Without the conception of self-
knowledge, it is impossible to discuss deliberation. Shoemaker suggests: 
Deliberation is a self-critical enterprise. One’s beliefs, desires, and 
intentions are up for review, and for this to occur one must not only have 
them but be aware of having them.12 
He firmly believes that rationality has a significant position in self-
knowledge. If an agent is aware of his/her beliefs and desires, then it 
obviously follows that he/she has knowledge of them. To be blind about 
one’s own beliefs and desires is paradoxical. It is like saying “it is shiny 
but I do not believe that it is so”. Though there is a logical inconsistency, 
from the psychological perspective, it can sound true, because one can 
psychologically believe that it is not raining though in the real world it is 
actually raining heavily. Here, it would be suitable to mention that 
asserting is considered a criterion through which we can make a 
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justification of the truth in our judgments. Therefore, we cannot get a first 
person psychological statement on the basis of bodily or behavioural facts. 
What is surprising about first person statements is that they do not always 
talk about the speaker’s body. First person authority relates to internal 
experiences and not external bodily affairs. Access to a first person 
experience has been always internal and not external.  
For Shoemaker, we can divide first person psychology into two 
groups: 
a) Corrigible statements: Statements about perceptual and publicly 
observable objects are regarded as corrigible statements. In fact, a 
person can believe a sentence is true even though it is false, or is 
late proved by others to be false. 
b) Incorrigible statements: Shoemaker says that incorrigible 
statements talk about private experiences or mental events, and 
include statements about pain, mental images etc. Shoemaker 
thinks: 
In such cases I shall say that the first-person statement is based on the 
criteria for the truth of a “nonpersonal component” of it. What I wish to 
attack is the view that a first-person statement, if known to be true or 
asserted with justification, must be based on the criteria for the truth of the 
whole statement, and not simply on the criteria for the truth of its 
nonpersonal components.13 
In the case of sceptical doubt about our own existence, Descartes has 
shown that “I think, therefore I am”, which means that thinking is the 
criterion through which we can be aware of our own existence. This 
Cartesian line of reasoning summarises the idea of indubitability or the 
infallible knowledge of an individual’s thoughts that are not based on 
empirical knowledge. Though contemporary rationalists like Burge 
disagree with this opinion, from the Cartesian accounts we can call it self-
knowledge. Jasper Kallestrup, in his recent work Semantic Externalism, 
writes:  
Self-knowledge is the knowledge we each enjoy of our own mental states 
as opposed to the knowledge we purport to have of the external world. 
This thesis also goes under the name “privileged access,” and we shall use 
both interchangeably.14 
Self-knowledge is ultimately based on the observation of our inner 
selves; we also know that self-knowledge is not empirically corrigible by 
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others. Even our knowledge of mental states is not incorrigible by nature. 
In defending the transparency of belief states, Gareth Evans mentions: 
[I]n making a self ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or 
occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If someone asks 
me “Do you think there is going to be a third world war?” I must attend, in 
answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would 
attend to if I were answering the question “Will there be a third world 
war?”15 
However, there is a crucial difference to be found between the way we 
know our own minds and the way we know others’. The distinction 
between first and third person utterances rests on the concept of avowals, 
i.e. expressions of our intentional or sensational states. The statement “I 
have a toothache” is regarded as a “phenomenal avowal”, while the 
statement “I hope the weather stays cool” is regarded as an “attitudinal 
avowal”. Three alternative characters are interconnected with the concept 
of avowals or self-knowledge: 
a) Authoritative: 
If one claims that he/she is in a certain mental state, then the sentence 
will be a prima facie case only if he/she fails to guarantee the truth of 
his/her self-ascription. So here, sincerity and competence are the primary 
conditions for becoming a self-knowledge or avowal statement. But in the 
case of attitudinal avowals, one can carry out self-deception, or make the 
mistake of engaging our own intentional states with our second order 
beliefs. 
b) Non-inferentiality: 
Avowals and first person authority are not related to the concept of 
non-inferentiality. If I claim that “I have throat pain”, there is no 
conception of inferentiality on my side. But in the case of a second or third 
person, if I tell them that “I have a throat pain”, then they have no other 
way to know without inferring about my mental attitude. The point is that 
second and third person ascription might be fallible because of this mere 
non-immediate access to the first person’s mental attitudes in terms of 
inferentiality. 
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c) Salience: 
It is possible for a third person to be familiar with all the relevant facts 
of a first person’s behaviour, but a third person will not be able to grasp 
the basic psychology of the first person. According to Kallestrup: 
A basic mental state M is salient to the speaker who has it. If in normal 
circumstances M occurs in Anna, then Anna knows that it occurs. In 
similar circumstances, if M does not occur, then it cannot seem to Anna in 
every way as if it does occur.16 
Here I would like to mention that first person beliefs and desires are in 
nature salient to one’s own self, but not to others. These are the common 
features that are easily endorsed with regard to self-knowledge or the 
avowal theory of first person authority. Evans takes a hybrid view to 
propose that one aspect of a content determines reference to the actual 
world, while another determines reference to possible worlds. We can find 
alternative opinions to Evans’s in Fumerton’s paper “Introspection and 
Internalism”. He emphasises: 
My internal states are states that we can identify with my exemplifying 
nonrelational properties – they are states that could exist in a world 
containing no other entity but me.17 
For instance, my thought of green is just my being acquainted with the 
universal green. Here we can take an example sentence: “I can know 
through introspection that my son is tall.” Furmeton replies: 
The internalist claims that the existence of my son and his causal 
connections to my internal state is no part of what constitutes my thinking 
of my son. That internal state may, of course, be included in the subject 
matter of propositions that describe features of the world that go beyond 
the internal state.18  
As I mentioned earlier, first person authority is not based on any kind 
of evidence and it is regarded as an essentially direct method. 
(3.3) A Response from Davidson 
At first, Donald Davidson, as an externalist, tries to clarify the debate 
between externalism and first person authority to say that first person 
authority is better privileged than second or third person authority. He 
admits: 
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Special authority attaches directly to claims about the desire and belief, 
less directly to claims about the necessary causal connection.19 
He is well aware of the fact that first person authority can turn out to 
be false, because sometimes our own attitudes turn out to be incorrigible 
thoughts. Now the question is: “Why are self-ascriptions privileged?” 
Davidson replies that in The Concept of Mind, Ryle suggests that what we 
take as “privileged access” is due to nothing more than the fact that we are 
generally better placed to observe ourselves than others are. He also adds: 
I agree with Ryle that any attempt to explain the asymmetry between first 
person present tense claims about attitudes, and other person or other tense 
claims, by reference to a special way of knowing or a special kind of 
knowledge must lead to a sceptical result.20 
Now we can take two different statements in connection with this: 
John’s statement “I believe Wagner died happy” and the statement Smith 
expresses: “John believes that Wagner died happy.” These statements are 
not the same, according to Davidson, because there is a first person/third 
person asymmetry between the two. This asymmetry tells us that there is a 
primary level difference between the self and other descriptions. It is 
logically true that my claim “I am feeling hungry” and your claim about 
me, “Sanjit is feeling hungry”, are not the same. 
Another asymmetry tells us that in the case of self-ascription, when I 
claim “I am happy” and X, a second person, says “Sanjit believes that he 
is happy”, here the self-ascriptive statement is always more authoritative 
than the ascription of the other. In the first case, the self-ascription of 
happiness speaks authoritatively and about my true mental content. But in 
the second case, there is a difference, as others cannot with authority speak 
about my mental states. In my case, I can report my thinking truly and 
authoritatively. Davidson writes: 
To put the matter in its simplest form: there can be no general guarantee 
that a hearer is correctly interpreting a speaker; however easily, 
automatically, unreflectively, and successfully a hearer understands a 
speaker, he is liable to serious error.21  
First person utterances are logically different from third person 
utterances. The latter is more prone to error than the former, whereas the 
former are taken as true under normal circumstances. Even then, first 
person authority is not actually error free. Davidson defends externalism, 
as he is aware that our thoughts are either true or false because of their 
relation to the external world. Davidson suggests: 
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Mental states (such as believing) can be, and usually are, identified in part 
by their causal relations to events and objects outside the subject whose 
states they are.22 
Like Putnam, Davidson also believes that the meaning of a word rests 
on the speaker’s linguistic background and what he/she has learned in the 
linguistic community. Following Hacker, 23  I will describe Davidson’s 
externalist account in the following way: 
a. Naturalist debate: In the theory of meaning, Davidson believes in 
the empiricist way. Words and their relations with the appropriate 
objects and situations take a relevant place in Davidson’s theory. 
b. Causal component of meaning: In his paper “The Myth of 
Subjectivity”, Davidson clarifies his notion of the causal 
component of meaning by saying that “in the simplest and most 
basic cases words and sentences derive their meaning from the 
objects and circumstances in which they were learned”.24 He also 
tells us that the meaning of a word is dependent on the causal 
relation between an agent and the external world. 
c. Connection between language and reality: Language, for Davidson, 
is anchored in reality. The presence of water will be true when 
there is water in the actual world. However, he admits that there are 
many words in natural language which have no causal relationship 
to the world; we cannot learn these words by way of the 
correspondence theory of meaning. 
d) Genetic constraints on speaker’s meaning: The reference and 
meaning of a word used by a speaker rest on the nexus between 
words and objects. Davidson says: 
 
… The correct interpretation of what a speaker means is not determined 
solely by what is in his head: it depends also on the natural history of what 
is in the head.25  
In his “Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Davidson tries to show that 
externalism may well be consistent with the claim of first person authority. 
He wants to point out that something which is external to the subject (or 
part of his physical or social environment) may well be intrinsic to it, in 
the sense that mental states can be individuated in terms of first person 
authority. He comes up with his famous sunburn example. Suppose a 
person has a skin condition which is identified by a doctor as sunburn. 
Here, though the sun is external to the patient, it is in terms of the sun that 
something which is internal to him, i.e. his skin condition, is identified. 
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Similarly, the broad relational content of thought is external to the subject, 
yet it is individualised. Davidson believes the following in this regard: 
Firstly, mental states, like beliefs and desires, etc., are similar to other 
states, like diseases, which are identified in terms of their causes, 
because they are partially identified in terms of the social and 
historical contexts in which they occur. 
Secondly, one should not think that this implies that physicalism is 
wrong, as “how we describe or identify events has nothing directly 
to do with where those states and events are”. 
Thirdly, it is possible for us to communicate with others, and also have 
access to their minds, only because other people’s mental states and 
the meanings that their words have are partially identified in terms 
of the causal relations between them and the external world. This 
does not, however, jeopardise first person authority. In his famous 
Swampman argument, Davidson 26  assumes that Davidson and 
Swampman are not only intrinsically physical duplicates, but also 
behavioural duplicates. In his words: “Suppose lightning strikes a 
dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to 
its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different 
molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, 
The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature, it 
departs the swamp, encounters and seems to recognize my friends, 
and appears to return their greetings in English. It moves into my 
house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one 
can tell the difference.” 
 
 So we can say that Davidson and Swampman are synchronic, physical 
and behavioural duplicates. Before we go further, let me remind readers 
that Davidson believes in a historical causal theory of representational 
content according to which we cannot separate the idea of past causal 
interaction with external affairs in our constitutive meaningful use of 
language. He modifies Wittgenstein’s representational thesis to add that 
content is individuated by causal and historical environment. Through this 
thesis, Davidson claims that Swampman has no capacity for intentional 
thought. He also claims that Swampman has not learned the meaning of 
any terms in our learning situation. The reason is that Swampman has no 
teleological function in his brain, so the utterance of his words has no 
reference; there is no question about their meaningfulness. As Kallestrup 
points out:  
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According to these theories, part of what makes Davidson have any 
thoughts at all is that they are rooted in his external environment via 
causal-historical chains of communication, but since Swampman has no 
causal pedigree he is utterly incapable of expressing or entertaining 
thoughts during t1-t2.27  
We know that one can recognise someone only if one has encountered 
him/her before, but in the case of Swampman, there is no question of 
meeting with all Davidson’s friends from before. Even Swampman is not 
able to speak a public language, as he had never gone through our learning 
processes. Another crucial argument is raised by Ruth Millikan from a 
biological perspective. She claims: 
As argued above, you and Davidson are also members of the same real 
kind, the kind Homo sapiens. Does it follow that you and Swampman are 
members of the same real kind? Is being members of the same real kind a 
transitive relation?28  
But here, in the case of Swampman, we will find discontinuity between 
ancestors and descendents. No such discontinuity is possible in the case of 
Homo sapiens. You and I are both human offspring, but Swampman is not 
a human. So it does not follow that belonging to the same real kind is 
regarded as transitive. Humans and other species have certain evolutionary 
similarities which the Swampman does not possess. These natural kind 
features are individuated precisely by their microphysical constructions, 
for example water as H20. But Homo sapiens is not a natural kind term 
like Putnamian “water” or “twater”. It is obviously a real kind, and it also 
has a historical causal background. 
Putnam’s natural kind externalism teaches us that the twins are 
ensconced in physically different environments, and this environmental 
difference warrants a difference in their conceptual ascription. On the 
other hand, Burge’s social externalism indicates that their different content 
ascriptions make a difference in the balance of their linguistic practices, 
rather than their different physical environments. Both Putnam and Burge 
believe in the hypothesis that twins have different psychological 
characteristics. Davidson agrees with Putnam and Burge about the role of 
environment in the case of content ascription. Joseph Owens rightly points 
out: 
Davidson is a linguistic externalist: he agrees that twins ensconced in 
different physical environments admit of different psychological 
descriptions, but he denies that their mental states are somehow external – 
he denies that they differ in their mental states.29 
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Davidson assumes that, though Burge’s argument is inadequate for 
self-knowledge, Putnam’s thought experiment is compatible with self-
knowledge. The problem is that if we accept content in terms of external 
factors, then self-knowledge appears to be threatened. This is because, if 
everything in our minds is determined by the external world, then 
knowledge of our own minds seems to be impossible. Davidson prefers to 
search for reconciliation between self-knowledge and externalism. One of 
the assumptions supported by Putnam is that meanings are not in the head 
and thoughts cannot be grasped by first person authority. This full-fledged 
idea is supported by natural kind externalism, which we looked at earlier. 
The other problem with externalism is that the externalist, in general, 
identifies self-knowledge with access to inner mental states. Davidson 
discards this assumption and shows that natural kind externalism is 
compatible with privileged self-knowledge, which tells us about the 
infallibility and incorrigibility of our mental contents. In his paper 
“Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Davidson talks about two assumptions that 
are of immense significance to externalism: 
First, if a thought is identified by something outside of the head, then it 
is not wholly in the head. 
Second, if a thought is outside the head, it cannot be grasped by the 
mind and so has so no first person authority. 
 
Davidson does not accept the first assumption. For him, if mental 
contents are actually linked with external objects, for that reason we 
cannot assert that they are outside of our heads. He offers an example: let a 
skin specialist check my skin and tell me that my skin is affected by 
sunburn. To identify the cause of the rash on my skin, the doctor refers to 
something (sunlight) outside of my skin. So from an externalist perspective, 
we can presume that the sun, which is regarded as an external object, is 
causally related to my skin. Davidson thinks that here, causal interaction 
has taken an important role in our linguistic reference. In his words: 
The claim is that all thought and language must have a foundation in such 
direct historical connections, and these connections constrain the 
interpretation of thoughts and speech.30 
Even in the case of “water”, when an agent thinks about water, the 
concept of water is not outside of his/her head. He/she thinks that thoughts 
about water and “twater” are different, in the sense that water is causally 
related to H2O while “twater” is causally related with XYZ. Here, two 
different causal relations make a critical difference to mental states. For 
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this reason, we cannot say that mental states are outside the mind or 
outside the head. So the claim about first person authority in mental states 
is defensible. Davidson also tells us that philosophers who deny compatibility 
between self-knowledge and externalism are misguided. They consider 
self as a “theatre” where the mental contents are displayed, and the world 
as a mirror, so they find it tricky to blend the mind with the world. 
Davidson refutes this Cartesian model of the mind. For him, the “mind” is 
necessarily related to the external world. Davidson states: 
On the one hand, there are the true inner states, with respect to which the 
mind retains its authority; on the other hand there are the ordinary states of 
belief, desire, intention and meaning, which are polluted by their necessary 
connections with the social and public world.31 
(3.4) A Response from Tyler Burge and Social 
Externalism 
Woodfield considers social externalism an individuation condition of 
thoughts, and these thoughts issue from trained thinking. He suggests: 
Social externalism, as I understand it, says that people who are competent 
in a public language are equipped to have certain thoughts whose contents 
are fixed (in part) by the lexical semantic norms of their language.32 
He even claims that Burge does not consider his own position social 
externalism. However, I think Burge believes in contents which are 
determined by the physical (not mental) and also linguistic environment. 
Anti-individualism is the view that the natures of many mental/physical 
states constitutively rely on relations between those mental states and 
specific aspects of elements in the environment. It would be irrelevant to 
claim that mental/psychological states themselves are related to the 
environment, or that they occur in the environment, or that they enclose 
entities in the environment within them. Burge sets out two types of 
thought experiment in his 1979 and 1986 papers. I will talk about those 
experiments briefly and try to explain how he establishes his argument 
against internalism. In his paper “Individualism and the Mental”,33 Burge 
argues that a protagonist speaker, let us call him Ramprasad (an agent), 
said “I have arthritis in the thigh”. But we know this is wrong, because 
“arthritis” occurs only in the joints and bones, and not in the thigh. Here, 
the agent Ramprasad’s comment is counterfactually different from the 
content of his belief in the actual situation. Let us imagine that in both 
situations (actual and possible), Ramprasad’s intrinsic physical and 
Externalism and its Critics 67
historical states remained unchanged. One can argue here that there may 
be some physical changes which occur in the environment. Woodfield 
responds:  
The answer is: Alf (agent) has been causally affected by the linguistic 
environment in which he has been brought up – but only to the extent that 
the inner traces have come to be a partial reflection of the ambient 
language.34  
Social externalism looks at concepts as norms. Concepts are by nature 
abstract; they are not located in people’s minds. Basically, they are 
dependent on social practice or the “socio-linguistic environment”. At 
first, Burge focuses on the limited scope of the “twin earth” thought 
experiment. The argument looks like this: 
a) It just talks about natural kind terms, like water. 
b) It only considers dependency on the external environment. 
Burge focuses not only on natural kind terms, but also on non-natural 
kind terms like government, sofa, arthritis, etc. His main intention is to 
illustrate that non-natural kind terms have wide contents. In one of his 
recent writings, Origins of Objectivity,35 Burge argues that the question is 
not whether beliefs are in the head or constituted by external objects, but 
more commonsensical; it talks about the location of beliefs’ contents. He 
adds a new idea: that belief states are located where the believers are 
located. Now he believes in a crucial relationship between belief content 
and believers, in the sense that social, linguistic practices alone embed 
these belief contents. In the case of the arthritis argument, Burge says that 
only through socio-linguistic practice one can determine whether one has 
arthritis in the thigh or in the joints. Burge emphasises that an agent would 
surely lack in arthritis thoughts, even if his internal history remained the 
same, even in the counterfactual situation. This difference lies in what the 
social environment determines regarding arthritis. I concur with Burge that 
the key point of Origin of Objectivity is that the constitutive determinants 
of a state are not necessarily part of the state. The circulatory system is a 
constitutive determinant of the heart. It is necessarily referred to in an 
explanation of what a heart is; a heart would not be a heart if it did not 
pump blood around a wider system - but the wider circulatory system is 
not part of the heart. Similarly, although elements in the physical and 
social environment are constitutive determinants of what it is to be in 
specific psychological states, they are not part of the psychological states 
at all. The psychological states are not located where they are. 
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In “Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind”,36 Burge assumes 
that X (an agent) inhabits a society where, in spite of the same physical 
structure, “sofa” does not mean something to be used only for sitting. 
Once X comes to accept claim 1, then he no longer accepts claim 2 or its 
negation. Now the consequences look like this: 
1. Sofas are religious artifacts. 
2. Sofas are large, overstuffed pieces of furniture made for sitting. 
3. Sofas are not large, overstuffed pieces of furniture made for sitting. 
It seems to me that the concept expressed by “sofa” comes under the 
heading of what Burge refers to with the term “reduced” with regards to 
the notion of a sofa, like an anthropologist might employ on coming into a 
society that uses a term for objects that he or she can recognise, but by 
whom it is used he or she has not yet determined.37 Burge briefly considers 
some remarkable ways to synchronise the notion of “reduced”. One 
elaboration considers that the reduced notion is “tied to perceptual aspects 
of sofas”. The other proposal is that the reduced notion is a “thing of a 
kind relevant to understanding what these things are (where some sofas 
are indicated)”. Burge suggests that the first proposal might not capture 
X’s notion of “reduction” properly, and that the second at best confuses 
reference-fixing with a meaning-giving description. Burge also states: 
The idea that we can attempt to determine what our thoughts are from a 
vantage point that is neutral as to which of various alternative thoughts we 
are thinking seems to me to be not only deeply implausible but 
incoherent… One’s first person standpoint is inseparable from the 
thoughts that one actually thinks.38 
 Now it is impossible to notice that social externalism can go together 
with first person authority. Social externalism generally entails the 
existence of other people and their linguistic practices, bringing about the 
content of thoughts. So, it seems to follow that if we know a priori the 
content of our own thoughts, we must know a priori that there are socio-
linguistic practices and other people. Burge refutes this argument by 
arguing that one may know something without knowing the “background 
enabling conditions” that make knowledge possible. For example, your 
knowledge of your thought that “water is a liquid” does not entail 
knowledge of the conditions that make the thought possible, for instance, 
the existence of “water” or H20. Timothy Williamson argued in his 2004 
Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society that the use of thought 
experiments need not involve any a priori intuition, but only “our general 
cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals, which is not 
Externalism and its Critics 69
exclusively a priori...”39 That is, Williamson assimilates the crucial parts 
of thought experiments in philosophy into ordinary, contingent counterfactuals 
that are not asserted on a priori grounds. For example, “If Dr. Johnson had 
kicked George Berkeley, he would have kicked a bishop” is both a 
posteriori and contingent. 
(3.5) Bilgrami on Self-knowledge and Externalism 
Recently, Bilgrami has taken up the idea of transcendental self-
knowledge. He rejects the traditional concept of Cartesian self-knowledge 
by arguing that our own mental states are not infallible to us. For example, 
beliefs about our past mental states have a propensity to go wrong. One 
can even discard the idea of transparency, which tells us that our mental 
states are simply accessible to correct beliefs. He refutes the thesis to cite 
that there are some racists who believe that all men are not able to develop 
equally. This is definitely a mistaken belief. Let us take an example; Aritra 
mistakenly believes that he wanted whiskey on the eve of New Year of 
2016. But he does not believe or come to believe that he wanted wine. 
Bilgrami emphasises that beliefs about our mental contents are not 
evidentially based or warranted by virtue of their relationship to other 
evidential beliefs. As I go further, I would like to take up the issue of 
Bilgrami’s constitutive thesis, which says that “there is a clear sense in 
which... there can be no exceptions to the claim that if someone believes 
that P, then he believes that P and vice versa”.40  
The intuitive starting point of Bilgrami’s transcendental argument 
shows the distinction between first order intentional beliefs and second 
order intentional beliefs. Let us take an example: Bappa believes that “he 
believes that his father is worthy of respect”, while his behaviour reveals a 
contemptuous attitude towards his father. Now we can correctly identify 
Bappa’s first order beliefs towards his father; that he is not worthy of 
respect, as revealed through his behavioural evidence. Here, one thing 
worth mentioning is that for Bilgrami, Bappa’s second order beliefs cannot 
be regarded as a mistake. Here, the first order belief renders its truth from 
the second order beliefs, though it follows an inconsistency in the realm of 
first order belief regarding his misbehaviour towards his father, caused by 
the agent’s resentment. Bilgrami holds that: 
Self-knowledge is a necessary condition of responsible agency... not 
merely know that he has acted..., but [he must] also know the intentional 
states which cause and explain (rationalize) the action.41  
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An intentional belief regarding his father is that he is worthy of 
respect, which causes him to assert that his father is worthy of respect. 
Now Anthony Brueckner 42  formalises Bilgrami’s constitutive thesis as 
follows: 
For all intentional states i and all subjects S, if i meets the condition of 
responsible agency (CRA), then S has i iff S believes that he has i.  
Brueckner also formalises Bilgrami’s thinking to add that with no 
intentional state, it would be a problem to rationalise or describe an action 
if the agent does not know the belief-desire pair that rationalises his/her 
action. It is not only that self-knowledge requires first order beliefs. Even 
second order beliefs can be true under conditions of responsible agency. 
But it is surprising to see that Brueckner concludes by criticising: 
I conclude that Bilgrami’s complex transcendental argument for the 
constitutive thesis CT is unsuccessful. He has not shown that knowledge 
of one’s own mind is a condition for the possibility of responsible 
agency.43  
Social externalism and natural kind externalism both reject the concept 
of unified content to show that there is one notion of content, which is 
called externalism. This externalism is separated from any kind of self-
knowledge and internalists’ views. Bilgrami thinks that the self-knowledge 
argument only threatens orthodox externalism. He raises a prima facie 
problem of externalism. He writes: 
If things outside the agent’s ken determine the contents of an agent’s 
intentional states then, prima facie, that raises a question about how the 
agent can always have knowledge, or at any rate full knowledge, of those 
contents. That is, to the extent that there might be features of the external 
things that the agent does not know, then to that extent he would not fully 
know the concepts and contents that those external things determine.44  
Bilgrami does not accept the social externalist view that our mental 
contents are fully determined by the social world. So he comments: 
Burge says that one does not have to know the necessary conditions that 
go into the thought that p being the thought it is in order to have that 
thought. And so if one is unaware of the various external factors that go 
into its being that thought, it neither follows that one does not have that 
thought nor, given their common necessary conditions, that one does not 
have the iterated thought that expresses self-knowledge of the thought.45  
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For Bilgrami, self-knowledge of mental contents is an essential part of 
those contents. Bilgrami holds that two alternative choices are waiting for 
the orthodox externalist: either they will choose the possibility of 
attributing inconsistency to agents, or they will accept the concept of 
bifurcated content. The first choice is totally unacceptable to any orthodox 
externalist, like Burge or Putnam. The second choice is also unacceptable 
for them, because they rebut any kind of unity between externalism and 
self-knowledge. The meaning of an agent’s utterance can be one thing and 
the content of his belief another. It would be contradictory, rather than 
inconsistent, if one uttered that “Water is not H2O” or “I have arthritis in 
my thigh”. For them, meaning is external while content is internal. 
Orthodox externalism does not admit self-knowledge for the reason 
that it would lead to self-inconsistency. That is why it bifurcates content 
into narrow and wide content. However, Bilgrami rules out this bifurcation 
of content. He states: 
But my externalism, unlike these others, has no problems with inconsistent 
attributions in the first place. Neither dilemma nor therefore trilemma ever 
exists for my view. My constraint on externalism sees to it that external 
items which determine concepts do not determine concepts that are at such 
odds with his other beliefs that he will fall into the situation of uttering or 
thinking inconsistent thoughts just on the basis of the concepts attributed 
to him. Agents, on my view, may think thoughts that we specify as “Water 
is not H2O” or “I have arthritis in my thigh” but the concept of water or 
arthritis in these cases will not be determined by the experts’ beliefs or by 
scientific essence etc.46  
Bilgrami offers a unified content theory which makes room neither for 
narrow content nor for wide content; according to this theory, there is 
unity between both these contents in our beliefs. So it is easy for his 
constraint theory to show that social external items are able to enter into 
content routed through the agent’s belief. Even taking the alternative 
position, where external items lack social contents, Bilgrami’s constraint 
thesis clarifies its meta-linguistical specification through reducing these 
issues to ordinary beliefs like “water is the substance that comes out of the 
tap”, and thus he tries to remove his constraint theory from the threat of 
self-knowledge, where social and non-social external elements are unified 
with an agent’s beliefs. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Boghossian and Segal discuss the transmission of the non-referring 
token of water on “dry earth”. Their aim is to refute the concept of the 
causal referential theory of externalism. Meanwhile, Shoemaker’s effort is 
to confirm privileged self-knowledge by dropping reference altogether 
from semantic theory so as to understand one’s mental content in terms of 
infallible knowledge of thoughts. Davidson, Burge, and especially 
Bilgrami, the three foremost externalists, are in favour of constructing a 
theory in which “self-knowledge is compatible with externalism”. 
Davidson holds that mental states can be understood in part by their causal 
relations to events and objects outside of the subject. Burge suggests that if 
we know a priori about the content of our own thought, then we must 
know a priori that there are also social and linguistic practices. If we want 
to find a compatible strategy for self-knowledge which avoids all threats 
of externalism, then we must modify Putnam’s causal theory of reference 
and meaning, because all these kinds of externalism (Putnam, Burge, 
Davidson, etc.) have failed to unify the external environment as 
constituting the content of thought. So one can follow Bilgrami’s 
constraint theory to avoid the bifurcation of content and accept a 
unification of contents. The central assumption of Bilgrami’s externalism 
is that contents are obviously public, as they are externally determined. 
Contents are not determined in a causal way, but every determination of 
content must be normative and public. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
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“After learning from the works of great philosophers, we should try to 
make some more progress. By standing on the shoulders of giants, we may 
be able to see further than they could.” 
—Derek Parfit 
Introduction 
 In the last chapter of the book, my intention is to reconcile the main 
debate between internalism and externalism, and also reformulate the 
relationship between mind and meaning from the perspectives of holism 
and phenomenology. First, I will show how we can make a bridge between 
internalism and externalism through semantic holism. I will concentrate 
much more on Quine’s “confirmation holism” and Fodor’s arguments 
against holism. More specifically, following on from the sustained attacks 
on strong holism and radical internalism, I want to put forward a reformed 
externalism which I call internalistic externalism. Later, I will focus on the 
Heideggerian conception of Dasein or “being-in-the-world”, in which I 
have found the clue through which I can reach my destination. Here, my 
effort will be to show how Heidegger mingled the two different things, 
being and world, together. On my way to formulating a new kind of 
externalism, phenomenology will be my guide and Bilgrami’s specific 
version of externalism or constraint (C) will be my inspiration.  
(4.1) Is Semantic Holism a Bridge between Internalism 
and Externalism? 
 I mentioned earlier that Putnam, or any other externalist, cannot 
believe in the possibility of an individualistic conception of knowledge. 
Knowledge is something that is always shared among many in the 
collectively used language. Here it is required that a speaker must have a 
minimum amount of information about the used words by which he/she 
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will participate in any collective discussions. This theory is familiar, in the 
form of Putnam’s “division of linguistic labour”. Putnam believes that the 
model of use of the language of the speaker and the hearer will be holistic, 
i.e. a particular word or sentence does not occur in isolation; it is actually 
dependent upon the whole program. Putnam thinks: 
Meaning, in my view, is a coarse grid laid over use.1 
Putnam also accepts Wittgenstein’s “use theory of meaning”, emphasising 
that the conception of meaning of a word or sentences lies in its use in a 
linguistic community. Wittgenstein considers meaning to be correlated 
with understanding, and understanding is also associated with explanation. 
Wittgenstein considers: 
Let’s only bother about what’s called the explanation of meaning, and let’s 
not bother about meaning in any other sense.2 
Actually, Wittgenstein thinks that philosophy is nothing but analysis 
and discussion of language. Language is “a form of life” and the activity of 
man is a game. Hence, the language game is a form of language and a 
child, as Wittgenstein suggests, learns here to play the language game 
from his/her elders in the linguistic community. Any language game has 
two aspects: an agent and the environment. Therefore, the agent’s 
appropriate use is guided by the environment, which gives information 
about the external world. We are familiar with Wittgenstein’s famous 
dictum: “Don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use.” 
Putnam says: “Frege taught us that words have meaning only in the 
sense of making a systematic contribution to the truth-condition of the 
whole sentences.”3 As we know, for Frege, the meaning of a word is 
dependent on the context of the sentence. Wittgenstein also says that to 
understand a sentence is to understand a language. Davidson puts it 
together to say: 
... Only in the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore a 
word) have meaning.4 
The general view of “semantic holism” or “meaning holism” suggests 
that the meaning of a linguistic expression depends on its relations with 
others’ expressions in the same totality. This relation may be inferential or 
conceptual. Semantic holism is different from “meaning atomism” because 
“meaning atomism” deals with expressions which have independent 
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meaning restricted to smaller parts and often unidirectional in molecular 
theories. In Ned Block’s own words: 
Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; 
it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently 
of their relations to any other sentences or beliefs and therefore 
independently of any theories in which they appear.5  
Semantic holism was introduced more elaborately and impressively by 
C.G. Hempel (1950) and W.V. Quine (1951). Hempel states that 
theoretical sentences cannot stand alone. Only together with other 
theoretical sentences do they imply observational sentences. We can 
regard this as confirmation holism. Quine also thinks that “The unit of 
empirical significance is the whole science”.6 Confirmation holism insists 
that the contribution of theoretical sentences depends on the contribution 
of other sentences. Quine also believes that “procedures” about the 
assertibility of anything are associated with the entire language, not with a 
single sentence. 
Here, I will give more attention to W.V. Quine’s “semantic holism” to 
analyse the concept of holism and also differentiate it from “atomism”. 
Quine holds that our learning of language starts with sentences that are 
directly associated with external stimuli, so any semantic change which 
occurs in any part of the system consequently affects a large part of the 
network. Fodor and Lepore claim: 
Quine is a verificationist; that is, he accepts the identification of the 
meaning of a statement with its means of confirmation...7 
Quine’s “semantic holism” is derived from his two well-known 
theories: “confirmation holism” and “verificationism”. Quine’s conception 
of “confirmation holism” assumes that there are no specific hypotheses 
through which we can assume any evidence or counter evidence in 
experiments; only the whole theory can do it. Besides this, in his paper 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, he clarifies his idea on “verificationism” to 
write that “the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically 
confirming or infirming it”.8 Whether we can call Quine a verificationist 
or not is a highly controversial issue that I will discuss later. 
We can summarise Quine’s arguments for semantic holism following 
Fodor and Lepore’s thoughts: 
a)  Meaning consists in its empirical contents. 
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b)  It is impossible for us to know any scientific theory individually. 
Actually, they are corporate bodies which lack any kind of 
empirical content in isolation from other sentences about the same 
theory.  
c)  The meaning of a sentence is dependent on the corporate body of 
sentences. 
 
 Quine, who believes that language is a social phenomenon, says: 
Language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of 
other people’s overt behaviour under publicly recognizable 
circumstances.9  
Here it is worth mentioning that Quine makes a distinction between 
“observational sentences” and “theoretical sentences”. Observational 
sentences belong to the periphery, as these are directly related with 
experience, whereas theoretical sentences lie above them in a linguistic 
network. Here, “linguistic network” refers to a group of sentences whose 
constituent parts recur and the identity roles of these related sentences. 
I will mainly discuss Quine’s arguments for “semantic holism” as 
follows: 
First: The scientific practices argument: 
When a scientist carries out an experiment with a hypothesis, he/she 
makes certain background assumptions that relate to accepted theories or 
the truth values of auxiliary assumptions. The scientist’s aim is to 
incorporate the hypothesis in the theory. The general form of that 
hypothesis is actually based on observable evidence in certain conditions, 
in which case it will be true. If for any reason it turns out to be false, then 
the scientist does not refute the whole hypothesis, rather he/she refutes the 
antecedent of the observation categories.  
A. Grunbaum 10  refutes the restricted version of the Duhem-Quine 
thesis to indicate that it is not logically possible in the case of any 
experiment for there to be an alternative set of assumptions. Even in 
physics, we cannot find such an alternative set of assumptions in any 
relevant cases, like atoms or electrons. If we revise a theory in an 
unrestricted sense (changing its meaning of some items), then the thesis 
may still be true, but in a trivial sense.  
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Secondly: The language learning argument: 
Quine believes in certain observational sentences which can be known 
by external stimuli. I mentioned earlier that these observational sentences 
are mingled with theoretical sentences, and also that they constitute a 
whole scenario where the meaning of any particular sentence is related to a 
unit of other sentences. If, in any case, one of our linguistic predictions 
turns out to be false, then we should revise the sentence to avoid the false 
prediction.  
Thirdly: The Reductio argument: 
Actually, in rejecting the mentalistic theory of meaning, Quine denies 
the conception of analytic and synthetic distinction. Here his intention is to 
prove that semantic holism is possible. The first dogma, as Quine puts it, 
is the cleavage between analytic propositions, which are grounded 
independently of matters of fact, and synthetic propositions, which are 
grounded only on facts or empirical contents. This rejection of the 
mentalistic theory vindicates externalism, which paves the way for 
semantic holism. One thing worth mentioning is that the heart of semantic 
holism is that the meaning of a sentence is defined in regards to the totality 
of nodes and paths in its semantic networks. Now one might ask, how can 
Quine’s theory of “radical translation” illuminate his theory of meaning 
holism? 
For Quine, translation is an indeterminate fact. As we know, “rabbit” 
and “gavagai” have same stimulus meaning, but linguists who desire to 
analyse the translation of the native term “gavagai” will face problems. 
Here, stimulus synonymy mainly corresponds to translation. For Quine, 
the terms “rabbit” and “gavagai” are co-extensive. He says that “terms and 
references are local to our conceptual scheme”.11  
 “Is Quine’s holism strong or moderate?” One may easily ask this 
question. In order to modify his strong holism, Quine takes two alternative 
arguments: 
a)  Our propositions about the external world are not internalistic, but 
are regarded as part of a corporate body. 
b)  The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic is 
unintelligible, so it can be abandoned. 
 
Now I will clarify the concept of “strong holism” to say that strong 
holism believes in the unity of meaning of the whole language. It also 
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believes that if a sentence is isolated from other sentences, then it lacks its 
own meaning. We find the idea of “strong holism” in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”, where Quine claims: 
No statements are immune to revision.12 
This indicates that the meaning of a sentence cannot be isolated from 
other sentences in the same language. However, “moderate holism” tells 
us that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its relation to many 
other sentences. But the fact is that the units of meaning would be 
fragments of the language. It seems to me that in his later works, like 
“Epistemology Naturalized” and Word and Object, Quine became much 
closer to a “moderate holist” than a “strong holist”. 
In The Language and Thought, Jerry Fodor assumes that no simple 
concept can be determined by any other concept in our conceptual scheme. 
Semantic holism thinks that one can grasp the concept X if and only if 
he/she can grasp the other concepts Y and Z which are related to X. Fodor 
calls it a kind of “epistemic liaison” that an agent engages in with the other 
concepts in a conceptual scheme. Fodor tries to refute “semantic holism” 
and “conceptual role semantics” by putting forward two arguments, which 
are as follows: 
First: The “Reductio ad Absurdum” argument: 
To avoid holism we need to accept the traditional analytic-synthetic 
distinction. An analytic sentence can be true by virtue of its own meaning, 
whereas a synthetic sentence is made true by extra-linguistic facts. For 
example, “all bachelors are unmarried”; this is regarded as a true analytic 
sentence, where the predicate term “unmarried” is contained in the subject 
term “bachelor”. Another example: “a dog is an animal” and “dogs bite 
postmen”; here, the first sentence is obviously analytic, while the second 
one is considered a synthetic proposition, because it gives us new 
information and we need to justify this information through external 
experience. We know that it may be false, as not all dogs bite postmen. I 
will now discuss why Fodor is reluctant to accept conceptual role 
semantics. Cain points out:  
Fodor’s answer runs as follows: Holism implies that, barring cosmic 
accident, no two individuals or time slices of the same individual ever 
share a concept and, thus, ever share an intentional state.13  
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It is plausible that A (an agent) has a belief about an O (object) which 
B (another agent) does not have. Two individuals can have different 
beliefs on the same object. But semantic holism suggests that an initial 
difference in the beliefs of two different individuals constitutes a certain 
change in their conceptual schemes. Here, they cannot share a single 
intentional state. It is relevant to note here that the acquisition or 
abandonment of a new belief on the part of one of the speakers causes a 
certain change in their concepts. Fodor and Lepore refute this idea. They 
argue: 
The colloquial senses of “similar belief” presuppose some way of counting 
beliefs, so they presuppose some notion of belief identity. If you have most 
of the beliefs that I have, then, a fortiori, there are (one or more) beliefs 
that we both have.14 
They also think that the similarities in beliefs between two agents are 
dependent on the concept of same inferences. We might say that two 
agents have similar beliefs only if one believes in A, B, C and D or the 
other believes in A, B and D. In a word, there are some similarities 
between the elements of their beliefs. 
 Secondly: Inconsistency with thought argument: 
If we deny that content is compositional, then the ability of thought to 
be productive and systematic will turn out to be false. Cain clarifies 
Fodor’s arguments, stating: 
According to Fodor, content is compositional in the respect that the 
content of a complex concept is exhaustively determined by content of its 
constituent concepts and the manner in which they are combined.15  
Fodor also suggests that the compositionality of content creates a 
problem in conceptual role semantics. If we admit that concepts are by 
nature compositional, we must admit that the causal role is also 
compositional. Now this raises a huge problem. Let me take an example: 
in the term “black dog”, there is a causal link between “black dog” and 
“animal”, and “black dog” with not being “white dog”. There is an 
intimate causal relationship between “dog” and “animal” and also between 
“black” and “white”. One might believe that “black dogs are ferocious”. 
Here we will find a causal link between “dog” and “ferocious”. Is it 
possible to find a causal link between “black” and “ferocious”? Fodor 
thinks that the content of a concept can be a matter of its causal role, but 
we cannot say that this causal role may be compositional. 
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Fodor and Lepore, who quote from “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” to 
prove that Quine is a meaning holist, mislead us on the argument cited 
regarding meaning. The Duhem-Quine hypothesis expresses that our 
bodies of scientific theory confront recalcitrant experiences as wholes. 
This is a sort of evidential holism. Even Quine was very cautious about the 
boundary of “verificationism”, which hints at the failure of radical 
empiricism. From the background of natural science, Quine’s inculcations 
of the meaning of a word rest on sensory evidence. Therefore, the concept 
of evidential checkpoints, according to Quine, would be “inter subjective”, 
i.e. it would be available to the third person perspective. However, it 
would be evidence for interpreters of Quine to argue that meaning should 
be public. But I believe that actually, Quine is hinting that evidence must 
be public. Observational sentences are holophrastic ones where conjunction 
takes no role. The concept of prediction makes a bridge between an 
observation and a theory. In Quine’s words: 
The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the prediction that 
checks a theory. The requirement that it command a verdict outright is 
what makes it a final checkpoint. The requirement of inter-subjectivity is 
what makes science objective.16 
This sort of naturalistic perspective leads Quine towards language as a 
social art. Quine’s empiricist account stresses the perspective of 
naturalism, explaining and interpreting the world in terms of sentences and 
words. So language, here, blends with natural science. For Quine, reference 
and observational sentence together create a bond between language and 
word through the capacity of a certain linguistic apparatus. We see a sort 
of holistic standpoint that is clarified by Quine in his Pursuit of Truth. He 
writes: 
We learn short sentences as wholes, we learn their component words from 
their use in those sentences, and we build further sentences from words 
thus learned.17 
Beside Quine’s “radical translation” manual is a continuous process of 
revisiting this translation manual through sentences rather than words in 
the light of the translator’s success or failure of communication in a native 
language that is quite different from the translator’s own language, usually 
English. Quine is well aware that translation equation may well be possible 
between two similar languages and culturally similar communities, but he 
worries about the translation procedures between two different kindred 
languages. Quine’s “indeterminacy of translation” thesis is best discussed 
in his book Word and Object. In the case of two different languages, like a 
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jungle language and English, the concept of intercommunication becomes 
hostile because of the two different vocabularies of the communicating 
persons. Quine says: 
Only by taking the initiative and querying combinations of native 
sentences and stimulus situations so as to narrow down his guesses to 
which eventual satisfaction… What he must do is guess from observation 
and then see how well his guesses work.18  
Quine’s “radical translation” procedure is mandatorily related with his 
behaviourism, because in a field situation, a translator (English speaking 
person) who does not follow a native’s speech mainly tries to extract the 
meaning of the native’s speech, like “gavagai”, from the native’s 
behaviour. Even the amenability of natives’ behaviour in different 
situations may mislead translators regarding the exact meaning of the term 
“gavagai”. Let us imagine that an English speaking translator visits a 
jungle and hears an unknown native word, “gavagai”, uttered by a native 
when a rabbit is passing by in the field. On hearing this native word 
“gavagai” and seeing that a rabbit is passing in the field, it may well be 
possible that the translator would tentatively note down the translation of 
“gavagai” as “rabbit”. But in this case, intercommunication is not possible 
because of their different languages and vocabularies. The only things that 
a translator can follow are the expressions for assent and dissent of a 
native speaker in different situations; for example, if an animal is caught in 
a net and the native speaker utters the same term, “gavagai”, then it will be 
clear to a translator that “gavagai” means the same as rabbit. It is very 
important to see that, in this case, Quine accepts “stimulus meaning” 
(which depends on the individual speaker), i.e. rabbit: this observational 
sentence is a sort of “stimulus meaning” for the translator, whereas 
“gavagai” is the “stimulus meaning” for the natives. Quine also believes 
that “empathy” takes a very prominent role in the procedure of language 
learning. This sort of “indeterminacy of translation” encourages Quine to 
accept the indeterminacy of meaning. Interpreters of Quine have 
misunderstood Quine’s concept of “stimulus meaning”, as they place it in 
the category of “meaning”, which actually, it is not. Quine takes “stimulus 
meaning” as a science-worthy notion that has some empirical content.  
Quine’s denial of the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction is a 
challenge to the mentalist theory of meaning. Some critics think that 
Quine’s rejection of the mentalist theory paves the way towards an 
externalism that is also interlinked with meaning holism, because for 
them, meaning holism depends on the semantic externalism hypothesis. In 
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the case of determining the meaning of a sentence like “Agni is a missile”, 
we should know the socio-linguistic practices of the community in which 
the term “Agni” refers to a missile. This is a holistic externalist approach 
to meaning. Putnam does not believe that Quine is bothered about 
“meaning” or “verificationism”. Actually, Quine’s conception of “meaning” 
in his naturalised epistemology is a second grade notion that does not 
depend on a “science-worthy” notion. For him, verbal behaviour is more 
important than indeterminate meaning. It would be very impressive for a 
holistic position to claim that the meaning of every sentence depends on 
the meaning of all other sentences. Once Putnam wrote to me:  
I have been writing to you that Quine is not a meaning holist, but a 
semantic nihilist. He does not believe that there is any such thing as 
“meaning” in the semantic sense. The term “empirical meaning” is widely 
used in philosophy of science, but does not refer to anything semantic. In 
Quine’s version, the empirical meaning of a theory is the “observation 
categorical” it implies, “Empirical meaning” is holistic by definition, 
trivially, but it is not what anyone calls the meaning of sentences and 
words. Fodor sometime paints Quine as a meaning holist by pretending 
that what Quine says about the holism of empirical meaning has to do with 
the holism of “meaning” in the semantic sense, but that is a mistake. There 
are no meaning and no semantic nodes – no semantic anything - for Quine. 
Semantic talk is heuristic and not to be taken seriously in metaphysics, 
according to Quine.19 
Now I would like to focus on the term “knowing”, and we will see how 
is it challenged by holism from Dennett’s point of view, which I highly 
appreciate. Dennett wonderfully claims that, when a person knows, we 
indicate that a person knows something or precisely specify a few things 
that he knows. But this specification depends on an indefinite number of 
assumptions. In the ordinary sense, “knows” refers to knowing as true. In 
this case, it may well be possible that one agent can claim to know a 
proposition P, but this P (proposition) somehow turns out to be false. Here, 
the answer would be that the agent had a belief in P, but he did not know P 
properly. Knowing rests on psychological states like belief, disbelief etc. 
Dennett cautions us that there are some cases where we find incompatibility 
between the two different notions of knowledge -truth conditions and the 
knowledge of belief. Dennett claims: 
When called upon to produce one’s knowledge one can do no better than 
to produce what one believes to be true, and whether or not what one 
believes to be true is true does not affect its being one of those things one 
will produce as knowledge when asked, or will otherwise act on as if one 
knew them… A thing (a fact or proposition or whatever) could not occupy 
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a special psychological position (e.g., have a special functional potential in 
the direction of behavior) in virtue of its truth, so knowing something 
cannot be purely a matter of being in a particular psychological state.20 
The “process of knowing”, according to Dennett, depends on two 
different concerns. First, we need to determine what a person knows or 
exhibits as knowledge; our task is to see which of these can be true. 
Secondly, we bear in mind that a person can be regarded as a store of 
information and misinformation. Now the question is: can we specify the 
content of an agent’s store with any precision? Dennett thinks that the 
storage of information is not only the constitutive part of the knowing of 
an agent, because libraries, dictionaries etc. have a lot of stored 
information, but they are unaware of this fact. The most notable of 
Dennett’s claims is that “knowing requires understanding”, and the 
understanding of the word does not rest on the understanding of the 
sentence. It may even be possible that one can understand a sentence 
without understanding the speaker’s utterances or speech. Dennett does 
not believe that the ability to produce paraphrases is part of understanding 
a sentence, because he argues that a computer program can construct 
paraphrases of English to translate into Russian sentences, but that does 
not show that the computer understood the sentences. In the case of a 
computer, though it has some verbal connections (input-output system), it 
lacks acquaintance with the objects that words refer to. The processes of 
the conceptual scheme and the perceptual apparatus do not work with 
computers. Dennett gives importance to the concept of the behavioural 
capacities of agents in the process of understanding. If an agent X claims 
that “Y (another person) is here”, it shows that the person must be able to 
assert and know other consequences, like “Y is a friend of X”, and the 
term “here” means in town, not in another place, etc. If X claims at a party 
that “Y is here”, then X must be able to point out person Y at the party. All 
these corroborating behaviours depend on verbal tests. But Dennett 
challenges this argument by giving an example: when a child claims “my 
daddy is an astrologer”, we find that the child has the ability to produce 
paraphrases, but can we claim that the child has all the other knowledge 
about his statement, like what an astrologer is and how the positions of the 
stars and movements of the planets have a tremendous influence on the 
behaviour, lives and fates of an individual? Obviously it is not possible for 
a child to grasp all these things in his/her childhood. He/she can utter the 
sentence like a parrot, but understanding of the sentence will grow slowly 
over the years. So if we say that understanding involves certain degrees, 
then we should claim that the conditions of understanding of knowledge 
are also related to degrees. So, the knowledge of a child about a term is a 
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sort of small knowledge, whereas the knowledge of an adult person about 
a term is quite mature knowledge. Following Ryle, Dennett shows that the 
knowledge system relies on the processes of knowing how and knowing 
that. The knowing how process is a matter of ability or skill. It has no 
relation to any of the sorts of proposition that are kept in one agent’s head. 
On the other hand, knowing that is a process of description that one can 
grasp without any ability or skill. Though it is true that a child’s knowing 
system is very close to the knowing how process, we cannot deny the 
concept of the knowing that process, e.g. “today is Sunday” or “today is a 
holiday”, in our learning systems. In the case of the understanding of a 
word, Dennett believes in degrees of understanding, levels that vary from 
speaker to speaker. The knowledge of a scientist of the term “atom” and 
the knowledge of a layman are not the same. So it is not possible to show 
the limits of understanding in the processes of the knowledge system. 
(4.2) Bilgrami on Belief and Meaning:  
A New Theory of Externalism 
Bilgrami’s thesis on the unity of contents suggests that contents are 
externally determined, but the same contents can also explain the actions 
and the commonsense psychological behaviour of an agent. Bilgrami does 
not deny the concept of externalism, as externalism implies the publicness 
of thought and meaning in our linguistic framework. But he cautions us 
that it will not be wide content. His external elements are determined by 
his new thesis, which is called constraint (C). In Belief and Meaning, 
Bilgrami introduces the idea of constraint (C) in order to avoid the 
problem of bifurcation. In his own words: 
(C): When fixing an externally determined concept of an agent, one must 
do so by looking into indexically formulated utterances of the agent which 
express indexical contents containing that concept and then picking that 
external determinant for the concept which is in consonance with other 
contents that have been fixed for the agent.21 
Bilgrami thinks that to understand belief content, it is required to be 
familiar with our everyday ascriptions of others’ beliefs. We can imagine a 
counterfactual community where the term “arthritis” refers to counterfactual 
arthritis, not real arthritis. It would not be inconsistent if X (an agent) 
believed “I have an arthritis in my thigh” in a counterfactual linguistic 
community. Even Bilgrami thinks that the process of the same beliefs 
occurring in two agents might be possible. Bilgrami says: 
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... our intuitions about explanation require that they (their beliefs) be the 
same. If, for instance, both Bert and counterfactual Bert put a balm on 
their respective thighs because they want to relieve what they take to be 
their painful arthritis, our intuitions tell us that no matter what their 
community and its experts think, they have the same psychological 
conceptions, and therefore… these amount to being the same 
explanations.22  
Permit me to confine my attention to Bilgrami’s treatment of the 
following sentences: 
(a)  X believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. 
(b) X believes that he has a rheumatoid ailment that afflicts only the 
joints in his thigh.  
(c)  X believes that he has a rheumatoid ailment that does not afflict the 
thigh (if and only if X believes that a thigh is not a joint).  
 
We found that to accept sentence a, we need to accept sentence c, 
which is basically an inconsistent sentence. We also need to break the 
elementary rule of the “principle of charity”. Therefore, we should reject 
the everyday common practices of belief attribution. Here, one thing we 
need to clarify is that Bilgrami’s theory of meaning actually deals with the 
theory of the literal meaning of an agent’s sentence or terms. We know - 
Davidson’s “radical interpretation” tells us - that if an interpreter wants to 
test a theory of meaning, then he/she cannot take for granted any 
knowledge of the content of an agent’s beliefs. Here, the interpreter’s 
effort will be to grasp the circumstances under which the agent’s 
ascriptions construct certain true sentences. Davidson also thinks that an 
interpreter can have the ability to express the literal meaning of an agent’s 
sentence and terms. But Bilgrami refutes this theory to say that “at the 
meaning-theoretical level... concepts are very fine-grained and they are 
hardly ever shared by people”.23 So it is difficult work for an interpreter to 
express the literal meaning of another person’s words. Davidson asks 
Bilgrami: 
... how could an interpreter grasp, much less formulate, the truth 
conditions of an utterance which she lacked the resources to conceive?24  
Bilgrami answers: 
The concept of truth is relevant to truth-theories of content only in the 
sense of truth as an agent (whose contents are in question) conceives of 
it.25 
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One can ask: how can we fix or externally determine the concept of an 
individual? Bilgrami gives us two alternative points through which we can 
solve this problem. According to the first formulation, we need to correlate 
each gross external item with an individual concept. In this case, the idea 
of shared similarity takes on an important role. The second formulation 
also tells us that it is necessary to find correct descriptions for external 
items. Bilgrami wants to establish a causal relationship between a concept 
and its content. He claims: 
The causal relations between external states of affairs and whole 
utterances of sentences are necessarily the evidence we look to for the 
attribution of concepts… content can itself be analyzed in terms of 
composition, by some routine method, out of concepts.26  
The central point of Bilgrami’s holism is that two agents can share 
their concepts in a particular locality, but it may be possible that they do 
not share any concepts at the meaning theoretical level. In the same way, 
we need to believe that there will also be a difference between belief 
contents attributed at the level of locality and certain belief contents 
attributed at the meaning theoretical level. It seems to me that Bilgrami 
makes an equivocation in the second step or the belief state. Here, his 
main purpose is to show that it is not the case that two agents who speak 
the same natural language express beliefs with the same content when they 
utter a given sentence in that language. Bilgrami believes that, even if 
Subrata and Sumit both utter the same sentence, “water will quench 
thirst”, it does not prove that they have the same contents. The sentence 
“water will quench thirst” may have a different literal meaning or express 
a different belief in each speaker’s idiolect. So we need to make a division 
between speakers’ linguistic expressions and the contents of these 
expressions. Bilgrami writes: 
All one needs to do … is to see what beliefs the two agents will agree on. 
Imagine them communicating in this local context of drinking water and 
see what they agree on and what beliefs puzzle and throw them off. If one 
of them says that the substance that they wish to drink will not poison 
them and the other agrees, then that belief may be counted as relevant to 
this local concept “water” which goes into the explanation of their actions. 
If one of them says that the substance has the chemical composition H2O 
and the other is puzzled by that, count that belief as irrelevant in this 
locality.27  
Now I will say a few words on Bilgrami’s new theory on externalism, 
which can be regarded as “individualistic externalism”. Through the 
concept of unified content, he tries to bring the debate between internalism 
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and externalism into one framework. Bilgrami does not believe in non-
social orthodox externalism within his theory of externalism. He also 
makes a distinction between the public nature of content and the social nature 
of content, and he denies the second. His thesis became individualistic 
externalism28 because it denies social contents as individualist, and it is 
also regarded as externalism, as it accepts the public nature of content. In 
the case of studying languages, an individual learns his/her idiolects, 
which are more connected with the intentionality of our beliefs than 
closely related to their meaning and contents. The objects of study, which 
we can call sociolects, are deeply related to the language of the community 
or a more local language, for examples French and Parisian, Hindi and 
Bhojpuri etc. Once I asked Bilgrami: “Why do you consider the 
bifurcation of contents (wide and narrow) an artificial division?” Bilgrami 
wrote to me: 
For several reasons, the most commonsensical reason being that it is very 
unintuitive to say that every time I have a thought, I really have two 
thoughts. The second is that a thought with wide content is very often the 
kind of thought that one cannot know that one is thinking, and I do not 
think that we should ever say that there is failure of self-knowledge unless 
there is some psychological evidence for it, such as self deception or some 
similar Freudian style reasons -- one should not deny self-knowledge on 
the basis of theories of reference of linguistic terms (in other words, I may 
get to know more astronomy if I discover that the morning star is the 
evening star or that water is H2O, but I don't get to know my own mind 
better).29  
(4.3) Heideggerian Model: Dasein-World Nexus 
According to Mary Warnock, existentialists like Spinoza, having 
shown what man’s place in the universe is, have shown a new way to look 
at human emotions and human understanding. In Kierkegaard’s writings, 
we find that he, as an existentialist, wants above all to free readers from 
the illusion of objectivity. To him, the aim of philosophy is to discover 
subjectivity, which is concrete and not an abstraction. From Kierkegaard 
to modern existentialists; all of them have taken the idea of “subjectivity” 
as the starting point of their philosophies. Kierkegaard says:  
... The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and 
thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something 
vanishing... The way of objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to 
mathematics, to historical knowledge of different kinds; and always it 
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leads away from the subject, whose existence or non-existence, and from 
the objective point of view quite rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent.30 
Human understanding is no doubt a part of what it means to be a 
human being. When one asks the question “What is being?”, Heidegger 
urges one to look at his own being. Heidegger understands the idea of 
“being” as it discloses itself in the idea of Dasein. Heidegger makes a 
distinction between ontical existence and the ontological existence of 
being. Ontical existence is something which enables humans to engage in 
everyday existence and ontological existence is something which 
encourages human beings to raise queries about his own Being. According 
to Heidegger, the fundamental condition of Dasein is “being-in-the-
world”. In this context, Reinhardt Grossmann comments: 
It is fundamental condition of being a person to have a world around you. 
The traditional idea of course is that the mind is intentional. A mind is 
always related to something. A mind always comes with object.31 
Heidegger explicates the idea of “world hood of the world” in terms of 
“being-in-the-world”. In the expression “being-in-the-world”, “in” has 
extra significance. It refers to the spatial dimension of the world. We 
cannot separate “I” from this contemporary world. It seems to me that “the 
word ‘I’ is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal 
indicator. We cannot think of an existence just as an ‘it’, here the existent 
also refers to ‘I’. This personal pronoun lays claim not only to a unique 
place, but also to a unique Being”. 32  “Mineness” is a term that has 
sometimes been used to express the awareness that “my” existence is 
unique and distinct from the existence of everyone else. I am not just a 
specimen of a class. “I am I.” Here, Heidegger’s purpose is not to make a 
juxtaposition between “Dasein” and “being-in-the-world”. He goes on to 
say that Dasein is being-in-the world, i.e. the “essence” of Dasein lies in 
its existence. He mainly stresses subjectivity. There is a necessary 
connection that can be found between Dasein and the world, but there is 
no such necessary connection between Dasein and the entities in the 
world. Here, by entities of the world, we mean all the surrounding objects 
in this world. Actually, Heidegger brings out the conception of the world 
in terms of the categorical and existential frameworks which are 
distinguished from ontical sense, which is generally related to entities. 
Heidegger does not believe that the world is the totality of all entities, but 
he thinks that it is also a system of reference. The world is characterised 
by the way in which Dasein exists. We cannot think of the idea of being 
without an idea of the physical body. Similarly, the concept of a world 
without human beings is valueless, and a human being without the world is 
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merely an abstraction. Heidegger’s unique contribution in this field consists in 
the use of a method which he calls “hermeneutic phenomenology”. 
Hermeneutic phenomenology is the way in which a being perceives the 
world from an intellectual point of view. Here, the term “phenomenology” 
expresses a maxim which takes us back “to the things themselves”. Mary 
Warnock explains this method in Existentialism as follows: 
The phenomenological method is said to be “hermeneutical” just because 
it does reveal significance. The world is thought of as a code or set of 
symbols, and the purpose of the phenomenological method is to interpret 
it.33 
We can make a distinction between perceiving the Taj Mahal and 
looking at a photo of the Taj Mahal. In the first case, we are directly 
confronted with the external object (the Taj Mahal), whereas in the photo, 
we are indirectly and also intentionally seeing the object (the Taj Mahal). 
Any intentional act by a subject is always correlated with external objects. 
Dan Zahavi and Gallagher state: 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations contains the first proper phenomenological 
investigation of intentionality. Like Brentano, Husserl argues that one does 
not merely love, fear, see, or judge; one loves a beloved, fears something 
fearful, sees an object, and judges a state of affairs... all of these diverse 
forms of consciousness are characterized by intending objects…34 
But one thing we can add here is that the presentations of these objects 
have various modes, like perception, imagination, recollection, etc. We 
can also say that all phenomenological qualities are also representational. 
There are no non-intentional objects. We can even consider pain a sensory 
representation which occurrs because of bodily damage. But Dan Zahavi 
and Gallagher believe that we need to take mind and meaning as 
environmentally embedded, so that they are directly referentially hooked 
to the world. They write: 
When I see a red ball, the ball is my intentional object, not because it 
satisfies the general meaning “the red ball,” but because it satisfies the 
demonstrative content “this red ball.”35 
We have seen that for Heidegger, the conception of Dasein is not 
described in terms of “properties” that are possessed by objectivity. Dasein 
never deals with “what”, like house, car, etc., but with “that”, a concept 
that helps to signify the object in itself. Dasein can be well portrayed by its 
ownness (je meines). And Dasein’s ownness is the very possibility of it, 
which cannot be avoidable. The concept of mineness or ownness has 
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certain public stances that are inseparably related to the understanding of 
human nature. There is an a priori determination of existence regarding 
the existential. For Heidegger, if we want to know the existential spatiality 
of Dasein then we should understand “being-in-the-world”, the essential 
structure of Dasein, in detail. Here, an ontological understanding means a 
type of care that expresses a pre-phenomenological acquaintance with 
“being-in-the-world”, which remains an inadequate ontological explanation. 
If we look at the concept of the world, then we should preliminarily 
analyse the term “being-in”. The world is not ontologically the mere 
essence of the name, of human types, but a characteristic of Dasein that 
becomes a constitutive element in the case of “being-in-the world”. Being-
in-the-world mainly consists of everyday, corporeal things, but the form it 
has taken is nonetheless a careful method. This is not a purely theoretical 
base, but a practical concern that proceeds to discuss knowledge. 
Therefore, the phenomenological explanation of the description of 
properties cannot determine what Dasein actually is. The referential 
context indicates that Dasein is not only embedded in the world, but in the 
user (being). This approach by Heidegger aims to refute the traditional 
opinion that talks about a separation between the knower and knowing 
objects. Even Descartes tried to demonstrate a distinction between the 
mind and the world. Heidegger claims that one should reject the thought 
that we can see the world objectively, as the world is not a mere object. 
Dasein is inextricably associated with the objective world. So the 
construction of a demarcation line between Dasein and the world would be 
flawed. Heidegger tries to analyse the meaning of being in terms of its 
existence. Dasein, for Heidegger, means Da (there) and sein (being), or in 
a word, “being there”. Heidegger thinks that the ontological stature of 
being make a separation between human beings or Dasein and the rest of 
the world’s objects. There are two concerns that need to be clarified here. 
The first concern is that Heidegger rejects the ontical sense of Dasein to 
establish that Dasein cannot be factual and a set of all physical entities. It 
may well be possible that Dasein does not exist, in the ontical sense, in the 
world. Actually, for him, “world” is not a term that refers to the totality of 
things; it refers to the sense in which the things or objects of the world are 
related to human beings or Dasein. Here, Heidegger looks into the 
ontological existential sense, which focuses on the equipment or practices 
that lead towards a public “we-world”. Dasein is inseparable with “being-
in-the-world”, as I earlier mentioned. Here, “in” does not designate the 
“aspatial” relation between Dasein and world, but actually means to 
sojourn or “to stay”. We cannot claim in a similar way that man stays in 
the world as books stay in bookshelves. Dreyfus says: 
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In laying out world, Heidegger seems to shift without explanation from 
speaking of the workshop, to the referential whole (Verweisungsganzheit), 
to the equipment whole (Zeugganzes), to the involvement whole 
(Bewandtnisganzheit), to the phenomenon of world, to worldliness. The 
equipment whole, I take it, describes the interrelated equipment; the 
referential whole its interrelations; and the involvement whole adds human 
purposiveness. The workshop is a specific example of all these wholes; the 
phenomenon of world is the special way the world manifests itself; and 
worldliness is the way of being of the world and of all its subworlds.36 
(4.4) A Reformed Externalism 
In the traditional period, science had some sub-divisions, creating 
formal sciences like logic and mathematics. Natural science, including 
psychology and social science, can be regarded as empirical science, and 
the differentiation, in spite of expediency, relies on various subject 
matters, sources of knowledge and techniques. Carnap tries to show that 
there is a “unity in science” beneath the approach of unity in empirical 
statements, which is possible because of a single language where all 
“states of affairs” can be understood using the same methods. The analysis 
of language proves that philosophy cannot be a distinct knowledge system, 
separated from science. Scientific research, whih involves experiment, 
observation, empirical materials and classification, also pursues 
importance in the form of scientific statements that have contents. The 
analysis of contents takes a prominent place in logic and philosophy of 
language. Natural science is based on observation and empirical status 
stands for nature as a spatio-temporal event. Even in the cases of history 
and social science, observation, as a subordinate method, takes an 
important position, but the preceding roles are taken by empathy and 
understanding, a more normative discipline that governs in philosophy, 
social science, history etc. Psychology, a divergent field (though it takes 
experience as its prime method), also has an intense demarcation with 
natural science, as psychology deals with the “psychical”, whereas natural 
science involves physical methods. Psychology not only attains knowledge 
through experience, but “understanding empathy” has also taken a relevant 
role. Here, my main purpose is to show, following Carnap’s thought, that 
the “unity of science” is possible because of the terms and “states of 
affairs” that are applied very ordinarily in scientific inquiry. If we look 
upon the “objects” that mean words, and the “state of affairs” that is 
exposed to statements in a philosophical sense (through analysing 
language), then we will see that the diversified methods of science can be 
merged into one. 
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Another important query is: How can we get the meaning of a term in 
our language? Scientific enquiry would suggest that either by “translation” 
or by “definition”, one can get the meaning of a term, which could be true 
for a nominal description like “tiger”, which is equal to such-and-such a 
distinguished character. Or, by some ostensive definition, we find various 
languages in our scientific language, like the language of arithmetic, the 
language of economics, the language of physical science and the language 
of psychology, which are distinct from one another. Arithmetical theorem 
uses a language where numbers, properties, relations between numbers 
and numerical symbols take a foremost role. Economists use the language 
of supply, demand, price etc. So we do not find a universal language; for 
example, some scientists believe that we cannot translate or describe an 
electro-magnetic field in the language of economics. 
The verification and direct experience that govern in natural science 
also face protocol statements. Here, verification that depends on protocol 
statements requires clarifying the meaning of the terms that are used by 
experience; they need to be more lucid in the course of further discussion. 
The protocol is that verification cannot state a single statement without 
entering into further discussion in the realm of entire systems. This is a 
holistic process of language that subsequently organises the root of 
scientific thought. Here, the language of direct experience has a previous 
backlog, where justification and clarification of the use of terms and words 
or of the extent of statements involve further discussions from a holistic 
approach to language. 
A controversial question that I would like to re-examine in my paper is 
that if we consider physical language (the language of empirical science) 
inter-subjective, can it also serve as a universal language (where the state 
of affairs as a statement would be expressed in terms of the language use) 
or not? How could physical language be “inter-subjective”? There is a 
sense in which “qualitative determination” can be distorted or translated 
into “quantitative determination”; e.g. “Kashmir is quite cool now” can be 
translated into a quantitative statement like “The temperature of Kashmir 
is between five and seven degrees centigrade”. Here, in the first case, 
physics places importance on quantitative concepts and the numerical 
could not only correspond with the determinate auditory field, but as an 
inter-subjective matter that physical statements contain to resolve other 
inter-sensory fields. For me, the process would be complicated if one 
wished to determine a colour, like “blue” of a specific kind. In this case, 
every physical state of the colour “blue” consists of an explicit 
combination of the frequencies of “electro-magnetic oscillation” that also 
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absorb a wave in the frequency of high intensity of the blue part of the 
spectrum. Here, the spectrum can be regarded as superfluous.  
Now, the argument is that we can expand the visual sense into the 
other senses. A completely blind person can identify the frequency of an 
electro-magnetic oscillation through a microphone which can pick up the 
exploration of the spectrum by constructing a set of emissions of adequate 
intensity of motion. By applying this thesis, we can claim that a personal 
determination based on inter-sensory information makes physical 
determination more inter-subjective; that is to say, a person can 
physicalise essential determinations (qualitatively) by physicalising 
himself and other persons. 
There is a trend which demonstrates how all other languages draw on 
biology, psychology and social science, which can be put into the realm of 
physical language. Carnap claims that “apart from the physical language 
(and its sub-languages) no inter-subjective language is known”. Science 
that deals with inter-subjective statements denies the claim of subjective 
interpretation, aiming to make physical language the language of science. 
To be a language of science, physical language does not have the only 
necessary criterion of inter-subjectivity; another relevant criterion that tries 
to fulfil its dream is the concept of a “universal language”. If we take 
biology, then we can see how we reduce biological laws to physical laws 
and biological concepts to physical concepts. Biology deals with species, 
organs etc., whereas physical science tries to see all these from a 
perceptible qualitative determination like fertilisation, eggs, the processes 
of spermatozoon etc., which leads to the definition of the redistribution of 
parts within the meaning of cell division, metabolism etc., which have 
empirical and perceptible criteria to show that biological statements can be 
transformed into physical language. Even physical science claims that 
every psychological concept refers to definite physical properties that 
point towards a sort of behaviourism. By this process, natural science, 
through its two fundamental criteria, (inter-subjectivity and the 
universalisability of language) tries to prove that observation and the 
evidential base of experience in physical science rule the scientific 
universe by creating a unity of science. I aim to challenge this by arguing 
that extensionality and the acquisition of natural language as a regimented 
notion of linguistic practices privilege an account of common sense and 
context sensitivity based on a philosophical perspective, accepting that 
observational and theoretical terms get their meanings through a 
functionally based approach, as argued by Putnam. Another important 
issue is that the process of understanding terms vindicates language 
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preceding thought to find justified and unjustified thoughts. Of late, 
philosophy of science has adopted this approach, and it ought to be 
followed by physical sciences in the near future. Like my mentor Putnam, 
I strongly believe that one should not think of “language as something that 
a community has created, like an automobile, something that the 
individual user has no part in creating. A language is like an art from 
which each user modifies and adds to. There is a constant interaction 
between the subjective and the inter-subjective”. 
It seems to me that if we want to reform externalism, then we need to 
formulate a reconciliation between internalism and externalism. I propose 
to do this from two different perspectives. First I will try to show this 
reconciliation from the background of semantic holism, and then I will try 
to develop a bridge between internalism and externalism from the realm of 
the Heideggerian point of view. In the case of semantic holism, I will 
accept both externalism and a socio-linguistic background together. But 
one thing I want to clarify here is that I do not agree with Quine about the 
second dogma, through which he was trying to refute the traditional 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I agree with Putnam 
that, as holism is undeniable, similarly, we cannot reject the traditional 
analytic-synthetic distinction at all. I hope we can reconcile internalism 
and externalism together if we accept that meanings are holistic, and also 
there is a certain distinction between analytic propositions and synthetic 
propositions in our natural language. Here my main purpose will be to 
show that “the analytic-synthetic distinction is necessary and harmless in 
semantic holism”, because if I am able to prove that this traditional 
distinction is necessary and harmless, then it will be easy to reconcile the 
ideas of internalism and externalism within one holistic framework. 
Externalists like Quine do not accept the conception of analyticity because 
of the correlated conception of a priority, which indicates that the meaning 
of an object is independent of the external world and that meaning is 
something which is located in our heads. 
Let me illustrate the idea of analyticity and share how it is connected 
with my reformed externalism. We can take the notion of meaning for the 
sake of the foundation of philosophical systems. More precisely, we can 
talk about the “atomistic notion” of cognitive meaning. For me, it is 
“atomistic” in the sense that here, the meanings of a sentence can be 
derived one by one. Besides this, it is also cognitive, as here, the meaning 
of an atomistic sentence is relevant to knowledge that is actually 
connected to reality. Depending on this supposition, one can define 
analytic sentences as unrelated to reality, therefore they cannot fail to be 
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true. This notion of definition makes it well fitted with the a priori claim, 
as it calls for detachment from reality, and the notion of the 
epistemological significance of truth value (unsupported by evidential 
justification or confirmation/disconfirmation) brings the notion of the 
analytic sentence closer to a priority. Quine, who is a believer in 
observational sentences and the process of verificationism, to an extent, 
strongly believes in holism. He deeply believes that empirical sentences, 
with the collaboration of a large number of other sentences, get their 
meaning through experiences. This is an inclusive theory that gives 
importance to implication, but rejects the individual sentence and the 
process of the one-by-one method (the atomistic approach to meaning). 
Quine shows that if we believe in the claim about reality and experiential 
processes, then it would be very shaky to accept the method of atomism, 
which is generally applied to the thesis that each individual part of a 
sentence can offer an understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence. 
Peter Hylton wonderfully claims: 
Bodies of sentences taken together make claims that cannot be parceled 
out among the individual sentences, hence the idea of a “claim upon 
reality” does not fit with our taking individual sentences, rather than wider 
theories, as the relevant units.37 
Actually, holism tries to attack the notion of atomistic meaning. 
Quine’s attack on the notion of cognitive meaning makes analyticity 
untenable. Now, one can question whether we can find any kind of tenable 
notion that rescues the claim of “truth in virtue of meaning”. If so, then 
how may it be possible? Quine agrees to accept that it may be possible 
only in the case of mathematics, where an understanding of analyticity is 
encompassed, but it has no epistemic significance. Quine rejects the 
hypothesis that meaning can be grasped through introspectable mental 
items. He aims to eliminate analyticity and admits theoretical language in 
the sense that here knowledge is embodied in the use of language. For 
him, asertoric uses of sentences ramify the concept of holism in the case of 
thinking about meaning. In his very early writings, e.g. “Truth by 
Convention” (1936), Quine says that one can determine the meaning of a 
word in the context of determining the truth and falsity of the sentence. He 
clarifies the thought in this way: 
Any acceptable evidence of usage or meaning of words must reside surely 
either in the observable circumstances under which the words are 
uttered… or in the affirmation and denial of sentences in which the words 
occur.38 
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This quotation talks of meaning that is coextensive with evidence. If 
we take the traditional definition of an analytic sentence, one that speaks 
about the truths of analytic sentences under every circumstance, then the 
thesis does not fit with Quine’s claim. Carnap discusses the understanding 
of analyticity to add that some circumstances are able to discard any 
sentences. But in the case of analytic sentences, he claims that this type of 
abandonment does a favour for language. The main reason is that Carnap 
tries to see analyticity as language-oriented; however, this is a different 
issue. Quine’s approach to meaning, which he later rejected, is basically 
based on holism. Hylton claims: 
Many sentences are more deeply theoretically embedded than this one, so 
that the observable circumstances that affect our acceptance or rejection of 
them may be extremely remote from anything that would ordinarily be 
thought of as their meaning. Holism implies that, even giving our 
impossible assumption, meaning is not a straightforward matter. 
Nevertheless, the imagined situation represents all that there could be to 
cognitive meaning on a Quinean view.39  
Here, one can again ask about cognitive meaning and its derivation in 
sentences. Quine answers that one needs to see the context of the 
sentences where the cognitive meaning takes place. We also need to see 
the ways in which the truth value could vary in terms of the observable 
circumstances. But critics could well argue that to get a reasonable 
variation, one has to discriminate between contexts, as there are some 
cases where truth can be regarded as the constitutive meaning of a given 
word. Besides, there are some sentences where we see that truth is, in 
virtue, related to the meaning of that word. It would be very difficult for 
Quine to deny that the sentence “All bachelors are unmarried” is analytic. 
Let us imagine a child who is well aware of linguistic erudition, but 
unacquainted with the meaning of the word “bachelor”, and can 
understand the meaning of the term “bachelor” only if others from his 
community suggest to him that it means “unmarried man”. In this case, the 
sentence becomes analytic if everyone accepts that it is true just by 
learning the word is true. In a videotape entitled “In Conversation: W.V 
Quine” (1994), we notice that Quine becomes quite sympathetic with such 
a claim of analyticity. We can accept a sentence as analytic only if “failure 
to accept it indicates that the speaker is not a competent user of one or 
more of the words in that sentence”. One of the most insightful defences 
of the analytic-synthetic distinction can be found in the writing of Hilary 
Putnam, in “The Analytic and the Synthetic”, where he claims that the 
distinction cannot be regarded as an epistemological work. As we have 
already noted, for him, only one-criterion words like “bachelor”, “vixen” 
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etc. are regarded as instances of analyticity. In contrast, we find “law-
cluster” concepts in theoretical physics that need multifarious criteria 
(laws and inferences) for their application. All these criteria, including 
“law-cluster” and “one-criterion” concepts based on “definitions”, are 
linked with language that Quine cannot suspect. Carnap, who also tries to 
make a demarcation between analytic and synthetic statements, firmly 
believes that analytic sentences are not immune to revision. For him, in 
short, analytic sentences can be reversed, and this revision may be possible 
because of changes of language in the sentence. Besides this, in the case of 
synthetic sentences, revision is possible just because of a change in the 
beliefs that are associated with the proposed sentence. The concept of 
immune revision has an epistemological background that also illustrates 
that synthetic statements are not related to the changeability of language, 
as these are involved with internal revisions, while external revisions are 
associated with changes of language and play a relevant part in analytic 
statements. Carnap firmly believes that evidence, justification and 
concepts are all language-centric. But this approach goes wrong as it cares 
about determining the justification for internal and external revision, 
where language takes an important role. Here, the main problem arises 
when there is no language in the presupposition; it will then be very 
difficult to attain a justification of the language. But for Quine, the 
decisive part of the demarcation between internal revision and external 
revision does not depend on any sort of clear cut contrast. No rule can be 
set out to create a boundary between evidence and theory. For Quine, 
synthetic sentences can generally be fixed, as the evidence for the sentence 
can be confirmed easily. Our degree of confirmation or confidence in 
making a decision has some background enabled conditions; this 
background theory leads the system as a whole to our beliefs. Hylton is 
right when he says: 
Holism, in Quine’s view, gives us principled reasons to think that no such 
theory of confirmation is available. According to that doctrine, the relation 
of justification does not, in general, hold between experience and 
individual sentences, but rather between experience and theories, more or 
less sizeable groups of sentences.40  
Quine accepts holism to refute the atomistic notion of cognitive 
meaning based on analyticity by arguing that in regard to sentences that 
depend on the notion of justification, their cognitive meaning and 
correlations with evidential checkpoints must be applied to other sentences 
or theories that are related with them. So in a liberal sense, a sentence, 
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according to Quine, has cognitive meaning if and only if it implies 
experience and takes theory as a whole, and not piece-by-piece.  
Let me elaborate on Putnam’s thoughts, which wonderfully make a 
bridge between analytic and synthetic sentences. Putnam claims: 
I am convinced that there is an analytic-synthetic distinction that we can 
correctly (if not very importantly) draw, and I am inclined to sympathize 
with those who cite the examples and who stress the implausibility, the 
tremendous implausibility, of Quine’s thesis — the thesis that the 
distinction which certainly seems to exist does not in fact exist at all.41  
Putnam thinks that there is another kind of distinction present, which is 
the main discussion topic in his article “The Analytic and The Synthetic”. 
Here he cautions us about the thought that we have no purpose in making 
a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements by merely using 
the words in terms of disposition, i.e. the tendency to use these related 
terms in trivial expressions like “having the same meaning”. What he 
thinks is that there is a “limited” notion of analyticity, which applies to 
such trivial cases as “all bachelors are unmarried” and which is 
philosophically unimportant, and an important but “revisable” notion of 
“necessity” or “conceptual truth”. For Putnam, there are some words 
which are “one-criterion words”, like bachelor, vixen etc. As well as there, 
there are words which are not “one-criterion words”; they fall under 
semantic categories. In fact, all nouns fall under semantic categories; for 
instance, cats, home etc. Putnam says: 
It is important to distinguish “analytic” truths of the sort “all cats are 
animals” from analytic truths of the sort “all bachelors are unmarried”, in 
part because the former tend to be less necessary than the latter. It might 
not be the case that all cats are animals; they might be automata!42 
Putnam clarifies his idea by using a scientific concept or the notion of 
a law-cluster concept. As he writes: 
Law-cluster concept are constituted not by a bundle of properties as are the 
typical general names like “man” and “crow”, but by a cluster of laws 
which, as it were, determine the identity of the concept.43  
Wittgenstein believes that “game” is such a law-cluster concept. There 
are some philosophers who claim that the concept of “species” is a law-
cluster concept. But Putnam takes “energy” as a cluster concept. He also 
thinks that in highly developed science, we may find that most terms are 
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actually law-cluster concepts, though there are some suspicions about their 
analyticity. 
Kinetic energy is the energy of motion. An object which has motion, 
whether it is vertical or horizontal, has kinetic energy. The mathematical 
equation of kinetic energy is K.E=½mv2, where “m” is the mass of the 
object and “v” is the velocity. Here it seems to me that if anyone wanted to 
change the definition of energy, then it would be necessary for him/her to 
change the meaning of “kinetic energy” or clarify the cluster concept with 
“redefinition”. Similarly, in the case of “All bachelors are unmarried”, we 
cannot get rid of the term “unmarried” unless we can make a radical 
change of the meaning of the term “bachelor”. It is also important to alter 
the extension of the term “bachelor”. Here, one may feel enticed to agree 
with Quine. In the case of “All bachelors are unmarried”, we define 
“bachelors” as “unmarried men”, but there are lots of plausible scientific 
explanations of the concept of “energy”. One might argue that “truth by 
definition” has no notable value in analytic judgment. Actually, Quine is 
not interested in psychological synonymy or poetic synonymy. He is 
concerned with cognitive synonymy, and this synonymy can be defined in 
terms of the interchangeability thesis of salva veritate. But Putnam 
opposes Quine by claiming that “truth by stipulation” does not play a key 
role in the concept of analyticity in our natural language. But he admits 
that “truth by stipulation” is the nature of analytic judgment in the model, 
i.e. the formal language model. Now Putnam wants to clarify the question 
“Why should we have analytic statements (or the strict synonymies 
pointed out by Quine) in our language?” 
In a hypothetical formalised language, the statement “All bachelors are 
unmarried” is considered an analytic statement which is immune from 
revision. Two important points emerge from this picture. Firstly, in a 
formalised language, an inventor can express his commands as per his 
own choices. Secondly, Putnam believes that “bachelor” is not a law-
cluster term. “Bachelors are unmarried men” acquires truth by mere 
stipulation, which can also be substituted by a complex expression like 
“male adult human being who has never in his life married”. Putnam tells 
us that we can think about an enduring institution, like “marriage”, but it is 
not necessary that our institution must be enduring, because both the bride 
and the groom are aware of the concept of “divorce”, which is legally 
supported by our society. Similarly, in our formalised language we say 
“Let every statement be subject to revision”, but it is not a permanent 
issue; we can find exceptions. Let us imagine that all bachelors are 
suffering from “sexual frustration”. Now “sexual frustration” becomes a 
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criterion for distinguishing bachelors from non-bachelors. One day we 
may find that by some “neurosis”, those who are already married are also 
victims of such a “sexual frustration”. Then our previous stipulation that 
“bachelors” is synonymous with “unmarried men” becomes inconvenient. 
So we should admit that there is a radical difference between formalised 
language and natural language when we want to talk about linguistic rules. 
We can clarify the main issues from the perspective of natural language. In 
traditional philosophy, there is an incorrect tendency to make a distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements in the context of “intuitive” and 
also “demonstrative” truths. So we tend to lump together analytic 
statements, traditionally considered “intuitive truths”, with all their 
consequences. From this thinking one might obtain a rough definition: an 
analytic statement is a statement which satisfies the criteria presented or a 
consequence of such a statement. But it is quite true that the last clause of 
these criteria indicates “borderline” cases of analyticity. For example, 
“girls are women” etc. Even though it is quite true, we can find statements 
in natural language which are truly analytic and others that may be 
construed as analytic. The same thinking is also applicable to synthetic 
statements. But then what are their criteria? Putnam 44  mentions four 
criteria. Let me explain them below: 
a) The statement has the form: “something (someone) is an A if and 
only if it (he, she) is a B”, where A is a single word. 
b) The statement holds without exception, and provides us with a 
criterion for something being the sort of thing which the term A 
applies to. 
c) The criterion is the only one that is generally accepted and 
employed in connection with the term. 
d) The term A is not a “law-cluster” word. 
 
Let me discuss the first criterion: 
“Something is A if and only it is a B”, e.g. “Someone is a bachelor if 
and only if he is an unmarried man”. But one might argue that this is a 
vicious circle. To put it another way: “Someone is a bachelor if and only if 
he is a unwed man.” If we try to define synonymy in terms of analyticity 
by saying that synonymous expressions are analytically true, one objection 
may arise. Let us take an example: “Someone is a bachelor if and only if 
he is either an unmarried man or a unicorn.” We know that from the 
perspective of Noam Chomsky’s “transformational grammar”, the quoted 
sentence is considered ungrammatical. Putnam thinks that we can 
summarise this issue as the conjunction of the following claims: 
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a) This statement is linguistically odd and not clearly true. 
b) There is no question about its general acceptance. 
c) People do not ascertain the term “bachelor” by the corresponding 
connection with the terms “unmarried”, “unicorn” etc. 
 
These problems arise because certain misunderstandings lie beneath 
our theory. Firstly, the English terms “or” and “if and only if” are not 
synonymous with logical function “V” or “≡”. Secondly, people might 
query its intelligibility, or decline to accept it. Thirdly, people might reject 
it because “quoted criterion” is not a generally accepted criterion for 
someone being a “bachelor”. Notice that here, the concept of “criterion” 
has great importance. We should examine it based on its uses. Putnam 
confirms that we can define “criterion” in two different aspects.  
Firstly, the “criteria” I am speaking of are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something being an “A”. 
Secondly, by means of these criteria people can and do determine that 
something is an “A”. We may find many indicators of 
“bachelorhood”, like being young, living alone, being high spirited 
etc. But the criteria will be determined by a combination of the first 
and second criteria which we have mentioned above. Then it will 
follow that the sentence “bachelors are unmarried men” will be an 
analytic truth. But our main concern remains unsound.  
 
Putnam himself has raised the issue of the relevance of the four criteria 
of analyticity. Putnam argues that it would be pretty insignificant to admit 
that “Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried or unwed” is 
an exceptionless law. It is quite true that there are no exceptionless laws; 
rather there is the “law-cluster” concept which is discussed in science. But 
one may ask: Is there any such concept in philosophy? Putnam replies that 
such a concept in philosophy is called a “one-criterion” word, like vixen, 
bachelor etc. But we should also admit that some sentences with law-
cluster concepts or one-criterion words which were once used as analytic 
truths would today become false propositions. For instance, “Atoms are 
indivisible” or “Whales are fishes”. So we can see that if we admit these 
are law-cluster concepts or one-criterion words, then the linguistic 
characteristic of the word also changes. Putnam also believes that an 
analytic statement may be true from the perspective of the “rules of 
language” or “true by stipulation”, even “true by implicit convention”, but 
all these expressions are true only metaphorically. Here Putnam says: 
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What is the reality behind the metaphor? The reality is that they are true 
because they are accepted as true...45  
In Hilary Putnam’s My Intellectual Autobiography, 46 he tells us that 
one evening during a party at Reichenbach’s house at Harvard, a graduate 
student asked C.G. Hempel: “I grant that one cannot show a clear analytic, 
synthetic distinction in a natural language, but why cannot one do it in a 
formalised language?” Putnam recollects: “I have never forgotten 
Hempel’s answer: ‘Every formalised language is ultimately interpreted in 
some natural language. The disease is hereditary!’”  
I do not think it would be plausible to deny the concept of “analyticity” 
in our natural language. We cannot even think of it as trivial. As we know 
that the concept of analyticity is traditionally associated with the 
conception of a priority, an externalist could not substitute it with anything 
independent of our expression. Analyticity is here to stay. So there will be 
no problem with me accepting analyticity or a priority with externalism. 
Quassim Cassam also says: 
The project of identifying a priori enabling conditions for the acquisition 
of various different kinds of knowledge by various different means would 
be doomed if the pessimist is right since a priori enabling conditions are 
just ones which can be known a priori. That is why, for better or worse, I 
am committed to optimism.47  
Cassam asks us to imagine a flag, the left half of which is red and the 
right half of which is green. Now can we imagine a circumstance in which 
something can be red all over and green all over at the same time? The 
answer will be that we cannot imagine such a thing. But this knowledge is 
not dependent on experience; it arises from our understanding, which is 
allied with our intuitive insight. Reasoning is another case with which we 
can associate the idea of a priori knowledge. Let us imagine that Mr. 
Pranab Mukerjee is the present President of India and the president lives in 
Delhi. Now by reasoning, I come to know that Mr. Pranab Mukerjee lives 
in Delhi. So we find that, in the case of this knowledge, it is not true that 
meaning is always external or that it is only in the mind. I believe that we 
need to see holism as a thesis where meaning is referentially attached to 
reality but intrinsically dependent on the agent’s mind. I agree with 
externalists, especially with Putnam, on the thesis that molecular 
duplicates do not necessarily have the same thoughts; that is the whole 
point of externalism. But molecular duplicates in environments which are 
physically identical in the relevant respects - e.g. “water” is H2O in both 
environments, “gold” is Au, etc. - do have the same thoughts. However, I 
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do not think that if there is a certain change in the environment, then our 
thoughts will necessarily change. I think not only molecule-for-molecule 
duplicates, but also two different agents, can share the same thoughts 
though their environments may be different. Let us imagine that a fighter 
pilot and a submarine pilot are talking about their war strategies during the 
war. They do not know each other personally. It is also important here 
that, through radar they are aware of the fact that both their respective 
aircraft and submarine are fighting for the same country. Now it so happen 
that the commanders have a disagreement about certain war strategies. An 
externalist could admit the point and say “yes, that’s true because their 
external positions are not the same; one is in the sky and the other is under 
the water”. But it seems to me that, though it is accepted that there is a 
vast difference to be found in their locations, it is still true that, in some 
respects, their internal states remain the same; e.g. both of them are 
soldiers and they are both fighting for their own country. So we can easily 
claim that meaning is related to the mind and the mind is not separated 
from the world. I consider language a social phenomenon of inter-
subjective communication, as I noted earlier. The way to explain meaning 
is from conceptual schemes, which are always related to external 
references. One might ask: What, then, are the references of non-existent 
terms like “ghosts”, “number”, etc.? I consider a reference to have two 
parts: direct reference to objects and indirect reference to objects. In the 
case of concrete, observable entities, obviously the reference to our 
conceptual scheme is direct. But an indirect reference will be applied in 
cases of non-existent terms like “number”, “ghost” or “unicorn”. For 
instance, we can take the example of “unicorn”. Here, if we summarise the 
conception of “unicorn” then we will find that we can divide it by its 
description, e.g. “a winged horse that can fly”. If we divide this term by 
description, then we will obviously find some external objects which are 
related with the term referentially, like horses, wings, the concept of flying 
etc.; all these are available in the external world. In this case, we can 
observe the reference indirectly through description. I admit that this is not 
a causal reference like “water” being referred to H2O or “table” to a 
concrete “table”; we can say it is a reference which we attain through mere 
description. So it also seems to me that the main debate between 
internalism and externalism, which follows from the debate between the 
theory of description and the causal theory of reference, is not coherent. In 
our theory of knowledge, “description theory” is as important as “causal 
theory”. So it is implausible to radically say that meaning is always related 
to the external world or that meaning is in the mind. We see that meaning 
is interconnected with our external world and also with our minds.  
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Here, it is relevant to say that my internalistic externalism paves the 
way for the “semantic” to enter into “ontology”.  
It seems to me that the debate between internalism and externalism is 
not only a semantic issue; we can see this problem from the perspective of 
“ontology”. Let me now turn to Heidegger’s thesis on Dasein. Heidegger 
emphasises the public world in his concept of Dasein. He believes that all 
kinds of special world (the physical world, the phenomenal world) have 
some public sphere: there is no privacy of experience about the personal 
world. Heidegger says: 
Self and world belong together in one entity, Dasein. Self and world are 
not two entities, like subject and object, or like I and thou; rather, self and 
world are the basic determination of Dasein itself, in the unity of the 
structure of being-in-the-world.48 
Dasein constantly enters into all kinds of association with others. 
Therefore Heidegger emphasises the question of being with. Dasein cannot 
be an isolated being, because we cannot imagine Dasein as a worldless 
subject. Dasein exists essentially for the sake of other men. Dreyfus 
clarifies Heidegger’s concept of Dasein to say: 
Remember, however, that strictly speaking we should not speak of 
Dasein’s being socialized. Human organisms do not have Dasein in them 
until they are socialized.49 
Let us now see the problem from the perspective of consciousness and 
intentionality. Sartre thinks that if you were conscious of nothing, then you 
would be an unconscious thing. Actually, consciousness is always related 
to consciousness of something. Dan Zahavi and Gallagher also aptly claim 
that the phenomenological account of intentionality is given in terms of its 
representation. They write: 
A re-presentation is something that re-presents; it is something that 
provides us with a derivative and mediated contact with the object 
represented.50 
Now we can derive certain consequences. The way I have put my point 
may mislead the reader about the role of semantic externalism. I will 
explain this by considering two relevant points. My thesis is more 
externalist than internalist; this is why I propose to call my reformed 
theory internalistic externalism rather than externalistic internalism. My 
purpose here is to explain the theory from the realm of externalism or to 
give more prominence to externalism. I will be happy to declaire myself 
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an externalist, rather than an internalist, in the field of philosophy of 
language and mind. I firmly believe that it is trivial to make a division 
between externalism and internalism. Meaning, mind and world are not 
different entities. If I am not wrong, they are interconnected with each 
other like “self and world”, as Heidegger mentioned in his philosophy. I 
think meaning is related to the mind and the mind is always in the world. 
When we talk about the mind, we are not talking about something distinct 
from the phenomenal world. The mind is surrounded by the objective 
world. As we cannot separate being from the contemporary world, 
similarly, we cannot separate our mental content from this world. I agree 
with externalists that the reference of content to our objective world has a 
great importance. I also agree with internalists, that the same content has a 
great value in our minds. I do not believe in the inner-outer distinction, 
because in this case, we need to make a distinction between the mind and 
the world. Therefore, it would be unfeasible to make a bridge between 
internalism and externalism. My internalistic externalism says that the 
meaning of our belief content plays two different roles at the same time. 
One is its “meaning theoretical” role, and the other is its role in the 
context determined by society or environment, which I call “socio-
environmental meaning”. The “meaning theoretical” role has much more 
to do with our mind, as internalists point out, whereas “socio-
environmental meaning” depends on the linguistic community, as 
mentioned by Putnam and Burge. In the meaning theoretical stage, an 
individual can think about any term or concept based on his/her own 
choice. He/she can break the norms of the linguistic society to which 
he/she belongs. He/she can think his/her pet dog is his/her son, or his/her 
parrot is his/her daughter. It is possible in our own minds, where our 
minds are king. However, we cannot see the case so easily from the 
background of “socio-environmental meaning”, because here the norms of 
society tell us that biologically, a dog cannot be the son, and a parrot 
cannot be the daughter, of a human being. Here we need to follow the 
rules of the society in order to continue our communication, which is the 
ultimate goal of language. Otherwise, there will be a communication gap. 
One might argue that in our society, we sometimes find that radical 
changes take place in the meaning of a term, e.g. “whale”. Once, we 
believed that “a whale is a fish”, but later, scientists proved that “whales 
are mammals”. In this case, a radical change has taken place in our 
meaning system. The change is not from the intrinsic part of mental 
content; it is much more related to the behaviour which we find in the life 
of a whale or its externalist reference (biological features). I agree, at this 
point, with externalists on the conception of linguistic experts or the 
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referential theory of causality. But I would disagree with them if they 
claimed that there is no conception of an “individualistic mind” or that 
meanings are not in “the individual’s head”. Of course, there are 
individual minds, but these do not work privately; they participate in our 
natural language, because natural language is the ground on which minds 
meet. There is no mind in our linguistic community which can be 
separated from the environment. Therefore, I believe that meaning is not 
something which is only external; meaning becomes meaning due to the 
presence of a mind. So the mind and meaning are embedded in the world 
in a symmetrical way. Even beliefs, desires, pain and other mental items 
are dependent on the mind, in the same way they are dependent on the 
world. So in short, my internalistic externalism brings about harmony 
between the world and the mind through the concept of meaning. Meaning 
is the place where two different aspects meet. My internalistic externalism 
can be regarded as the product of a relationship (which may be causal or 
descriptive) which prompts us to extract the external objects whenever we 
talk about the meaning of a concept. I do not think, like Bilgrami, that 
there is a unity of contents. For me, contents are in general unified in our 
thought, but a division is made by natural language, like wide, narrow, 
external and internal, in favour of our communication. My concept of 
internalistic externalism can be best understood in the realm of thought; it 
is not in the natural language, because in natural language, there are so 
many vague concepts, like “this” and “that”, used as indexical terms, and 
also certain inferential concepts which raise problems regarding the 
conception of unified contents. Even the subject-object dichotomy can 
play an important role. For instance “this stomach pain will kill me” or 
“that building is gorgeous”. In this case, the content of my belief is not so 
easy to point out from the perspective of internalism or externalism. But 
for internalistic externalism, it is not difficult to understand the problem, 
as I believe that, from the internalists’ point of view, we can fix the 
meaning of concepts, and from the externalist point of view, we can fix 
their references. We cannot separate them. When we think or are 
conscious about X, then X will automatically be something in the world or 
related to the world.  
Concluding remarks 
In a reply to Putnam, elsewhere, Dummett says: 
I learned my language from other people; without it I could form only 
inchoate thoughts about the immediately present. I might be quite cunning 
in dealing with the immediately present, but I should barely be rational. I 
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am what I am only because I belong to the human race, and am surrounded 
by its members, with whom I interact in various ways.51  
Following Dummett, we can consider that just as “myself” cannot be 
divorced from the rest of the human race, similarly, our minds cannot be 
detached from the world. The mind, the world and other people constitute 
a common circle where the mind is related to the world, so we cannot take 
apart the mental content and the physical world. 
Quine emphasises the learning process of language, which is directly 
associated with external stimuli. In this case, a sort of semantic change in a 
part of the system can consequently affect a large part of the network, as 
the meaning of a sentence, for Quine, depends on the corporate body of 
sentences. It is quite true that we need to take meaning and mind as 
embedded, so that they hook to the causal referential directness of reality 
through the conceptual insight of the agent. I think that in the indigenous 
field of language learning, at the primary level, it is not possible for a 
learner to know the whole meaning of a sentence through a tribunal of 
sense experience. A learner can grasp the sentence which seems to him/her 
the most pertinent to expressing his/her thoughts in communication. I 
think it is a reliable process for a learner or a speaker to have partial 
knowledge of the meaning of an expression, and the process of learning 
this knowledge, or to an extent, the specific expression of the words can be 
gradually increased along with the maturity of the speaker or learner and 
his/her linguistic practices. I have also shown that there are some cases 
that trivially show a keen distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements by introducing the notion of one-criterion words, cluster 
concepts and a priori knowledge. My internalistic externalism focuses on 
the interrelationship of being and the world from the perspective of 
phenomenology. The intricate relationship between being and world, as 
proposed by Heidegger, seems to me very relevant for reconciling mind 
and world. There is another side, where I look again at the theory of 
meaning by proposing socio-environmental meaning and theoretical 
meaning to show that in natural language, meaning and mind are 
interconnected to each other, in regards to the world, which expedites our 
linguistic communication. In conclusion, I attempt to reconcile the mind 
and the world through the concept of meaning and mental entities that are 
also dependent on the world. 
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Though I have given short concluding remarks for each chapter, here I 
would like to summarise my main conclusion or what I have achieved in 
my book. My main intention has been to reconcile internalism and 
externalism, the debate between which is considered one of the most vital 
problems in the philosophy of mind and language. I have tried to show 
that we can regard the “theory of description” and the “causal theory of 
reference” as a primary step in the debate between internalism and 
externalism, through which we can enter into the realm of meaning and the 
world. Basically, internalists believe in the conceptual role semantics, 
intentionality, and supervenience hypotheses, and consider meanings 
intrinsic (“meaning in the head” hypothesis). However, externalism argues 
that we need to accept wide or broad contents to determine the meaning of 
terms, so meanings cannot be located in the head of a speaker. For 
externalists, meanings have causal and referential ties with the socio-
linguistic community and the environment. Externalists believe that 
talking about properties or determining states cannot be fulfilled through 
“individuation”. Here, one needs to claim the “causation” or external 
reference, which is no doubt outside of the skin.   
In this scenario, empty concepts, self-knowledge and first person 
authority have raised some important charges against externalism. I have 
also tried to propose replies from the perspective of an externalist, to 
establish that self-knowledge is compatible with externalism. Here, I have 
not attempted to sketch an exhaustive diagram of the unity of internalism 
and externalism; however, it is relevant to mention some features which 
may help to grasp the fundamental intention of this thesis. It is worth 
emphasising that externalism considers “natural kind terms” partly fixed 
by the “division of linguistic labour”, and partly fixed by what are called 
“stereotypes”. So we find that externalism gives importance to the 
“thought world causal relationship”, whereas internalists, who are the 
strongest supporters of “descriptive theory”, believe in the conception of a 
conjunction of all the descriptive properties of a natural kind term.  
My thoughts are somewhat nearer to externalism. Here I have tried to 
argue that the environment can be changed, but agents can retain the same 
thoughts. So it is not always the case that the environment makes changes 
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in the content of the thought of agents. It is well known that logical 
inconsistency is related to the world and language, whereas 
psychologically, we can find no such inconsistency. It seems to me that in 
psychology, the deliberations of the mind are a self-critical enterprise. For 
instance: “It is raining and it is not raining”; here we find a logical 
inconsistency, because in our world we will never find such a case. But 
psychologically, there is no inconsistency in thinking “it is raining and it is 
sunny at the same time”. It also seems to me that we can reconcile first 
person authority and self-knowledge with externalism only if we accept 
corrigible and incorrigible beliefs together. Corrigible beliefs are in 
nature perceptual, and these deal with public observable entities, like “I 
feel it is too cool”. But incorrigible beliefs are regarded as mental events 
or private (individual) experiences, like mental images and pain. If we 
accept reformed externalism, which I call internalistic externalism, then it 
will be easy to solve these inner-outer problems. Internalsitic externalism 
accepts that there are some concepts which are intrinsic in the sense that 
they are not dependent on second or third person experience. Here the first 
person or agent is much more authoritative and there is immediate 
acceptance of these contents. But like Wittgenstein, I also do not support 
any kind of private language or solipsism, so I believe that intrinsic 
experiences get their meaning when they are used in public language, and 
we can also think about them through natural language. So incorrigible 
experiences become external when one tries to see their meaning from our 
publicly sharable language viz. natural language. So it can be easily 
derived that mental contents are not in the mind (they are external), but we 
can call them intrinsic in some cases, as their agents are the best authority 
on and have immediate access to their concepts, like “I am feeling 
hungry”. 
My third point is that we can identify a difference between Bilgrami’s 
new theory of externalism and my internalistic externalism. Bilgrami 
believes that contents are not determined in a casual way, but every 
determination of contents is public and normative. I would agree with 
Bilgrami only if he used the term necessarily in his thesis. It seems to me 
that it is “not necessary” that all the determinations of our content are 
causally fixed. For instance: “I am personally influenced by Bilgrami’s 
thinking”; in this sentence there is no causal relationship. I am not causally 
influenced by Bilgrami’s thoughts, but rather normatively influenced by 
him. Besides this, I also do not agree with Bilgrami when he tells us that 
there is no exact way in which the causal relations between the concepts of 
an agent and the objects in the world can be established. For Bilgrami, 
“there is no direct way of fastening on the external determinants of 
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concepts”. It seems to me that, though there are causal constraints on 
references, that does not mean that a reference can be reduced to causality. 
Bilgrami commits this mistake. We cannot reduce the concept of reference 
into causality, a relationship that externalists claim exists between words 
and the world.  
Now I will clarify more elaborately and technically the main 
achievements in my reformed externalism. 
First, semantic holism, which naturally fits with semantic externalism, 
mainly concerns how belief states are dependent on each other for having 
their contents fixed. In Quine’s dictum: the meaning of a sentence is 
dependent on the corporate body of sentences. Quine also denies any kind 
of analyticity, as he considers the division between analytic and synthetic 
unintelligible. We can also derive analyticity from “cognitive synonymy”; 
this synonymy can be defined in terms of interchangeability. This is the 
point where I do not agree with semantic holism, especially with Quine. 
For me, semantic holism can mingle with analyticity. In my reformed 
externalism, I have tried to explain that, in a hypothetical formalised 
language, we can say that analytic propositions are immune from revision, 
as the speaker can express his/her logical thought in a formalised 
language. But I am closer to agreeing with Putnam regarding the 
conception that there is a limited notion of analyticity which applies to 
such a trivial case as “all bachelors are unmarried”, and though it is 
philosophically unimportant, an important notion of analyticity depends on 
the “necessity of revisability” and “conceptual truth”. This is the point at 
which my reformed externalism comes into its own, as it claims to explain 
a priority and analyticity along with externalism. As we know, necessity 
and a priority are the main criteria of analytic propositions. It also seems 
to me that reflection, understanding and calculation provide us with non-
empirical knowledge or a priori knowledge. So we find that semantic 
holism can be compatible with analyticity; similarly, internalism and 
externalism can be reconciled. 
Secondly, my internalistic externalism paves the way for the 
“semantic” to enter into phenomenology or “ontology”. In the last chapter, 
I discussed Heidegger’s concept of Dasein or being-in-the-world. I think 
the debate between internalism and externalism is not only a semantic 
problem; we can put it forward in the ontological field. The conceptions of 
self and the world and their interrelationship are common matters in 
“ontology”. Heidegger tried to bring Dasein to the world which was 
bracketed by Husserl. He explicitly stressed that it can be seen 
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phenomenologically that being and the world are related in the structure of 
“being-itself”. Similarly, mind and language are both world-directed, and 
we cannot separate mental content from the physical world, as mental 
content gets its meaning through shareable language in our community. It 
also seems to me that in the cases of non-existent terms like “unicorn”, 
there will be no problem for my reformed externalism, as I believe that 
reference has two parts: direct reference to objects and indirect reference 
to objects. In the case of “unicorn”, if we analyse the concept of unicorn 
then we will find that we can divide it by its description, e.g. “a winged 
horse that can fly”. If we divide this term by description, then we find 
certain external objects are related to the term referentially, like “wing”, 
“horse” etc. So it is credible to argue that it is always possible to 
interconnect mind and world through language. Externalism, in Putnamian 
form, determines the meanings of terms in favour of the physical 
environment, whereas Burge’s externalism is closer to the linguistic 
environment. For physical externalism, the notion of truth conditions plays 
an important role in determining the meanings of referred terms, but for 
Burge, it would be suitable to turn to linguistic use rather than truth 
conditions. The conception of Putnamian meaning cannot be located in the 
head, as the truth conditions of the sentence are sensitive to change in 
regards to the changeability of the agent’s natural environment. My 
attempt here is to look again at the externalist background by supporting 
the causal theory of content and truth conditions. But I fervently believe 
that the processes (which may be truth conditions or linguistic uses) of 
externalism cannot restrict the contribution of the mind. I strongly believe 
that the mind, the world and other people constitute a common circle 
where the mind is related to the world, and we cannot separate mental 
content from the physical world. Mental contents are sometimes directly 
causally related with the world, and sometimes indirectly related with the 
world through descriptions, especially in cases of non-existent conceptual 
terms. I also believe that there are some cases where thoughts are 
supervenient on the physical state of the world, like the cases of gold, 
water etc., but these are not the last words of semantics. 
I would like to support internalism to an extent, but my purpose is to 
bring about a reconciliation in the debate between externalism and 
internalism, in the sense that we need to take mind and meaning as 
embedded, so that they can be linked with causal referential directness to 
the world (an externalist point that I fully accept). But here, we cannot 
reject the role of our conceptual insight, which externalists try to ignore. I 
also believe that the causal history of content is also associated with 
shared language, and what we as language users have achieved by our 
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linguistic skills (the contents) and can share with others. Here, I think that 
what we share (the conception of shareability is an externalist approach) 
actually supervenes on how we are from the skin in (an internalist 
approach)! I have already mentioned that there is no mind in our linguistic 
community which can be detached from the environment; therefore, for 
me, the meaning of a term is not something which is only external; the 
referred term gets its meaning partially from the contribution of the mind 
and obviously partially from the contribution of the world.  
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